Rethinking the Process of Operational Research & Systems Analysis by Tomlinson, R. & Kiss, I.


PERGAMON INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY
of Science, Technology, Engineering and Social Studies
The 1000-volume original paperback library in aid of education,
industrial training and the enjoyment of leisure
Publisher: Robert Maxwell, M.e.
Rethinking the Process of
Operational Research and
Systems Analysis
1'\
(f)~~~ THE PERGAMON TEXTBOOKINSPECTION COPY SERVICE
An Inspection copy of any book published in the Pergamon International Library will
gladly be sent to academic staff without obligation for their consideration for course adoption
or recommendation. Copies may be retained for a period of 60 days from receipt and returned
if not sUitable. When a particular title is adopted or recommended tor adoption for class use
and the recommendation results in a sale of 12 or more copies. the Inspection copy may be
retained with our compliments. The Publishers will be pleased to receive suggestions for
revised editions and new titles to be published in this important International Llbrarv
This book is the second volume in a new international book series
FRONTIERS OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
AND APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
General Editor: Rolfe Tomlinson
The series is aimed at helping practitioners to broaden their subject base
and to advise managers and specialists in related areas of important new
developments in the field.
The scope of the books will be broad and their authorship international.
The subject is interpreted widely to include any scientific, applied, inter-
disciplinary and systems-oriented approach to the study of real-life
decision problems.
Rolfe Tomlinson is Professor of Systems and Operational Research at the
School of Industrial and Business Studies at the University of Warwick,
and is President of the European Association of OR Societies. He was for
many years the Director of Operational Research at the National Coal
Board and was then Area Chairman for Management and Technology at
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis. The series will
reflect his deep belief that scientific systems-oriented research can be of
direct practical use over a much wider range of topics than at present, but
only if the work is problem-oriented and seen as a callaborative effort with
the problem owner.
Volume 1
EDEN, C., JONES, S. & SIMS, D.
Messing about in Problems: An Informal Structured Approach to their
Identification and Management
Volume 3
STAHL, I.
Operational Gaming: An International Approach
Volume 4
KINGSMAN, B.
Raw Materials Purchasing: An Operational Research Approach
A Related Journal
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY"
Published on behalf of the Operational Research Society Limited, London
Editor: Peter Amiry, Department of Engineering Production, University
of Birmingham, PO. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT, England
This journal publishes contributions on any matter relevant to the theory,
practice, history, or methodology of Operational Research or the affairs of
the Society. It is aimed at applications in any field and encourages the
submission of accounts of good, practical case studies illustrating OR in
action; of reviews of the state of development of fields of knowledge
relevant to OR; and of controversial articles on methodology, technique or
professional policy.
.. Free specImen copy sent on request
Rethinking the Process of
Operational Research
and Systems Analysis
Edited by
ROLFE TOMLINSON
University of Warwick, UK
and
ISTVAN KISS
Hungarian Committee for Applied Systems Analysis, Budapest
e
PERGAMON PRESS
OXFORD NEW YORK TORONTO SYDNEY PARIS FRANKFURT
UK
U.S.A.
CANADA
AUSTRALIA
FRANCE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall,
Oxford OX3 OBW, England
Pergamon Press Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park,
Elmsford, New York 10523, U.S.A.
Pergamon Press Canada Ltd., Suite 104,
150 Consumers Rd., Willowdale, Ontario M2J 1P9, Canada
Pergamon Press (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., P.O. Box 544,
Potts Point, N.S.W. 2011, Australia
Pergamon Press SARL, 24 rue des Ecoles,
75240 Paris, Cedex 05, France
Pergamon Press GmbH, Hammerweg 6,
0-6242 Kronberg- Taunus, Federal Republic of Germany
Copyright © 1984 International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced. stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in
any form or by any means: electronic. electrostatic.
magnetic tape. mechanical. photocopying. recording or
otherwise. without permission in writing from the copyright
holders.
First edition 1984
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Rethinking the process of operational research and systems
analysis.
(Frontiers of operational research and applied systems
analysis; v. 2)
1. Operations research-Addresses. essays, lectures.
2. System analysis-Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. Tomlinson, Rolfe C. (Rolfe Cartwright) II. Kiss, Istvan.
III. Series.
T57 .6. R45 1983 003 83-13433
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Rethinking the process of operational research and systems
analysis. -- (Frontiers of operational research and applied
systems analysis)
1. Operations research
I. Tomlinson, Rolfe
II. Kiss, Istvan II. Series
001.4.24 T576
ISBN 0-08-030829-5 (Hardcover)
ISBN 0-08-030830-9 (Flexicover)
Printed in Great Britain by A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd.• Exeter
Preface
Both practitioners and teachers of OR and Applied Systems Analysis have
suffered from the fact that, until the present, the subject has lacked a firm
methodological base. A simple explanation for this is that the subject has its
formal origins in traditional laboratory science, but that its practice lies firmly
in the realm of applied social science. Both supporters and opponents of the
subject have, therefore, tended to define it to suit their own purposes, and
practitioners have, by and large, explained themselves in terms of "this is what
I do". There has been increasing dissatisfaction with this state of affairs and in
recent years a number of researchers and practitioners in different countries
have set out to provide a more rigorous framework for understanding what
the subject is really about; based on successful experience, rather than on
hypothetical ideas as to what the subject should be. This book is the
consequence of a meeting between a distinguished group of such practitioners
and methodologists at a seminar at the International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis in August 1980. They found that there was a substantial
agreement as to how the subject should be described and went away to write
their own personal commentary on this common overview. The papers are
diverse in style and intention-some are intensely practical, others are deeply
philosophical. Together they provide, perhaps for the first time, a coherent,
interlocking, set of ideas which can be considered as the foundations on which
we may describe the subject as a science in 'its own right. Practitioners and
teachers of OR and Systems Analysis will find the book directly useful as well
as intellectually stimulating, and philosophers of science will find much in it
that is relevant to their thinking.
ROLFE TOMLINSON
General Editor
v
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Introduction
This book is the outcome of a seminar held at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in August 1980 under the title" Rethinking
the Process of Systems Analysis". Rather than try to reprod uce what was said
at the seminar, much of which was necessarily ephemeral, the participants felt
that they would like to go away and submit a paper which could be included in
a collaborative volume, which would then truly represent the state of
understanding after the discussions that took place.
The seminar was, in the first place. the result of a common concern that
systems analysis, and its sister disciplines such as operational research, too
often failed to achieve successful implementation because of an incomplete,
and often incorrect. methodology. It was felt that analysts were making
assumptions, sometimes subconsciously, that did not stand up to serious
examination. One such assumption was that the "hard" part of a problem -
which could be expressed in mathematical terms - could usefully be isolated
from the human and organizational elements which could thus be eliminated
from the analysis. Another false assumption was that implementation was an
entirely separate activity from the analysis itself.
Clearly any adequate discussion of these problems demanded the involve-
ment of experts from outside traditional OR/Systems fields. It was a case for
discussion with philosophers and social scientists. It was therefore proposed
to the Director of IIASA that a seminar should be held for invited scientists
interested in developing an improved methodology based on experience and
with a proper philosophical basis. The participants would be from a range of
countries and with different professional and academic backgrounds. IIASA
was already undertaking studies in the methodology of OR. and a Handbook
of Systems Analysis is being developed under the editorship of Ed Quade and
H ugh Miser. This seminar seemed a llseful adjunct to that activity and
approval was given accordingly.
Something should be said immediately about the subject of the seminar. At
IIASA it is called Applied Systems Analysis, many (particularly in the UK)
call it Operational Research, some Systems Analysis, and some simply
Analysis. To others, each of those names can mean something quite different.
To meet this problem. Rolfe Tomlinson had coined the word ORASA, which
xi
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is frequently used in the book, but the confusion of names is likely to persist
and we have not attempted to force a single name on our authors. The form
and purpose of the activity is, however, not in question. It is the
interdisciplinary, scientific, systemic study of problems and of decision-
making processes, undertaken, with a view to their solution and/or
improvement. Some simply call it "seientific problem solving". Throughout
the book the term "systems analyst" is lIsed within this sense and not, of
course, as it is in the west, to describe someone working in commercial data
processing. Sixteen persons from 8 countries attended the seminar, and some
additional observers from II ASA's staff attended from time to time. Their
initial training had been in many different disciplines; philosophers, social
anthropologists, psychoanalysts and sociologists rubbed shoulders with
"hard" economists and mathematicians. All had some experience of systems
analysis and had written. or at least thought, extensively about it.
The meeting lasted one week and was structured with formal sessions in the
mornings, and the afternoons were left free for informal discussion. All
discussants had the chance to make a short presentation of their ideas if they
wished, and were invited to suggest reading material from published papers,
etc. Only two formal papers prepared especially for the seminar were
circulated in advance of the meeting. One, from Istvan Kiss and J6zsef
Kindler, set out the basic dilemma which we needed to discuss. The other, by
Janos Farkas, discussed the philosophical background.
From the eager way in which the distinguished contributors accepted the
invitation we had good reason to believe that the discussions would be
committed and lively. No one had guessed how stimulating they would prove
to be, nor that, despite underlying differences of approach that were
fundamentally at variance, there would be almost total agreement in
diagnosis. It was agreed that there was a malaise, crisis, in the formulations of
the subject. and there was a consensus regarding the elements needed to be
included in any adequate description of adequate ORASA. It made no
difference whether the foundation for concern had been empirical or
philosophical the outcome was the same. The traditional reductionist
approach to analysis, developed from laboratory science, was quite in-
appropriate. We needed to talk in terms of intervention, action research, in
which the scientist's separation between observation and observer was as
inappropriate as it is unachievable. Concepts such as optimization need to be
alkn:d to "change for the better" etc, etc. The seminar felt that we were now in
a strong position to establish a "true" systems philosophy, which could
provide a basis for adequate training for practitioners and development of the
subject.
In view of the consensus. it is perhaps not surprising that all but two of the
participants accepted our invitation to present a paper for inclusion in this
volume, and that all but one of these are specially written for the purpose. In
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the truest sense we believe them to represent the state-of-the-art, which will
enable that art to extend its many successes and reduce its failures. No
individual paper, except perhaps the last, attempts to provide a compre-
hensive overview. But together they provide a rich, many-faceted, consistent
picture of an important activity for social progress. Apart from the first and
last papers we could find no logical system for grouping the individual
contributions and have therefore set them out alphabetically by author.
One problem that we encountered was the question of language. The
meeting was in English, and we felt that to reach the widest possible audience
the papers should also be in English. But many of the ideas and concepts
developed in French, Hungarian or Russian do not easily translate into
English. We decided to "help" individual authors so that each paper would be
understood by an English-speaking audience, but not to "translate" into an
English that might be grammatically correct, but might distort the ideas that
are being put forward.
Finally, the editors would like to record their thanks to those whose
particular efforts have made this volume possible. In particular we are grateful
to Phil Ratoosh, Director of the Wright Institute and Professor of Psychology
at the State University of San Francisco. In the course of a sabbatical period at
IIASA Phil played a leading part in the planning and organization of the
seminar, of which he was an active participant. He took part in the early stages
of the editorial process and it is unfortunate that administrative difficulties
made it impossible for him to continue in this role. As a psychoanalyst who
previously worked as a management scientist his contribution was invaluable
and we are most grateful. We would like to thank the other participants at the
seminar who have not written papers for this volume particularly Sven
Persson, of Sweden, and Michael Thompson, lIASA - for their share in the
success of the seminar. Finally, we should thank Hugh Miser, lately Director
of Publications at IIASA, for his support and encouragement in the
preparation of the volume.
ISTY AN KISS
ROLFE TOMLINSON
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Future Methodology Based on
Past Assumptions?
JOZSEF KINDLER and ISTVAN KISS
I. ON THE METHODOLOGY - THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
One of the most important developments of applied science in the last 20
years has been the increasing attention that has been given to the study of
complexity. This approach has been a radical departure from traditional
methods of scientific enquiry since it has not been concerned with the
reductional approach of segregating a problem into its constituent elements
and analysing them separately but with the process of putting related elements
together and analysing their integrated effect. In connection with this, then,
has been the formal development of systems theory as well as methodological
developments associated with systems-based sciences devoted to complex
problems, such as systems engineering, systems analysis, action research,
evaluation research, etc.
These theories and methodologies demand from us a changed attitude. The
essence of this is well characterized by the lecture on the fundamentals of
methodology in systems analysis given by Gvishiani (in Obninsk, 1978; Kelle,
1979): '"The first methodological starting principle of systems analysis could
be characterized as the idea or the organic unity or the subjective and t!le
ohjcctive aspects Il'ithin a system. It is typical of systems analysis to modify
definitely the traditional. subjective-objective relation. In this respect. systems
analysis differs from the traditional acquaintance with nature where the object
is rather rigidly demarcated from the subject." (Gvishiani, 1978)
Exactly the same concept was expressed by Cavallo in the Preface of a
report dealing with the first 25 years of the international systems movement,
which is a moderate and un biassed survey, prepared in the course of2 years of
international cooperation. (Cavallo, 1979) In his opinion the basic question is:
docs science accept that man is an inseparable part of the essential problems of
today? This idea however entails a new attitude; therefore we have to study
how systems approach can affect the treatment of that complexity, of which
man is a part, and whether this attitude contributes to the spreading of our
I
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information and to the development of our capacity for collaborating with the
world.
Ackolr has called the second half of our century the Systems Axe, This
deviates from analytic thinking, reductionism and the determinism of the
Machine Age. and is featured by synthetic thinking. cxpansionism and
objective teleology, Forming this new attitude demands a new paradigm and
here a quotaiion from Martin is relevant: "those people heavily involved in
systems endeavors are up to their necks in grappling with the present shift in
world-views", (Martin. 1978)
But what kind of means arc being employed in developing this new attitude?
Boulding. one of the founders of the systems movement, elaims that general
systems research is a "level of theoretical model-building which lies somewhat
between the highly-gencralized constructions of pure mathematics and the
specific theories of the specialized disciplines", (Boulding, 1956) This may be
misinterpreted in two different ways and the following 25 years havc produccd
examples for both kinds of misunderstanding, On the onc hand. it suggests
that systems theory only produces theoretical constructions which have no
connection with practice: on the other. that on account of its abstraet nature it
works exclusively with mathematical means. There are series of examples to
contradict the former, e.g, the methodologies based on the systems approach
like systems engineering and operational research. or the manifold appli-
ca t ions of systems analysis. As for the la Iter misinterpretation, this may have
been due to the fact that some representatives of mathematical systems theory
regarded their own work as exclusively systems research and they stressed it
accordingly. Essentially the "traditional scientific criterion" seems to verify
the latta misconception too. namely: only that which is scientific which can be
formalized, and formal description can only be given by means of
ma thema tics,
Similar criticism has been expressed by Blauberg-Sadovsky-Yudin:
onL' 01" the reasons why several versions 01" general syskms theory arc limited is that
thL"e eoneq-,tions emrhasize formal. mathematical problems in describing systcms,
w herea' the cLlIllent basiL' in this theory has not ycl been sullicicntly workcd out.··
(HI'lubLTg Sadmsky Yudin, 1969)
The other extreme viewpoint developed in connection with mathematies is
orten overem phasized:
"It " "ne thing to caricature a narrow-minded mathematical approach which would
\ iL'" a rarticular mathcmatical and or Ljuantitativc structure as IIii' rel/filL Howcvcr it is
Ljuitc anolhL'r 11111 to recognizc that mathematics and logic represent high points in the
aehiL'vemL'nt 01" our collective intellect. and that it is not thc usc 01" such achievements but
their abuse which is unwarranted and dangerous." (Klir. 1979)
In systems research the choice oft he tools has a double role: it helps to point
out the limited applicability of tools under given conditions, and it calls
attention to new non-mathematical but scientific tools for them to be
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developed and applied. The synthesizing feature of systems theory is indicated
by the striving for integration of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
descriptions, problem solutions. There are definitions for a complex system to
be one which may be analysed more than one way. (Rosen, 1979) According to
Klir who represents mathematical system theory: "Within general systems
research, the tools for solving the problem are of secondary importance" and
"The tools need not be only mathematical in nature, but may consist of a
combination of mathematical, computational, heuristic, experimental or any
other desirable aspects." (Klir, 1979) The interdisciplinary feature of the
systems approach finds expression in the wide range of investigational
approaches and of the tools employed.
It is due to the introduction of systems thinking that the systems approach
and its methodologies developed in the fifties, that is in the realization; for old
problems new methods were developed, even if within a traditional branch of
science. This enabled the recognition and definition of newer problems, and a
new language for communication belonging to them evolved, which made it
possible for representatives of problem areas previously treated as unrelated
to think in common, that common thinking which is indispensible when
dealing with such complex phenomena of which the recognizer and the
resolver of the problem is a part. Thereupon, one of the important functions of
systems research has been to remotivate consideration of concepts which.
although left out, are widely recognized as needing to be grappled with.
(Cavallo, 1979) It is especially interesting. that it was the methodological
trends of the systems approach which created the situation in which numerous
tools had earlier been employed whose usage began to be questioned. Itwas
this experience in application which induced the heated arguments. Further.
reinterpretation of concepts previously regarded as common in scientific
practice, the investigation of the relation between theory and practice, and
science and its application in a new correlation are being carried out. Why this
change? Because instead of the traditional client-analyst relationship,
participative problem solving is coming to the forefront; because the
resolution of the conflict between the "ideal" concepts of rationality and
optimality and the "practical" impossibilities. demands new methods and
replenishing the old concepts with new contents.
What therefore is the cause of the debates and what the content? Why is it
necessary to redefine certain concepts. and to replace others by new ones? And
finally why did the argument over methodologies become more intensive') Let
us start with the last question.
Systems engineering, systems analysis and finally, but not least. operational
research belong to the group of methodologies which an: applying systems
approach. These methodologies are used in decision analysis in technical.
economic. social. political fields as well as in planning, management etc. where
they lead to a sequence of procedures like identifying and weighing the
4 1Ii::se( Kindler and IS(I'Qn Kiss
obj~ctiv~s, generating and comparing alternatives, implementation etc. In the
cours~ of using the procedures, the usefulness of the applied tools, and their
suitability, b~com~s obvious sooner or later as in the majority of cases real
probkms demand concrete solutions. It is just the applications which created
a n~w situation and new problems, and mainly in those countries where these
m~thods w~re developed and first applied. In this connection we ha ve to form
an opinion on the current problems of operational research and systems
analysis.
Th~ situation in the field of operational research and management science
may be review~d in terms of the sarcastic lecture by the mathematician R. E.
D. Woolsey at the 1978 IFORS Conference. (It should be remarked that the
I~ctur~s at the plenary session of the conference were devoted to the basic
problems of OR/MS and systems analysis experiences of the past, to the
pr~s~nt problems and to the possible evolution of the future.)
"OR; MS had a utilitarian beginning, when the primary aim was to 'solve
probkms'. This was probably the golden age of utility and acceptance of
OR/MS. Rapidly ... the tool makers dominated the profession. There is now
a countcrr~vol ution against the tool makers being carried on by the tool users.
W~ tool us~rs have no illusions that we can live without the tool makers. We
just r~aliz~ that w~ have told them that their tools were unsatisfactory with no
result." Today two apparently opposite viewpoints prevail: "The first totally
committed to utility and elegance, the second committed to sophistication and
the !lo/Jeofutility." The two viewpoints do not always have to be in harmony,
but only th~ two together can provide good solutions for a long time in terms
of Woolsey. (Woolsey, 1978)
Other signs also point to the fact that the future ofoperational research, and
at the same time the future of the application of mathematics to management,
organizational and social sciences. lies not in the further refinement of the
mathematical models but in the transformation of the working style (and this
essentially impli~s a return to the inter-disciplinary team work in the heroic
age of operational rcs~arch).
It is significant, thaI the papers at the Soviet conference on systems analysis
in 1978 in Obninsk w~r~ on exactly Ihe same theme. (Obninsk, 1978; Kelle,
1979) They ~l1lphasized that compkx social and economic problems -
dilkr~nt Irom Ihose of simple technical ones - do not allow optimal solutions,
and malh~malical models are only approximations which do not so much
provid~ solUlions as help 10 put up good questions. The papers stress those
solutions in which ther~ arc conflicting objectives or several criteria. when no
singk individual makes a decision except on the basis of values of the groups.
The work of the All-Union Institute ofSyst~msResearch in Moscow is also
mnarkabk from Ihis poinl of view. They are developing interactive decision
procedures or such models as avoid the separation between decision-makers
and op~rational researcher/systems analyst. (Larichev, 1979) With the
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methods developed, they wish to ensure that the model analysing decision
should serve not the modeller but the decision-maker. It is on account of this
that Lapin emphasizes that systems analysis cannot be reduced to certain
formalized methods. (Lapin, 1979) Actually over-formalization explains that
in the United States, 20'%; of the decisions on major programs are based on
such "scientific" methods of analysis.
As was shown in examples from the USA and USSR, and the list may be
extended, there are problems in using scientific methodologies. It is evident,
therefore, that there is contradiction between the exact methods of systems
analysis and the decision-making in practice. What is the cause of this
con tradiction?
The significance of the methods in scientific research is well known. It is also
known that the approach in certain scientific branches, as well as the uncritical
acceptance of methods, has caused many disturbances to this day, in areas
where they have been accepted mechanically. (For example the mechanical
application of approaching the social phenomenon in a natural science way,
like organizational research, has in many respects led to a dead-end.) At the
same time, it is also true that certain methods which were worked out in other
fields can be successfully applied in phenomena spheres deviating from the
original. "Borrowing" methods is absolutely necessary in the research of new
areas which do not dispose of appropriate methods to fit the nature of their
particular subject. Criticism. checking of the assumptions. and investigation
of the validity however are indispensible.
In scientific papers, but also in the daily newspapers, there are an increasing
number of reports which regard the traditional method of natural science and
technological approach as inadequate - on account of negative experiences
for solving different organizational, management and social problems. The
modelling techniques which have become so widespread in the last 20 30
years are being especially criticized. The basie phenomenon is as follows: the
scientific proposals for solution arc made with a large amount of technical
apparatus (formal models. computers) mainly as recommendations of an
external body. and the results are never implemented. The phenomenon is
repeated much too regularly. and could be explained by the unsuitability of
the leaders of the organizations involved.
[t can also be established as a fact. that sueh undesirable consequences ean
be attributed to the distorting method of approach. in which ideal
presuppositions are made referring to man and his society. [n conceiving the
problem, it is common to exclude - on grounds of "scientific objectivity"
questions of interests. and problems of the value system. although these are
fundamental in identifying the problem as well as in its solution.
As it is obvious that scientific information on man and his soeiety belongs to
social sciences (according to the traditional classification) it is therefore not
surprising that the role and significance of social sciences are growing
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throughout the world. With the growth of the role of social sciences, for
instance, we need to review our concepts of rational behaviour of human
beings in organizations.
This is why the investigation of the fJ!"rsuppositio/ls have a special role, since
every modelling procedure is based on assumptions.
2. ON THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PRESENT METHODOLOGY
It may be useful at the start, and perhaps as a frame of reference, to reveal
and define the assumptions relating to the problem. In all the material
distributed at the seminar, there was some ki/ld oj'{Jrohlr/ll, as in Churchman,
I!/(' .\T.\leIllS l/ii/lki/lg {Jrohlelll, with Majone the {Jrohlr/ll oj' pitfalls, in
Tomlinson m;sco/lCL'{JI;O/lS, in Blauberg-Sadovsky the problem of the
!Juwdo.Yex. However it had not been established just what the fundamental
prohli'1Il was, the genus proximum. Without this, as a consequence of the
deviating interpretations functioning as concealed assumptions in the course
of the discussion, new pitfalls, misconceptions would be generated. Bartee's
understanding of the problem seems to be acceptable for us and this
assumption of ours will now be made explicit.
.. ;\ I'/'{JI>!('III i, delinL'd here as an unsatisfied need to change a perceived present situation
to a perL'L'jIL'd de,irL'd ,ilu"tion. A wllllio/l to a problem is realized when the perceived
present ;"HI de,ired situations arc perceived to be the Same. Proh/ell/ .",tring is the activity
"''''L'ialcd \lith the change 01" a problem state to a solution state." (Barke, 1973)
We think that this understanding of the problem and the problem solution
is in harmony with, on the one hand, our experiences; on the other, it actually
belongs to the Popper-like second world described by Majone:
"POppLT dlstingui,hes three 'worlds' or kvcls ol"rL'ality: first the world ol"physieal objects
"nd physical 'tates. ,econd. thL' world ol"mental states, ol"subjective preferences and beliefs:
"nd third. a world 01" objective structures that "re produced by human minds but which,
\)[KL' pwduced. exist imkpenlkntly 01" them (theories, "rtistic creation, and styles, norms,
IIlstituliol1S. probkm ,itu"tion, critical argumL'nts). This 'World 3' is autonomous I"rom the
other 1\1 0 kl cI, lll" reality. though it is rehllcd to them by a number ol"links "nd fecdbaeks."
I Ma.lOnL'. IlJXO)
It is hard to believe therefore that in relation to our topic there are some in
the Ea~t and the West who do not perceive any problems in connection with
systems analysis because they arc satisfied with the present situation and so
they have no problems, subject preferences, and beliefs: their second world of
Popper rdlects everything as being in order.
For most of us, however, the situation is problematical or unsatisfactory
and our motivation can be expressed by the title of the final chapter in this
book, written by Tomlinson: "Doing something about the future" (Tomlin-
~on, IlJXO).
This i~ like saying that all of us judge the situation to be problematic,
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However it is not certain that we view the differences between the present and
the desired situation, or the seriousness of the problem, in the same way. In
fact when sketching the desired situation our standpoints may be varied. The
fundamental problem may be expressed in the words of Susman and Evered in
connection with a crisis in organizational science:
"The principal symptom of this crisis is that our research methods and
techniques have become less useful for solving the practical problems that
members of organizations face" (Susman-Evered, 1978).
In other words Blauberg-Sadovsky-Yudin also criticize abstract con-
siderations isolated from real system investigation:
"'This gap between the level of abstraction and that of concrete investigation is generally
characteristic of the present state of systemic elaboration. and it inhibits the development of
this work as a whole." (Blauberg-Sadovsky- Yudin, 1969)
Based on the previous statements, it may be possible that some of us regard
the word "crisis" as an overstatement, claiming that the situation is not so
serious. However, what we can be sure of, is that wc all agree that there is a
greater difference between theory and practice than in the acceptable and
unavoidable. If we judge this well, this implies the essence and focal problem
of our discussion. But what procedure is to be followed at the very beginning
of inquiry?
Four possible relevant answers can be found in the history of thinking:
Francis Bacon: One must proceed purely inductively, putting all precon-
ceived ideas, or Idols, aside.
Rene Descartes: One's procedure is purely rationalistic. One intellectually
doubts everything which can possibly be doubted and then, from the
indubitable minimum which remains, one deduces the remainder of one's
knowledge.
Morris Cohen: Starting with the problem which initiates inquiry, coupled
with scepticism with respect to traditional beliefs, one pursues hypotheses,
testing them by the method of trial and error.
John Dewey: Since inquiry begins with a problematic situation, one must
first observe the determinate facts, together with the indeterminate un-
certainties of the situation, to suggest hypotheses respecting the possible
resolution of its problematic character. These hypotheses in turn must be
pursued to their deductive consequences and thereby checked operationally.
(from Northrop, 1947)
In this way our discussion became a secondary decision problem for the
methodology question. However this raises a host of questions. What for
example do we regard as "facts", what as uncertainties?
"The potential for chaos in such a system is great. but it does not need to
occur because every problem has a storehouse of knowledge and standards by
which selection takes place. There is a simple control on the mechanism: the
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human mind, unable to tolerate chaos, moves inevitably to decrease the
number of options and focus on something from which it can reason and test.
Although an infinite number of claims might emerge on a single problem, they
will not. Only a limited number will and soon one will be the focus, however
kmporarily. This characteristic of human thought is a wonderful thing and it
shortens our work in finding solutions enormously, but it has its dangers. The
mind may be attracted to easy claims that seem to solve problems but which
have grave conseq uences." (Rieke Sillars, 1975)
This excerpt is from a book on argumentation and decision-making and
confirms Bartee's understanding of the nature of the problem whilst, at the
same time emphasizing the tremendous significance of argumentation. This
and the role of persuasion is accentuated by Majone too. "The question is not
whether analysts should use persuasion in proposing new policy ideas, but
which forms of persuasion may be used effectively and without violating basic
principles of professional ethics." (Majone, 1980) If we accept this then there
will be a double consequence of our present discussion. Firstly our present
discussion is audience-centred; secondly the results - if there will be such - will
have to take this into consideration in oral or written presentations.
Now what arc considered to be facts and just what presumptions values and
value systems our authors have can only be known from background material
and from their other work and may be quite fragmentary. It may be supposed
on the basis of this, that in recognizing the problem and diagnosing it, there
will be many common features especially with respect to facts. However - and
there arc subtle causes for this - a diversity of opinion is characteristic. It is
even more likely that in relation to the method of the solution - in which not
only the deviating assumptions but the conditions anticipated by the
participants, as well as the difference in values and \'alue systems, have a major
role a much greater plurality is to be expected than in the former. This
howcvcr. if we accept the principle of the dialectic approach proposed by
Churchman or Mitroff, is no trouble. But while we consider the dialectic
approach to be an cxcellent method for revealing the concealed assumptions,
we can, with rcspect, imaginc several solutions to solving the problem. In
other words, it is not at all certain that with respect to the method of solution,
a uniform standpoint can be worked out. We are therefore inclined to agree
with the arguments of Van Gigch who, in his inspiring work published in 1976
(Planning jiJr Freedo/ll) propounded that "different kinds of planning spell
diffcrcnt kinds of freedom(s). The planning paradigm consists of an
'assumptions-condit ions-opportunities' triad by which the types of freedom
prcvailing in a system are determined. Due to the disparity among the
elcmcnts of thc triad from system to system, it is difficult to make intersystem
comparisons of the amount of freedom which obtain."
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3. TOWARDS A SOLUTION·
The authors of these chapters certainly accept as a fact that, for example,
the differences between Eastern and Western countries are not negligible. One
Marxist principle about using concrete methods appropriate for different
objects or systems has often been violated in the West by regarding certain
procedures as generally acceptable, and by using pre-fabricated models to
treat any object or system; the same approach has often caused difficulties in
the socialist countries too. All this applies to concrete methods and procedures
(namely to the tactical level of the methods) but does not imply that the
methodology policy (and strategy) at greater depth, and built on more
abstract assumptions and of much wider validity, could not be worked out. It
is clear, however, that at this level we have to accept a more philosophical
mode of discussion, although there are quite a few who regard this as empty
speculation; in fact the positivists smell in it a brand of new metaphysics. The
suspicion of the positivists has not been mentioned accidentally. It is precisely
in this area that the more serious methodological pitfalls of the more subtle
assumptions are concealed.
Majone mentions the burdens of the heritage of scientific method: "The
received view on scientific method, which in one form or another has
dominated the philosophy of science from the 1920s to the 1950s, has by now
only historical interest for the specialists but it is still accepted by many
researchers as a general scientific ideology. In particular, the influence of
logical positivism - a key component of the received view - has been felt
throughout the social and behavioral sciences, and nowhere more strongly
than in the study of decision-making." (Majone, 1980)
As the close connection between systems analysis and decision-making is
well known and since "during the past decade, the focus of research on system
theory and systems analysis has shifted towards the analysis of large-scale
systems in which human judgement, perception and emotions play an
important role" therefore either on the basis of the interdisciplinary principle
or on the dialectic approach method we have to take into account the large-
scale systems inherently containing the human element, or the standpoint of
the researchers in their organizations. But the positivist approach is not
appropriate - from the marxist viewpoint either - for solving organizational
or even social problems. We agree with Susman and Evered's claim in that
"what appears at first to be a crisis of relevancy or usefulness of organizational
science is, we feel, really a crisis of epistemology. This crisis has risen, because
organizational researchers have taken the positivist model of science, which
has had great heuristic value for the physical and biological sciences and some
field of the social sciences, and have adopted it as the ultimate model of what is
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best for organizational science. By limiting its methods to what it claims is
value-free, logical, and empirical, the positivist model of science, when applied
to organizations, produces a knowledge that may only inadvertently serve
and sometimes undermine the values of organizational members."
(Susman-Evered)
The term positivist science is used for all approaches to science that consider
scientific knowledge to be obtainable from only sense data that can be directly
experienced and verified among independent observers.
We are primarily concerned with the assumptions lying beyond the
positivist approach methods. All positivist approaches to science (P.S.) are
deficient in their capacity for generating knowledge for use by members of
organizations for solving problems they face. The following arguments
explain this deficiency.
"P.S. assumes that its methods are value neutral", but "knowledge and
human interests are interwoven, as reflected in the choice of methods and the
ends towards which such methods are put".
"P.S. treats persons as objects of inquiry, even though they are subjects or
initiators of action in their own right."
"P.S. eliminates the role of history in the generation of knowledge.
Individuals and organizations are not born in an instant with their present
str~ctures and functions intact. Rather, present patterns of behavior can
many times only be understood as the product of shared definitions held by
organizational members regarding what their common endeavor is about."
"P.S. assumes that a system is defined only to the extent that a denotative
language exists to describe it. However, any representational system is always
less than the actual system leaving the practising manager to rely on intuition,
hunch, interpretation, etc. P.S. generally acknowledges that such methods can
be precursors to scientific knowledge, but it does not consider them by
themselves to be legitimate scientific methods."
"P.S. is itself a product of the human mind, thus knowledge of the inquirer
cannot be excluded from an understanding of how knowledge is generated."
(Susman-Evered)
It is not difficult to realize that with this elucidation we have come closer to
the roots, although in contrast with this some would acknowledge John Stuart
Mill's viewpoint. He claimed that "the relations of the basic principles and
science are not like the comparison between the foundations and the house
built on it, but that of the roots and the tree. The roots fulfil their task perfectly
even if it is not dug down to bring them to the daylight." (Mill, 1863)
In our case, however, we had to dig down to the roots, because as it emerged
from the description, the positivist roots in contrast with the physical sciences
did not fulfil their role. As Checkland remarks: 'The positivist methods of
science applied to the physical regularities of the universe are not problemati-
cal. However, the question as to whether social phenomena may be
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investigated by the methods of science is highly problematical. Is 'social
science' science? It is a live issue.... 'Systems Analysis' of the Rand
Corporation variety, 'Systems Engineering' and most of the 'Operational
Research' studies which get reported are positivistic in this issue.
"All these approaches have severe limitations on the face of the rich
complexity of the real world and in the last decade 'Soft systems methodology'
has emerged as part of the struggle to respond to these problems."
(Checkland, 1979)
We consider that the theoretical and practical deficiencies in the claims of
Churchman, Majone, Tomlinson, Boothroyd, Blauberg-Sadovsky, Farkas
and others in applied systems sciences, looking at their roots, may be also
traced back to the unsatisfactory positivist approach method.
If this is so, then essentially two policies may be worked out to avoid the
consequences of the deficiencies. One is of the type "Beware of the pitfalls" or
warning that in the course of systems analysis, systems research, what kind of
pitfalls can be counted on. This kind of methodological policy is somewhat
frightening. The question is however, whether it is worthwhile to proceed on
such a path where there are so many pitfalls? There is only a little chance that
however carefully we proceed we are bound to fall into one or another pitfall.
As another alternate policy some kind of new approach is necessary.
4. ON A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO BE MORE "SCIENTIFIC"
Among the a uthors of this book there seems to be a surprising essential
agreement on the key term of "action" in the new approach. That this
approach, built on what many call action research, radically deviates from the
traditional approach is well reflected by Tomlinson (1980).
In this chapter, as in that written by Checkland, a subtle assumption is
disclosed: namely, the norm, or perhaps the myth, of scientism. The excellent
Soviet mathematician Ju. Srejder's remark is most fitting; that is, if today we
call something "scientific" this just about means the same as when it was said
in the Middle Ages "according to the teaching of the Church"; that is, it
suggests infallibility, an aura of a convincing power and certainty. Therefore
the adjective "scientific" has the same laudatory connotation as, according to
Majone. the term "analysis" has.
If we accept this characterization then it already appears that there are
certain contradictions. Miser, Majone, Tomlinson and others. as well as
scientists from the socialist countries (Gvishiani, Blauberg) stress tha t there is
a living, successful. activity which is not, or only sporadically. reflected in the
literature.
At the same time this successful activity whether we call it action research
or something else is pre-scientific and "has developed through personal
experience and intuition". This is called "craft" in systems analysis. The
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dilemma is therefore the following: there is successful activity - in our case
"the craft of systems analysis" - but this is not "scientific"; the scientific
<Ipproach (for example current operational research) is not succes.~ful. It
should however be just the opposite: we ought to prefer the scientific
approach. because it is more useful and successful. To solve the dilemma two
alternatives arc available. One of these was conceived by Atkinson and is that
"one must grasp the fundamental difference between the practical-problem
oric/ltatio/l and hasic-sciencc orientation which exists in all fields of scientific
endeavor.
"When practical-prohlem orientation prevails, the matters considered are
always matters of obvious social significance. It is, in fact, the immediate
social importance ofa problem which defines the need for empirical, trial-and-
check efforts to find solutions.... The guiding intention of technological
research on these matters is efficient solution of the immediate problem.
.. Basic-science orientation is different. Here the intention is to contribute to
the growth of a conceptual scheme which will account for some phenomenon
more adequately than does the conventional wisdom (common sense) of the
time. The conceptual analysis of a general problem leads to interest in some
events that may appear very trivial when evaluated in terms of social
importance.
"The intention of basic research is to contribute to the growth of a
conceptual scheme and that the significance of solving some immediate
empirical problem is to be evaluated solely in terms of the degree to which the
solution does or does not contribute in some way to the enhancement of
fundamental knowledge about the phenomena being studied." (Atkinson,
1964)
In our opinion, however, the other alternative is more appropriate.
According to this view the criteria of being scientific have developed on the
basis of natural sciences. So the "covering law" idea may be found in
Atkinson's characterization tool. "Covering law is the term which Hempel
(1965) a leading contemporary philosopher of the formalist school, applied to
a general law which explains a particular case by 'covering' or subsuming it.
Covering laws are the basis for the only two kinds ofexplanation that Hempel
considered as meriting the label of being scientific, that is the deductive-
nomological and the inductive statistical forms." (Susman-Evered. 1978)
If we consider the norms of positivist science as the yardstick, then we may
regard action research as unscientific. This was the conclusion that Susman
and Evered reached too: "We find that action research is not compatible with
the criteria for scientific explanation as established by positivist science.
Hempel's covering-law model ofexplanation would not grant action research
the stat us of a valid sciencc. However in action research the ultimate sanction
is in the perceived functionality of chosen actions to produce desirable
consequences for an organization." Susman and Evered accentuate the
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philosophical viewpoints of action research, underlying that "While ad-
herents of positivist science can cite several philosophical viewpoints as a
foundation for legitimating its methods, action researchers can do the same
with different philosophical viewpoints."
Some of the viewpoints will be enumerated in the form of key-words only;
praxis, hermeneutics, existentialism, process philosophies and phenome-
nology.
Some of these are considered especially important on account of the lines
represented here.
I. Praxis, which refers to the art of acting upon the conditions one faces in
order to change them. Its significance has to be pointed out, since from a
marxist point of view it was one of the basic focal thoughts of Marx as in his
often quoted thesis: "The philosophers interpreted the world in different ways;
the task is to change that." ("Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden
interpretiert es kommt an, sie zu verandern." These iiber Feuerbach)
2. The hermeneutic viewpoint of action research is connected by two
threads to the background material. On the one hand in respect of the
presupposition (Mitroff, 1979) "the idea of the hermeneutical circle is that no
knowledge is possible without presuppositions", on the other in respect of
holistic interpretation (systems thinking). As Churchman has said, "In the
social sciences, the hermeneutical circle takes the form of attempting an initial
holistic understanding ofa social system and then using this understanding as
a basis for interpreting the parts of the system. Knowledge is gained
dialectically by proceeding from the whole to its parts and then back again....
The hermeneutical tradition strengthens the action researcher's methodologi-
cal position by forewarning him that his interpretations of a social system will
never be exactly the same as held by the members of the social system. This
provides the action researcher with a base for understanding his own
preconceptions better and by contrast those held by system members, and also
allows him to see possible sol utions not seen by system members."
(Churchman, 1968)
3. In Checkland's opinion the point of a soft systems methodology is
Husserlian phenomenology. "Developed experimentally, this approach (i.e.
soft systems methodology) turns out to be based in the alternative tradition of
social science, that of Husserlian phenomenology." (Checkland, 1979)
4. Action research has much in common with existentialism. Both arose
out of concern with limitations of rationalistic science, both assert the
importance of human choice and human values, both are keyed to the
importance of human action, and both avoid giving traditional causal
explanations of human actions.
We can see therefore that action research may be based on philosophical
theories, though doubtless these digress from the theory based on positivist
methodology. If we wished to reply to Checkland's question of whether social
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science is a science, then our answer would be "yes", but not in the traditional
positivist sense and its criteria have still to be worked out, of course, not on
traditional positivist bases. The question may be asked: Is there any need for
this at all? The answer is rather simple because "science" and "scientific" are
"good" words, that is their connotation is positive and will remain so for a
long time. This has to be taken into consideration, if we wish to view systems
analysis and systems research in an "audience-centred" way and this in our
opinion, on account of their function, is almost necessary.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
After surveying the application of the different methodologies based on
systems thinking we could find quite a lot of contradictions in their usage.
From one point of view this could be judged as the dead end of these
methodologies: but from another - and from our viewpoint as well - it means
the source of further development, that is the condition of improving these
methodologies. (Gvishiani, 1979)
In the current Soviet yearbook ofSystems Research there are several papers
dealing with the philosophical side of the subject. Even more significantly the
subtitle of the yearbook is: Methodological Problems. One of the papers is
entitled: Sr.l'tems unulrsis. as a program/f)r scientific research. (Nappelbaum,
1980) I nstead of forecasting which would be extremely difficult in this phase
of evolution. because we are now at a breaking point in it Nappelbaum
claims considering tendencies. raising questions for creating conceptions. It is
necessary hecause the methodologies are currently under change, and this is
why they arc becoming the immediate subject of research. What is the reason
for this process? All of these methodologies - cybernetics. operational
research current the day before yesterday, management science yesterday, and
systems analysis today were developed for social demands. The wave of
events lifted systems analysis to the highest position among the methodo-
logies, and now its or any other methodology's- shift from this position
depends on how the given methodology fulfils those social demands which
created them.
One of the main features of a systems analyst is the higher sensitivity of
information. Considering this sensitivity, the systems analysts have to realize
that the facts on the surface are only syndromatic signs of a problem but they
need diagnosis. have to he reconsidered with respect to the primary
information to be able to improve the methodologies, but at the same time,
they cannot wait for the development of a more scientific background. This
will be developed by providing systems analyses. during which they have to
apply their craft knowledge. But in doing so emphasizes Nappelbaum -
never forget the cardinal feature of systems research, that it is "action-
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oriented" because of the human beings involved iIi all of the systems
investigated or treated by systems approach.
From the methodological point of view systems analysis in its present form
can be regarded as a subset of special methodologies. That is to say systems
analysis is one version of systems approach .
.. Methodology in general is regarded as a branch of philosophy, and might
be deemed to compromise all philosophic mathematical and scientific
methods. In contrast to this sum-total of all rational ways of pursuing
knowledge there are special methodologies which emerge either out of needs
of specific disciplines or out of a specific attitude towards reality. The systems
approach seems to be such a special methodology rather than a new science or
superscience. In particular it is a methodology which grows out of a holistic
view, and thus not bound to a single discipline or a limited number of them.
The holistic view is no novelty but requires the acceptance of certain basic
assumptions." (Mattessich, 1979) Regarding the systems-oriented methodo-
logies, the more basic assumptions are considered the deeper is the foundation
of the methodology. This is why systems methodologies emancipate "thought
from traditional schemata, which hindered the posing and solving of new
problems of cognition. The emancipation is more effective the deeper its
methodological core is perceived." (Blauberg-Sadovsky-Yudin. 1969)
The present day systems analysis has a traditional schemata as well. This
traditional line of systems analysis has laid great stress on analysis having used
mostly analytical methods and procedures which have been based on
positivistic assumptions. In this sense systems analysis has been not so much
systems analysis as systematic analysis and because of this strongly marked
feature its scope ofapplication has been curtailed to systems "free from man".
Attempts to enlarge this narrow approach to organizations have not met with
success.
The term itself, systems analysis, has some inconsistency as "analysis"
conflicts with the holistic view represented by the connotation of the term
"systems". The time has come to change the old term. coining a new one which
is basically consistent. Perhaps "systems inquiry" would be appropriate as not
having a "contradiction in terms" (contradictio in adiecto).
The main point, however, is that the course of systems analysis has to be
changed if it is to keep its usefulness in coping with really significant human
systems.
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Systems Approach and Systems
Analysis
I. V. BLAUBERG, E. M. MIRSKY and V. N. SADOVSKY
INTRODUCTION
Assessing the modern state of systems research, its potentiality and
perspective for further development, it is necessary first of all to pay attention
to three circumstances which to a large extent define the present-day situation
in this field.
Firstly, there is a steadily (in any case within the last 10- 15 years) growing
requirement for conducting systems research in very different fields of science,
technology and practical activity. The number of supporters of systems
research has been increasing every year; specialists in different sciences, from
theoreticians to policy-makers, hope to solve the problems facing them with
help from its methods.
These hopes are not unfounded, because, sl!condly, systems research has by
now already convincingly demonstrated its practical usefulness. Research on
the global problems of the modern world, the working-out of long-term
programs to solve energy. ecological, food and other similar problems. the
extension of the methodology tools of systems analysis, as well as much
systems-theoretical work in the sphere of the fundamental science· all these
testify to the undoubted effectiveness of systems research.
But at the same time, thirdly, it should be noted that in spite of the evident
practical results, modern systems research continues to be rather un-
satisfactorily grounded from the theoretical point of view. We specially
emphasize the need to tackle the problem of the theoretical foundations of
modern systems research, because the history of systems research develop-
ment and especially its general philosophical foundations are essentially better
understood. Amidst Marxist philosophers it is generally accepted that
Marxist-Leninist dialectics is the philosophical foundation of systems
research methods'~ cO and that these methods had their roots at least in
classical philosophy. 2M When it comes to the building of a common systems
concept capable of synthesizing a number of differently oriented systems
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thl'oril's and investigational rl'sults. then researchers still face some essential
ditlkultil's.
Two gl'nl'ral systl'ms approaches developed during the first post-war years-
thl' general system theory of L. von Bertalanffy 5 and N. Wiener's Cyber-
netics'» which exerted an important stimulating influence upon the
dl'vdopml'IH of systems research. Unfortunately because of the many
limitations and impl'rfections inherl'nt in them, they are not able nowadays to
Sl'rw as a thl'oretical basis for modern systems research.
Authors. who subsequently attempted to elaborate genl'ral systems theory
in various ways. as a rule sought to express their ideas in a strictly scientific
form. most commonly in terms ofmathcmatics (M. Mesarovic. 24 R. Ackoff,l
R. Kalman."G. J. Klir,19 N. P. Buslenko,6 N. N. Moiseyev,26 A. I. lJemov34
and many othl'rs). Nevertheless, from the outset they each largely limited their
attention to systems of definite classes and types. In most cases they did not
l'ven try to cia borate foundations of systems methods as a whole. Post-Wiener
variants of cybernetics (W. Ross Ashby.2 H. von Foerster, 13 G. Pask,20 A. I.
Berg. J V. M. Glushkov 15 and others) were being developed in the same way.
Finally. it must be stated that systems analysis (as usually understood) cannot
play the role of providing a theoretical foundation to modern systems research
ewn though today its own methods and conceptual means seem to be
elaboratl'd in ddail. The fact is that systl'ms analysis has to do only with
mdhods of decision-making in the problems arising in sociotechnical
systl'ms2 I and this does not cover the whole sphere of systems research at all.
Moreover. thl' nel'd to dl'velop theoretical foundations for systems research
is also conditioned by the ract that nowadays systl'ms research is understood
to represl'nt a rathl'r vast and ultimately diversl' spectrum of scientific and
tl'chnical disciplinl's. rl'search and design studies etc. (ranging from disciplines
of a rathl'r gl'nl'ral charactl'r like general systems theory, theoretical
cybernetics and ma thl'matical systl'ms theory to strictly concrete models of the
runctioning of special systems in the fields of biology. psychology. social
bl'haviour etc.). It is l'xtremely difficult to l'stablish general criteria which are
rekvant to this wholc. and in any case it may be done only artercertain crucial
probkms. concerning specific theoretical and methodological features of
systems n:search methods. have been solved.
Thl' situation has led to the rise of many critics of systems research methods
in recent years (I. HOOS.1 7 Y. Oror,12 G. Majone. 30 L. Lynn. 13 O. Berlinski l4
and others). The need to reply to these criticisms and thus create conditions
ror thl' rurthl'r progress of systems research (the latter is the chief aim) calls for
the urgl'nt sol ution of a large complex of problems connected with the
theoretical and methodological base of systems research. Some of these
problems will bc considl'rl'd in this article.
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SYSTEMS ANALYSIS CRITICISM AND ITS LESSONS
In the above-mentioned critical works directed against systems research
systems analysis is analysed as a methodology for studying and solving
complex economic, socio-technological and ecological problems which face
the modern world. In this way the criticism is directed not only and not mainly
at individual failures in the attempt to apply systems analytical methods and
procedures. As a rule, the problem raised is broader than this. The argument
in question is whether systems analysis as a general approach is able to
correspond to those problems towards whose solution it has been created and
fashioned and in connection with which it has been demonstrating its
effectiveness for many years.
Systems analysis in these critical works is often given a very broad
interpretation. as if it were a synonym of "systems research methods as a
whole". The book entitled On Systems Analysis by D. Berlinski4 is typical in
this respect: much space in it is paid to criticism of the general systems ideas of
L. von Bertalanffy, E. Laszlo. M. Mesarovic and others, when in fact their
connection with systems analysis is rather remote. In other critical works, for
instance. those by I. Hoos 17 and Majone and Quade. 30 systems analysis is
understood in its own, specific, meaning of this term.
One rather essential thing should be explained at once. In this chapter we
are not going to defend systems analysis from its external critics and
opponents· though of course such a defence could be made. To our mind.
trying to be constructive, this aspect of the polemical debate is neither decisive
nor interesting for systems research specialists. Besides. there is no urgent
necessity to defend systems analysis since, at present at least. none of the critics
are able to suggest a methodological approach that can compete with it.
Indeed. they eannot even state connected principles which would provide the
basis for elaborating such an approach in the future.
Voiees of another timbre are prevalent in the critical choir. Dissatisfaction
with the level of theoretical inq uiry and of the effectiveness of many practical
applications of systems analysis are first expressed most strongly by specialists
who are professionally engaged in developing some particular sphere of
systems problems. In other words, we refer to criticism of a relkctive character
arising from attempts to generalize and to comprehend critically the
accumulated experience of systems research. undertaken as a necessary
precondition to improve on this experience. The publications already
mentioned which have appeared in the last years (see particularly reference
30), and the discussions that have taken place at a number of symposia and
conferences, testify to this. The IIASA seminar on which this book is based.
having the rather symptomatic discussion theme "Rethinking the process of
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systems analysis", was typical in this respect. In addition to IIASA staff, well-
known spccialists from a number of countries engaged either in rcsearch in
systems problems, practical applications of systems analysis or teaching
activities connected with systems analysis, were also invited to take part in the
seminar. It is worth noting here that the important feature of the seminar was
striving to find some general theoretical-methodological foundations on the
basis of which it would be possible to comprehend and interpret problems of
systems analysis.
To our mind, the srstems approach as its theoretical and methodological
rd'kxion may serve as the hasis}i)r elahoration oj"systems analysis problems.
La ter, when speaking of the structure of systems research as a whole, wc shall
moreover touch upon functions of systcms approach. We should like to direct
your attention to the following circumstances, in order to avoid terminologi-
cal confusion and to clarify our own position. The rcference to a systems
approach seems to be appropriate because it is within its framework that some
positive experience of methodological research in the application of systems
ideas to difTerent areas of science (biology, psychology, ecology and so on) has
been accumulated. On the other hand, the reflective component is not yet
developed well enough within systems analysis. Overdramatization of the
general situation currently cstablished in systems analysis makcs no sense ...
In the history of scicncc it has been notcd again and again that new and
promising studies usually pass through three stages of their appreciation.
1. The stage oj" ellthusiastic acclaim and indiscriminate overestimation of
results achieved in difTerent fields of science. The mixing up of hopes and real
perspectives is also prescnt.
2. The stage oj.\{"(/tltillg and largely unj"air criticism when the major attack is
directed mainly against the discrepancy between the personal expectations of
a particular critic and the real achievements of the emerging discipline.
J. The stage o!r('latil'ely smooth and peaceful development accompanied by
elaboration of the disciplinc's thcoretical foundations as well as increasing
elliciency of applied results.
Systems analysis now seems to be at the second stage of this process and
there is no reason to doubt that it will enter the third period of its dcvelopment
very soon.
It should be noted that in the showcr of critical commcnts about SA a
pn:vailing theme is to reproach it for its indTcctivcness when applied to the
study of social. cconomic. political and similar processes. This inefficiency
may be explaincd by thc f~lct that thc tools of SA are evidently inadcquatc for
the developmcnt of authcntic modds ofcomplicated socio-economic systems.
One cannot but admit that this criticism is a well-founded one. At the same
timl: howl:ver it should be stressed that the same qualifications are equally
valid for other approaches and should not bl: regarded as applicable to SA
only. These obvious shortcomings reflect specific features of a common
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process, which is under way in various domains of science and practice, and is
connected, on the one hand, with the need to gain a more exact and objective
understanding of social, economic, biological, psychological, etc. phenomena
and, on the other hand, with the inability of existing applied mathematics to
meet all the demands created by that understanding. Both these problems are
widely discussed elsewhere (and not only in the literature on systems studies)
and gradually a rather encouraging convergence of previously alarmingly
diverging opinions is emerging. Moreover, in many cases the way to this
rapprochement has been paved precisely with the help of systems approach
conceptual ideas.
As to SA itself, its status. possibilities, prospects and limitations (parti-
cularly applicd systems analysis), there is still a very long way to go before the
debating sides can settle their differences. In fact the reverse process is taking
place, and a relative concord is giving way to a more and more explicit
divergence of opinions about problems of crucial importance. and this is
happening not only between systems analysts and external opponents but also
amongst the most ardent supporters of systems ideas. In this connection it
seems to be appropriate to draw some conclusions rclating to the criticism of
systems analysis which is under way now.
It is typical that in the dissenting studies examined here the main lines of
criticism are focused around a range of problems of paramount importance
for the future of systems studies methodology. All these problems. without a
single exception, were known to people active in systems studies some 10 15
years ago (see 7. 31. 3.\..\4..\7). We refer here to the problems of wholeness, of
system boundary demarcation, of adequate reflection in a system repre-
sentation, the ties connecting the system with the environment, and the
structural representation of the environment etc. To repeat, all these problems
have been formulated years ago although, for various reasons which we will
comment upon later, they were not researched as intensively and productively
as they should have been.
At the same time if we are going to limit ourselves to reducing all the existing
difficulties to already established theoretical and methodological problems.
we would find it most difficult not only to envisage the future prospects for
systems studies development but even to answer a much simpler question.
namely to explain the success and effectiveness of systems studies. and SA in
particular. which have "'een demonstrated in a variety of research fields and in
management practice in recent years. Indeed it is exactly these achievements
that have provoked such a wide acceptance of systems methodology. Such a
question does not have to bother an external opponent of SA but the answer
to it is one of the major prcrcquisites ji)1' systems analrsis rethink illg and for
finding ways to pcrfect it.
Thus evcn thc above examination of the ovcrall situation in which systems
analysis now rests indicates that for an drectivc conceptualization and
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reconceptualization one must: first, investigatc relations bctween vanous
forms and kinds of systems studies; second, consider - along with the purely
methodological questions - certain organizational aspects of the formation
and development of the systems analysis activity; third, digress from time to
time into history of systems studies. Naturally, we shall not bc able to touch
upon all these problems here and will concentrate our attention on the
"hottest spots" of the problematique of modcrn systems research.
STRI'C1TR[ OF \tOUERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEM
OF "WHOLENESS"
To ~olve the problems formulated above. it is necessary to classify the main
lypes of systems studies with respect to the level of generality, thcir tasks and
function in the realm of scientific and practical activity. To our mind it is
essential to devclop an adequate typology of this kind because above all it
makes it possible to formulate questi;)ns about Ihe il/lernal il/Il:'raclio/ls imide
Ihe scopc oj srllCll1 sludics which take place between the various forms of
knowledge. scientific activity, technical art and, equally important, between
people with dJikrent professional backgrounds. Earlier in some of our papers
(~ee eg. H. .12) we have proposed to this end to make a distinction between the
philosophical systems principle. the systems approach and systems analysis.
Let u~ ~hortly describe these directions of the modern systems research.
By llicIT.IICIlIS principlc we mean a principle in compliance with which a
phenol11L'non of objective reality, as viewed through the relations of the
systL'I11S wholeness and interactions of the components which constitute it,
LTeates a specific epistemological prism or a specific reality "dimension" eo,
p, 10). In such an interpretation the systcms principle is indeed a philosophical
one emhracing the conccptions of the wholcncss of objects, of the reality of
the relation betwecn the whole and its parts, of thc system-environment
interadion as of one of the prerequisites of systems existence. of the structural
nature orany systemic object. etc. It is quite obvious that the systems principle
pedigree can be traced right back to elassical philosophy (sec 2H for more
details). As to methodological considerations, reliance upon the systems
prillL'iple provides a researcher with a certain general conception, with a
L'ertain vision of the essence of complicated transient objects, This conception
turns out to be closely connected both with the historico-philosophical
retrospection. a~ revealing the makings and application of various
epistemological-cognitive conceptions and with modern problems covering
the methodology of science. However to carry these general methodological
i(ka~consistentlythrough in a specillc scientific study one has to provide thcm
with a much more concrete and detailed expression cast into specific
methodological constructs. Dcvelopment and advanccment of such constructs
is a main ohjcctive of thc syslems approach,
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The systems approach is one of the forms of methodological knowledge and
is directly connected to analysis, synthesis and design of objects as systems. It
is essentially interdisciplinary and supradisciplinary by nature. Among the
major systems approach problems arc: I. The problem of development of
conceptual tools, both meaningful and formal, permitting one to represent
objects as systems: 2. The problem of generalized systems modelling, as well as
the problem of modelling oriented toward the different kinds or different
properties of systems, e.g. system dynamics, system goal-seeking behaviour,
system development, system hierarchical structure, system control processes
etc.: 3. The problem of analysis of the methodological foundations of the
various systems theories. Every prohlem from this list, whilst having a distinct
methodological flavour typologically. is not beyond the scope of concrete
scientific knowledge as we have it through the present methodology of science.
However for Its validation and development the systems approach calls for
some philosophical knowledge and has to rely in particular upon the systems
principle.
Finally, systems (Il1all'sis being the latest form of systems study and one
which is especially distinguished for its applil?d orientation. may be regarded
as the advanced offspring of operational research and, to some extent. system
l?ngineering which Wl?rl? a great success in the fifties and sixties. Along with its
prl?decessors, systl?ms analysis is first and foremost a mind of scientific and
tl?chnological activity applied to the analysis and design of complicatl?d and
owr-complicatl?d objects. Whl?n it proved impossible to justify an analytic
solution, whether in krms of principk or practicality - as was the case e.g. for
environml?nt protl?ction, adequatl? food provision on the world scak. global
modelling and other similar problems - thl?re was no way out but to consider
the probkms as compkx problems calling for the use of the entire range of
existing techniques (heuristic methods and devices included). Following this
argument, systl?ms analysis is a spl?cific type of scientific and enginl?ering art
which may bring in impressiw rl?sults in the hands of an l?xperienced
professional, and may eq ually rl?sult in a ncar wastl? of l?f1'ort when practised
mechanistically and unimaginatively. (Unfortunately the latter fault occurs
rathl?r frl?qul?ntly.)
From thl? ml?thodological viewpoint. the remarkable dTectiwness of
systl?ms analysis at the early stagl?s ofdevelopml?nt can bl? attributed chiefly to
a conscious USl? or thl? inkgratl?d s}'stl?ms rl?presl?ntation of thl? problems and
of thl? situations analysl?d and designl?d i.e. thl? utilization of thl? concept of
11'111111'111'.1'.1'. At thl? time it was a concl?ptual breakthrough because whl?reas a
holistic vision or phl?nomena and procl?sses was already fairly well entrenchl?d
(though not universally) in the rl?alm or philosophical and methodological
thought, it was, still soml?what alil?n and spl?culative to thinking in l?ngineering
and applil?d scil?ncl? Nl?wrthell?ss it is this realm (that of enginel?ring and
applied science) which is thl? main sphere of systl?ms analysis. The conscious
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study of obj~cts to examine if they possessed characteristic wholeness
imm~diatelybroadened th~ scope of applied knowledge and practical systems
d~velopm~nt.for it has encouraged the analyst to take into consideration and
to pr~dict int~rrelations b~tween systems components which had previously
b~~n completely neglect~d.Why then, has the effectiveness of systems analysis
less~n~d and why hav~ many systems analysts chosen to look back to simpler,
basically analytical (rather than holistically-synthetic), purely formal (rather
than l11~aningfu1) approaches? In our opinion, the heart of the matter is not
only in th~ growing complexity of the objects being studied with the help of
SA. or the problems to be treated by it. First and foremost the explanation lies
in the fact that th~ "wholeness" concept exploited in earlier studies has
gradually exhausted its heuristic pot~ntial. It has been in fact a concept of
wholeness wholly lacking in adequate definition. not a concept of wholeness
within the rigorous. philosophical theoretical meaning of the term that earlier
studies haw been trying to capitalize on.
To account for this idea I~t us refer to J. van Gigch "Applied general
syst~l11s theory". 1-' This aut hor quotes Hegel's statements concerning the
interactions or the whole and its parts in a chapter devoted to the main
principles of general systems theory. He writes in particular that the works of
HegL'1 contain some ideas which form the basis of general systems theory, for
exampk:
I. TIlL' whok is mon: than the sum of its parts.
2. The whole delines the nat ure of its parts.
:I The parts looked at apart from the whole can not be properly described.
~. The parts are constantly interconnected and interdependent.
It is doubtful if one can accept this as a proper interpretation of Hegel's view
of the probkl11. Firstly. it should b~ noted that the authorship of some of these
'itatements Gin not be directly ascribed to Hegel: for example. the thesis of
non-summativity of the whole originates from Plato and Aristotle. It is
particularly important that the cited statements were not regarded as
lIldisputahle truths. either before Hegel or later.* and this circumstance itself
needs c1arilication.
It 'ihould be noted that an e1kctive application of the concept of wholeness
<IS ,I dclinite methodological tool in a concrete scientific study requircs far
• I kr,'ll I' il"lrUL"liw I" rcc'all J, J. Rnusseau', nhjcL"linll 10 L. M, Deschamps in connection
\lllh hi, approach \" thc' prohkm or whok and parh (incidentally, in the French historico-
pllll,""phical litnalurc' ell' Ihc' Illnc'lc'elllh eelltury L. M. Deschamps was orten regarded as a
l'ur''rUIlIl''r "I' Hcgc'liall karning): "Wc judgc wilh the help or inductioll within certain houllds. we
Judgc' 'th"lIllhc' wh"k hy ih parh. HUI il 'ee/1l' I" /1le Ihal ynu do just the OPPOSile in deducing
'I"}\\ kdg,· ah"uI Ihc' \I h,,/c', I am nnt a hk In ollder,land this .... ' (sec ( II. P IJ )). Let us veillure
I" 'Ial,' Ihal argllll1l'llh like Ihi, w"uld hc acccpted with sympathy hy a considcrahk Illllnhcr or
.... pL·C1;l1i .... h \\ 110 \\or" 111 L"OllcrL'll' ~rhL'r('~ of kIlLl\\'k'Jgc.
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more than a mere affirmation of the holistic nature of the object under
investigation and to the conclusions which follow. To make the most of the
concept of wholeness when dealing with some phenomenon, process or
problem, one has to recognize the need for, and to skilfully exploit, various
complex research procedures, e.g. to provide a combination (or, even better, a
symbiosis) of analytical and synthetic research strategies, to understand the
need for, and explicitly curtail, the reductionism in a research policy, to
identify different kinds of wholeness, to differentiate methodologically
additivity, super-additivity and sub-additivity principles in holistic objects of
cognition etc. (see e.g. 6).
The analysis of these research procedures is being carried out using the
systems approach, the main purpose of which is to expand these procedures in
such a specific methodological form that they would be ripe for effective
assimilation by scientific (both fundamental and applied) knowledge.
That is why if we are willing to proceed by treating (in the form proposed
above) systems approach as a supradisciplinary, methodological orientation
bringing together the philosophical systems principle, on the one hand, with
interdisciplinary systems research and development, on the other, we would
be amply justified in affirming that one of the most important factors for the
development of SA is the recognition of the need for close links between SA
and the systems approach and the working out of the best lines of advance to
this end. This will open the way to enrich ASA with existing philosophical and
methodological ideas and enable the subject to capitalize on a rich and highly
structured concept of wholeness, rather than a simply intuitive conception of
wholeness.
THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERRELATION OF SYSTEM AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT
Together with the necessity for a profound understanding of specific
features of the problem of wholeness, a methodologically based solution to
the question of the interrelation o(a system and its context (envirol1ment) - an
issue which has received growing attention in recent works on systems analysis
is equally important for the further progress of systems analysis.
Whatever version of SA may be adopted in a particular case, the system
conceived in the course of the study is always designed to conform to a quite
definite objective to be pursued with the help of it. That is why the main
analytical efforts arc always centred either around goal setting, i.e. at the stage
preceding system identification, or around its structuring, policy formulation
etc., i.e. at thc stage of systcm analysis after the systcm has becn identified. As
to system identification, demarcation of its boundary, selection of the relcvant
fragments of the environment etc., all this is performed on the basis of one
most crucial assumption (whatever particular procedurc used at this stage in
RPOR-B*
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any particular case). It is assumed that separating the system out from the
environment, taking into account the relevant parts of that environment,
would have practically no effect on the behaviour of the environment and
specifically would not change its organization. Moreover it is implicitly
assumed that the goal-oriented system to be designed will radically surpass the
environment with respect to its orderliness and will embody in itselfa kind or
orgolli::ed ('I/e/al'(, in a relatively underorganized environment. As to the
problems of in terrelation. they are treated at the systems analysis level as the
problems of interaction between systems components or subsystems. To put it
ditfcrently. the whole range of SA tools is brought together for the study of a
.Iingle system. And this is not accidental. It reflects a totally justifiable desire to
make the most effective use of the heuristic potential of the already discussed
concept of system wholeness and its relative independence from the
environment (its autonomous nature).
The fundamental nature of the difficulties related to this assumption and
weaknesses of the concepts based on it did not become immediately apparent.
It becomes evident only as, due to ASA proliferation, the systems
environment acquires a much greater degree of organization (systemic
organization in some cases) and the creation of new systems produces a kind
of second order chaos. A methodologically similar situation arises in the case
when newly designed large scale management and information systems get
involved in an interaction with traditionally functioning objects and systems.
By way of illustration we may refer to the case of computer telecom-
munication network design, where I/ormal.system operation turned out to rely
upon its legal. economic and similar compatibility with traditional com-
munication means. the problem being aggravated by great discrepancies in
regulatory statutes for their functioning in different European countries.
Moreover the new system is not designed as an alternative to the former, but
rather has to supplement it under the conditions of partial function overlap.
Thus we arc dealing now with the change of the methodological relevance of
the problem which has been known in principle in its own right. but has
acquired an ultcrly ditTerent significance in the course of ASA development.
Altempts to bypass the context problem by extending the scope of relevance
rail (critics of systems studies arc quick to point this out) due to awkwardness
and unmanagcableness of the resulting systcm. and consequent loss of the
very advantages ASA is callcd to provide. Meanwhile in recent years the
theoretical problem of system-environment interrelations was being attacked
rather sluggishly, partly because this problem has been considered to be of
greater importance to applied studies.
We may therefore conclude that if the problem of the interrelation of the
system and its environment is to be solved adequately, as well as the problem
of wholeness, systems analysis needs to be enriched with the principles and
methods of the systems approach.
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To put it another way, if we are to succeed, i.e. to meet prearranged
effectiveness criteria, systems analysis as a certain form of science being to
some extent an integration of science and art, has to undergo two changes. In
the first place it has to build on the firm foundation of the systems approach
and, secondly, to develop a frame of reference which can be carried forward
into the future, utilizing some form of theoretical generalization and
accumulation of experience. In current practice systems approach principles
are used in systems analysis only to a limited degree. General systems concept
are used with a great regularity when social, economic, man-machine and
other similar systems are studied as only one instance of the particular class;
this constitutes one of the main fields ol/he application vi SA. An intensive
search for ways of reinforcing /he ins/rumen/al aspect of these investigations
has resulted lately in the emergence of various new research tools - systems
dynamics, heuristic programming, simulation etc. - which are however
developing as a number of (explicitly or implicitly) competitive programmes
(see (27)). deprived of the unifying theoretical foundation.
In this respect it should be noted that a popular emphasis is quite often
given by describing SA as an "art". Of course it goes without saying that any
practical activity calling for decisions under uncertainty has to rely at least
partly upon intuitive heuristic considerations. In this respect any research
activity is not evidently an exception, though it does not give us grounds to
consider it as art. Accordingly, no radical advancement of SA can alter this
fact and should not even try to do so. But it is quite another matter when the
role of art becomes over-inflated, covering most of the problem and leaving to
scientific techniques nothing but an instrumental support of the various
analysis stages merged into a shallow framework which has remained intact
for the last 10-15 years (goal setting - option generation system design etc.
with minimal variations). In this case, a lack of introspection concerning
assumptions and difficulties in model interpretation is the price to be paid for
this excessive role of art. Nowadays it becomes quite obvious that any further
strengthening of the instrumental SA foundation will result in a noteworthy
increase of systems analysis effectiveness only if it is simultaneously matched
by a significant progress in the development of the theoretical foundations.
Quite a few obstacles of real substance hamper this process. One is related
to the problem of identification of the class of objects for which systems
analysis ofIers a theoretical explanation. Taking into consideration the
already mentioned integrative function of systems analysis (with respect to its
"scientific" and "art") components. we cannot but agree with a statement that
"systems analysis theory evidently should be primarily a theoretical
explanation ofthc systems analysts ac/il'i/ies and to a much lesser degree and
only indirectly of the objects of these activities" (36. p. 18).
In conclusion one more remark should be made. When speaking of the
necessity for a single. general, foundation for systems analysis or systems
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research (the latter is essentially wider than the former) we should keep in
mind that a general theory is only one of the forms, though it is the most
ctkctive form. in which there can be set out the similar basis of a research area.
One does not always succeed in classifying investigations starting from some
single theoretical nucleus. even in developed scientific disciplines with long
and great traditions. Let us take for example the physics of elementary
particles. the chemistry of polymers and even evolutionary ecology. We
cannot really state that in all these fields there are what we may call a single
general theory which is the foundation for unifying investigations. The
situation is rather the opposite: the existence of some general theory of the
same kind may be created in the more or less remote future.
For the present we can state that mechanisms for the organization of
knowledge which provide some unity across corresponding disciplines are
situated and function in other than theoretical dimensions. The zone of
activity of these mechanisms is nor rhe main line o( research. It applies to the
work connected with creation of handbooks, curricula and textbooks.
reading-books and other so-called secondary scientific sources. 25 This work.
being concerned with forming a single hod)' o(knol1'ledge. differs of course by
its nat ure from activity connected with a general theory covering correspond-
ing areas. Pressures of time. and the need to produce concrete results. lead to a
situation when basic texts and handbooks are achieved at the expense of
conventional concessions. omissions in the theoretical impositioning, or the
description of various viewpoints and approaches etc. But one should also
keep in mind that although in traditional science this organization of
knowledge is often regarded as subsidiary and artificial, it also plays the main
IIni/ring parr in the overwhelming majority of the applied fields of science. We
are now beginning to have a plethora of handbooks on systems analysis, and
increasing efTorts are being appl;ed to the development of teaching courses
and to discussing their contents all this possibly indicates that systems
analysis has reached the level on which formal energetic organizational action
is needed. The situation is rather obvious, so it needed not be laboured. But
the reflective side of this situation, one being characteristic especially for
systems research. is worth attention. The fact is that the study and
comparative analysis of the forms of presentation and organization of
knowledge concerning systems of various types represent one of the most
important directions for methodological search within the framework of
systems approach. Bcsides, together with abstract constructions and epi-
stcmological cia borations. there grows a proliferation of attempts to address
empirical forms of the organization of knowledge including forms specific for
applied tasks. From this vicwpoint systems analysis. being interdisciplinary
and having a great variety of problems as well as approaches to their solution,
is a really fruitful field for tests and applications of abstract systems
constructions and models.
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The Deliberative Context of
Systems Analysis
HYLTON BOOTH ROYD
This chapter is in four parts: an indication of how it relates to the general
culture of operational research and systems analysis, some comments about
the origin of the ideas I presented to the IIASA Seminar, an outline of the
presentation itself, and some post-seminar comments.
THE WORLD OF ORASA
There has been a continuous ORASA culture since the late 1930s. In the
UK, the USA, and Sweden the original ORASA cultures grew from the direct
investigational support of decision-makers by full-time scientists who carried
out observational/analytical studies of operations. This grounding of
ORASA in investigation-plus-recommendation remains strongest in North
America, the UK, and Scandinavia. This chapter is about the theoretical
foundations of the investigational practice of ORASA. It is part of a slowly-
developing personal enquiry into what constitutes an adequate description of
ORASA: an enquiry that has already led me to criticize three widely influential
subsidiary themes in thinking about ORASA.
At an early stage in the history of ORASA a potent subsidiary theme
emerged: enquiry into mathematical and computational problems posed by
some types of model produced by some types of investigation. For various
reasons there was an explosion of interest in such enq uiry, to the extent that
many participants and funding-sponsors came to believe, wrongly, that
ORASA consists principally of enq uiry into mathematical and computational
problems. Indeed, there seemed to be a widespread phantasy that the truth
about real systems could be discovered by ratiocination largely di vorced from
observational investigation. Those engaged in investigation and recom-
mendation have not been seriously misled by this view of ORASA-as-
mathematics, apart from a widespread tendency to confuse optima-within-a-
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model with optima-for-real. But many of those with no direct experience of
investigation have become prisoners of this view.
A second subsidiary theme was that ORASA is only a tantalizingly short
step away from a science of decision-making. In the USA, Churchman and
Ackoff wrote extensi vely towards this goal. and in countries with a Marxist
constitution the hope for a good scientific outcome to human problems is
often an explicit article of faith. Those engaged in investigation and
recommendation have long suspected that ORASA-as-science is a good but
incomplete account, and some have been disheartened and embarrassed when
ORASA studies ha ve led to conflict or to recommendations later discovered to
be wrong. The problems partly come from confusing the use of scientific
methods with the possibility of constructing a scientifically-justified deductive
decision technology.
A third subsidiary theme was that ORASA as a social process would only be
sa tisfactorily described if it was re-conceptualized in terms of the behavioural
and social sciences. On this theme ORASA practitioners are divided: some are
dismissive, others arc hopeful but find the behavioural sciences to be too
extensive and too fragmented to consider re-interpreting their practice in
those terms.
So this chapter stands somewhat apart from the traditions of ORASA-as-
mathematics, ORASA-as-science, and ORASA-as-social-science. This means
I ditfer in theoretical standpoint, though not I think in spirit, from
Ch urchman; that I see the seminar contributions of M itroff and Checkland as
providing views on possible conceptual contents of ORASA enq uiries where I
am silent; and the contributions from the USSR, Hungary and Poland as the
beginnings of a similar process of making the descriptions of ORASA fit the
reality of practice more faithfully and more fruitfully.
THE ORIGI:'IIS OF' THE PRESENTATION TO THE IIASA SEMINAR
In 1956. as a young mathematician, I joined the 40/50 strong operational
research group in the UK state coal industry: the group was committed to
extensive programmes of measurement and modelling, both to improve
operations and to improve planning. I soon discovered that much of the
mathematics that was needed was below graduate level. much was beyond
anyone's mathematical ability, and relatively little was both challenging and
I'casible. That was not a hardship to me. I was soon completely won over to the
idea of science-in-action. Until I joined it, I had never realized that such a
satisfying investigatory activity existed.
It was only slowly that I realized that I had no understanding of economics,
that I had neither the means nor the ability to think analytically about
psychological and social factors, and that the flow of commissions for study
needed a level of imagination. confidence, risk-taking and negotiation skills
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that was largely unknown to the teams which then went on to carry out the
studies.
By 1966, when I moved into the university world, I had begun to be aware of
two particular problems and the university soon presented me with a third:
(a) clients were inclined to treat the findings of investigations as complete
and final, rather than as a stage in a joint process of exploration and
experiment - this was related to their picture of science as providing
definitive final answers on both facts and desirable choice of action;
(b) in the literature of operational research and systems analysis the
implicit picture of decision-making was quite unlike the untidy,
episodic na ture of the experience ofmaking decisions abou t the cond uct
of investigations - the words and concepts we used in practice to guide
our own professional behaviour were not the words and concepts we
offered to our clients;
(c) within the university world, most people who had not themselves
advised on action based on research were quite unable to visualize its
nature or its value - it was at times like living among a race of the blind!
The end results of a lengthy period of wrestling with these problems were a
working paper widely circulated in the UK in 1974, a summary of some key
points given in a paper to IFORS in 1975, I and a major re-working of the
paper into the book, Articulate Intervention. 2
Although Articulate Intervcntion is only about 150 pages long, it is dense
with terse arguments about a wide range of matters which are germane to
systcms analysis. Apart from its density, it is tough reading in one other
respect: the analytical point of view is quite unlike that of previous writing for
systems analysts and is used with no attempt to link it with a presumed starting
point anywhere else. It may be useful therefore to put on record some of the
ideas which I experienced as fundamental unlockings of the problem of
describing ORASA in the order in which they occurred, starting from a simple
science-in-action point of view:
(i) all theories have the logical status of conjectures;J this means that
when we complete a piece of scientific or mathematical investigation
the results cannot be guaranteed to be final and unchangeable: so every
idea we work with must remain subject to criticism; but this is true of
all theories, not just scientific ones, so the collection of ideas-in-use-for-
decision-making has a unity of logical status within which some ideas
have been more thoroughly researched than others:
(ii) life is saturated with theories:~ every piece of thinking about action is
made against a background of uncountably many ideas about the
nature of reality and the likely outcome of actions; the theories can be
of great generality, or so direct and simple and specific that they arc
considered to be t~lctS:
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(iii) many economic and social theories are simply interest-group slogans
masquerading as theories;' life is not lived simply as the product of
theories but partly also as the product of wants, volitions, laws,
contracts, and social customs which are logically expressible as
proposals but not as theories;
(iv) the morally justifiable goal of minimizing suffering is profoundly
unlike the goal of maximizing happiness;6 taken far enough this
implies that we ought not to retain the ideal of a calculus whereby
decisions are determined without further review and criticism,
particularly if we value freedom within the framework of a society
which meets our basic needs;
(v) life is saturated with proposals;2 every piece of thinking about action is
made against the background of uncountably many ideas about
obligations, preferences, and values; for the actors involved these have
the status of proposals rather than theories;
(vi) intellectual history has a stable programmatic nature which can be
considered in its own right independently of the actions which cause its
development; 7 organized life similarly has a stable, but changing,
portfolio of theories and proposals whose programmatic development
can be considered in its own right;2
(vii) human conduct is considered and resolved upon a platform of
understanding - we can usefully call this combination of reflection and
decision the '"deliberation"' of actlon;H in using the word ""de-
liberation"' I want to evoke the idea of thinking as combining theories
and proposals not just thinking about what-is but thinking about
what-to-make-be;
(viii) the man who makes the platforms of others explicit is in danger of his
Iife;H so, for example, J expect some people to dismiss what I write as
unuseful to them, but J also expect some to attack both me and what J
write because they feci threatened.
1 his was the undeclared background against which I suggested that for
preliminary reading my fellow seminarians might look at Chapters 2 and 3 of
Articulat£' lnt£'F\'l'ntion on programmes and actions. Finally, the time came to
squeeze what J was to say into a linear form for oral presentation. To my
surprise something new came out, at least initially: the idea that I could order
my thinking around the ccntral place of natural language in the deliberation of
actions.
AN OUTLINE OF THE PRESENTATION TO THE IIASA SEMINAR
Our central concern is to say useful things about systems to clients. On the
one hand, we particularly offer formal analysis, the construction and
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exploration of explanatory models, and the usc of scientific Illethod~. On the
other hand, we lind ourselves needing behavioural. social. and politie,t1
explanations to describe our relations with e1ients and to discuss our conduct
of systems analysis. There is tension here. What we particularly olfer doe~ not
provide an adeq uate ground for theorizing our own goings on. But if V\L' try to
ground ourselves in behavioural. social. and political points of vie\\ V\e ri~k
usurping the prime place we currently give to the explicit content of our
analysis.
I therefore propose that we ground our understanding of systems analysis
neither on the analytic methods we usc, nor on a behavioural. social. and
political viewpoint. I propose rather that we start from the fact that we. and
ourelients, usc language to talk about action: that their and ourcognitioll~arc
central to our experience of systems analysis. II' we take this "s a cen tral poi n t
of view, we can then t urn on the one hand to our familiar approaches th rough
scientific modelling and we ean turn on the other hand to behavioural. social.
and political concepts, but we shall remain e1ear that the eontri butions of both
will derive from the practice of language and representation and that the
contributions will be commissioned, conducted, included and rejectL'd hy the
practice of language.
Our aspiration as systems analysts might then be sUlllmed up in a ~ingle
diagram (Fig. I):
WeLL founded
modelS and
scenario,;
WeLL - (rlilClzed language
Longuage
FIG. I
The practice of language has many aspects, of which \\e might particularly
note that it is used:
to refleci and argue about what is. whal i, going 10 he'. and \\ hell L'llldd h,·.
to ddiheralc' whal 10 do.
10 persuade and to negotiale.
Of these, it is the delibaation of action which provides the original eonte\t
for the commissioning of systems analysis, and thL' context to which the
outcomes of systems analysis arc most evidently offered.
A key question is whether for deliberating action our language in principle
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needs anything more than well-founded theories. In a perfect world. would
actions be a logical consequence of knowing? In the end. can a science oj
decision-making be a science jiiY decision-making? The classical form of the
question is: Does is imply ought? My answer is. No. Theories do not seem to
me to imply action. To stand alongside theoril's in language, I need proposals,
which cover not only possible actions and conditional actions. but also our
proposed evaluations of the actions and their imagined consequences.
My view of deliberation is then that at any point in time there is an active set
of imagined actions, imagined consequences. theories. and proposals drawn
from a much wider. indefinitely large set. The content of the wider set will
range itself on a dimension from the completely articulated to the completely
unarticulated. and on a different dimension from unshakeable core to
disposable non-core. The whole process through time. together with the real
actions and real consequences. constitutes an "action programme".2
ORASA can be conceived of as intervention into action programmes.
Schematically we might use a simple diagram (Fig. 2):
CLient Anolyst
C
p
FIG.2
A
T
C
p
to suggest that useful systems analysis is possible if there are enough
differences between clients and analyst to provide a useful contrast and
enough similarities for them to work together.
It is then possible for systems analysts to define their role as some or all of
the following:
(a) joining clients in articulating and elaborating the components of
reflection before action;
(b) reflecting on the quality of components and acting to improve them;
(c) elaborating the means for deliberative argument;
(d) participating in deliberative argument.
COMMENTS ON SOME ISSUES ARISING FROM THE I1ASA SEMINAR
There is an open-ended set of issues raised by the material in the
presentation. Of these, I think it most useful to comment further on the idea of
natural language as the context for ORASA and then to comment on the
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status of the ideas of '"deliberation", '"action programme", and "in-
tervention" .
In putting natural language at the centre I was doing much mon: than using
a presentational device. It is at the centre for several strong theoretical and
practical reasons:
(i) life is like that; the cognitive content of deliberation and the process of
deliberation may be enhanced by ORASA on the one hand and
behavioural and social sciences on the other hand, but their acceptance
and integration will be not on their own terms but on the terms of the
deliberative goings-on to which they are directed;
(ii) natural language is a powerful and flexible tool by which deliberative
concerns can be switched with extraordinary case: the cognitive and
explorative products of ORASA are offered against a presumed closed
set of anticipated cognitive needs and anticipated explorative needs:
the conduct of ORASA has suffered by a tendency to regard its output
as having timeless relevance and validity: the designer of negotiation
support systems needs to take into account the dynamics of de-
liberation:
(iii) anyone who participates in the deliberation of cooperative action
quickly learns that although we aim to treat low-level decisions and
routine decisions by rules, there is nevertheless a constant passage
between obeying rules and questioning their current validity: criticism
appears not to be satisfactorily exercisable as a deductive activity· it is
an imaginative and creative activity for which natural language is
nat urally well-suited;
(iv) we have no logically defensible way of assuring an actor that he can
hereafter rely permanently on the rightness of our theories to
determine his actions; there must always be room for over-ride by him.
The idea of systems analysis arising out of deliberation and contributing to
deliberation was found useful by the seminar. It tied in with the experimental
work of Mitroff9 and the soft-systems view ofCheckland. 'o As a result of this
and other debates it now seems reasonable to postulate:
(a) a deliberative point of view will always be experienced as consistent
with the practice of systems analysis:
(b) some analysts will find a deliberative point of view supportive and
heuristically useful in suggesting new categories of analytical activity:
other analysts will simply note it without finding it either supportive or
suggestive.
The idea of mapping the content of deliberation on to the formal
components of action programmes was /lot explored by the seminar. and
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indeed an explicit mapping of a sample of deliberation is something 1 have
only occasionally attempted myself. There are various reasons for this:
(i) even a short segment of deliberation carries with it an endless cloud of
implicit theories and proposals deliberation takes place in an
environment that is saturated with theories and proposals that are left
unspoken. unwritten, unremembered, and mutually unaccessed bet-
ween actors:
(ii) the explicit content of sentences in which action is being considered
usually combined features of theories and proposals intimately
interwoven they are distinguishable only by rewriting into clumsy,
non-fluent separate statements.
Nevertheless, an analytical approach to the deliberation of action seems
unavoidably to require analysts to distinguish is/ought content. The most
notable progress in the analysis of deliberation is that of Eden. 11 Otherwise
the notion of "action programme"' is at present little more than an organizing
principle that occasionally comes vividly to mind when one realizes that a
debate is hopelessly confounding is and ought.
The use of the word "intervention"' causes some unease, and leads systems
analysts to be reluctant to describe their own activities in that way. On the one
hand. some systems analysts in the UK, deeply integrated into the goings-on
of industrial companies, feel that the word ""intervention"' suggests a
remoteness and distance which quite mis-describes their position; for them,
the right word is ""participation"'. On the other hand, systems analysts at
IIASA. deeply aware of the sovereign independence of member states, feel
that the word ""intervention"' suggests a wholly improper interfering attitude
towards their counterparts and clients in member states; for them, the right
word is ""analysis"'. In between, there is a substantial group of analysts for
whom the word ""intervention"' correctly suggests that the world will go on
without them unless they negotiate a contributory analytical role with the
intention of changing the content and/or the process of deliberation.
I understand and sympathize with these points of view. However, I am clear
that my use of the word ""intervention"' includes all three. The analyst who sees
himselfas a full participant has to provide a continuing flow of useful reliable
contributions to deliberation or he will cease to be a participant. The analyst
who sees his work as the uncontroversial documentation of how a system
works also expects that there is a possibility that sometime, somewhere,
someone will open his document and find it useful. I am certainly not writing
this for an IIASA publication in the expectation that no-one will ever be in the
slightest degree affected by it!
So. I think that the meaning of what I have written. holds over the full
spectrum of systems analysis. from participant to detached commentator. On
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the other hand, I acknowledge that very few of us could announce ourselves as
interventionists without being misunderstood! For the present, there is
therefore a difference between the language of self-analysis and the language
of self-presentation. For the foreseeable future we will continue to present
ourselves as operational researchers, or applied systems analysts, or whatever
other name is in good standing in our environment. But I hope that we do not
intend to practice our craft without leaving a mark somewhere!
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Rethinking a Systems Approach
PETER CHECKLAND
INTRODUCTION
The fact that it is rare for anyone firmly to declare themselves against "a
systems approach" probably indicates the weakness rather than the strength
of the idea conveyed by these words. The phrase is so loosely used, and means
such different things to different people, that many potential opponents
probably regard "a systems approach" not as impregnable but as not worth
attacking. I shall argue that the notion can be sufliciently sharply and lucidly
expressed that debate about its strengths and weaknesses becomes meaningful
and is worth encouraging, This paper will consider briefly the nature of
systems thinking and "the systems movement" within which the ideas are used
consciously; it will try to indicate the meaning of "a systems approach" among
the many activities which go on in the systems movement and dcscribe the
implications and significance of recent practical research which has esta b-
lished "soft" systems methodology for tackling the ill-structured problems
which abound in the real world: and it will argue that the implications of this
work are that the traditional concept of "a systems approach" now has to be
re-thought. For the work not only illuminates the meaning of "a systems
approach" in its first manifestations (in "systems engineering" and "systems
analysis") it also gives it a new meaning and links systems thinking more
firmly to the concerns and problems of social science. Finally, we examine the
question: what does the successful application of a systems approach in real-
world problem situations imply about the nature of social reality?
SYSTEMS THINKING, THE SYSTEMS MOVEMENT A:"ID "A SYSTBIS
APPROACH"
This section will summarize briefly argumcnts which have been rehearsed at
greater Icngth elsewhere.!. 2 . .1 ...
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Systems Thinking
In considering the nature of systems thinking it is worth reflecting upon the
ract that the noun "system'" yields two adjectives. and that the use of systems
ideas in prohlem solving has usually implied one of these - "systematic" - and
has neglected the other ··systemic". Systems engineering 5 and systems
analysis as developed by the RAND Corporation h (this latter being implied in
most of the work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
IIASA -) arc hoth highl)'.l"s/cl1/(//ic. Soft systems methodology!' ~ aspires to be
',S[Cll1ic. and the rethinking entailed in moving from a systematic approach to
a sy stemie approach is the subject of this paper. But in order to understand
that shirt. and to relate it to the systems movement as a whole. it is necessary to
consider the s,s/cmic origins of the systems movement. which may be seen
historically as an attempt to develop holistic thinking which is complementary
to the reductionist thinking of the method of natural science. I. 2
The most rundamental systems idea is that of "emergent properties". Such
prnpenies are those of some entity regarded as a whole - they are meaningful
only in terms or the Whole. not in terms of its parts. The smell ofammonia and
the functional capabilities of a hieycle are examples of such properties. The
ammonia smell. as a concept, has no meaning in terms of the properties of the
nitrogen and hydrogen which make up the ammonia molecule: it is a
meaningrul concept only in terms or the entity ammonia. Similarly, the
properties or a bicycle relate only to the assembled whole. not to its individual
parts. My student who remarked to one of her colleagues "you're certainly
mnre than the sLIm of your parts, you're an idiot". had understood the idea
com pletcl) .
Given the hasic idea that it might be useful to assume that the universe
lnntains many wholes having emergent properties (both natural and man
made) we may regard systems thinking as the attempt to develop an
epistemology built upon this concept. Systems thinking tries to develop an
epi·;temology which can hoth describe the universe and attempt to elucidate
.,ome or its mysteries: its basic notions are tha t whole en tities (ha ving emergell/
/,ro/,cr/ln) are hierurchicalll" arranged, the entities being characterized by
processes of CIl/JIl1lllllicu/iO/l and cOI1/rol. this latter in the control engineers'
sense or processes which seek to maintain the integrity of the whole in the face
nra changing external environment. 1 Historically it is not surprising tbat this
kind or thinking was developed - before being generalized to cover entities of
any kind by the so-called "organismic biologists" (Woodger. Haldane.
Lloyd Morgan. Henderson. Cannon. Bertalanlfy) who doubted whether the
biological organism could be investigated adequately by the purely re-
ductiollist methnds of science.
Systems thinking. then. emerging from biology in the 1920s and then
rurther dcveloped hy control and communication engineers in the 1940s.
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provides a complementary tradition to that of the 350-year-old tradition of
natural science. Summarizing sa vagely, we may present scientific thinking as
the brilliant working out of the consequences of adopting Descartes' second
rule for using the mind. 9 When faced with complexity, suggested Descartes in
1637. divide it up into separate parts and treat these one by one. The method of
science does precisely this: it represents the triumphant working out of this
principle. But it is not an all-powerful enquiring system, and in particular can
hardly cope with the kind of complexity associated with. for example,
biological organisms as whole entities or with real-world problems as opposed
to those defined by scientists within laboratories.
Systems thinking is a response to the impotence of reductionism in the face
of great complexity.
In all ages there have been systems thinkers, of course. thin I<ing in terms of
the emergent properties of wholes, but the conscious development of systems
ideas and the language to express them stems only from the late 1940s. The
systems movement is only 35-years-old.
The Systems Movement
In order to build a picture of the whole of the activity which constitutes the
systems movement. it is necessary to make a number of distinctions which
yield a map of it. 3 This "map" does not purport to describe the systems
movement unequivocally, since any particular piece of systems work may well
span several of the map's categories. But it does provide the minimum
necessary categories needed to enable any piece of work to be "placed" and
related to others. It is a typological rather thnn a representational mnp.
The first distinction is made between the development and/or use of systems
ideas as such and the development and/or use of systems ideas in other
disciplines. Within the former category we may now distinguish between the
development of systems ideas theoretically and their development in practice.
Finally within this latter category we may distinguish work which seeks to aid
decision-making, work on the engineering of "hard" (concrete) systems and
work on problem solving using the idea of "soft" (conceptual) systems. These
four distinctions yield the categories of systems-based work shown in
Figure I.
46 Pelt'r Check/£Il1d
I The systems movement
1 2 1 The study of systems Ideas as such
31 fhe theoretical development of
systems Ideas
32 The development of systems Ideas in
practice (problem solving)
4.1 Work with "hard"systems
(concrete)
4 2 Aid to decision-making
4 3 WorK with "sOft"systems
(conceptual!
~llcation of systems tn,nKlng In other
disciplines I
FIG. I C,11<,gllri", III '.I.\I"III.,-I>".\['<I lrilr/; /I""<I,,d 10 ",,,/('r,,I<lIId Ihe Srslellls
;\[')\('111('/11 <I.' " \'!Iol"
Examples of work which does fall to a considerable extent into one
category. and so illustrates that category. would be:
2.1
, ,
:1.1
4.1
4.2
4.:1
Dcveloping General System Theory.! ()
De\eloping a systems-thinking-based physical geography I I or con-
ceptualizing Social Work in systems terms. I 2
Developing the logical entailments of "all possible machines"] J or
estaolishing hierarchy theory.'4
DC\eloping systems engineering. 5
De\eloping RA N D systems analysis. 15
Developing "son" systems methodology.!
\ S~~tl'ms Approach
The se\en categories illustrated are sufficient to provide understanding of
,In y ~ystems-oriented ,tctivity ooserved in the real world and also to provide
the oasis ofa dclinition of what is meant oy"a systems approach". The phrase
,>uggests £I \\£11' lI!gllillg £Ihllll{{£Icf.:.IiIlR proh/elll.\. analogous to the phrases "an
ex peri men tal approach" or "a mathematical approach" (with both of which
approaches it is not incompatible). Tackling problems using a systems
,Ipproach implies not being reductionist. examining the complexity of the
proolcm situation using the ideas of "organized complexity" which systems-
thinking emoodies. The description "a systems approach" will most often be
associated with the use of categories 2.2 or :1.2 in Figure I. and the phrase is
prooaoly most used in connection with work based in 4.1 and 4.2. It is worth
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examining the nature of the systems approach embodied in systems analysis,
systems engineering and most operational research, and comparing it with
that emerging in the more recent work on "soft" systems methodology.
HARD SYSTEMS THINKING AND ITS "SYSTEMS APPROACH"
Both systems engineering (SE) and systems analysis (SA) imply a value
system which rates most highly the achievement of some practical end. In this
they resemble technology rather than science, whose prime value is the gaining
of new knowledge. I Both SE and SA aim to achieve practical results: a system
engineered to meet some defined need in the case ofSE, a rational appraisal of
the alternatives facing a real-world decision taker in the case of SA. Analysis
ofa dozen accounts of the methodology ofSE and SA published between 1955
and 19764 shows that all reduce to the same core proposition, which may be
taken as the defining characteristic of "hard" systems thinking:
problems can be expressed as the search for an efficient means of reaching a defined
objective or goal; once goals or objectives are defined, then systematic appraisal ,)f
alternatives. helped by various techniques, enables the problem (now one of selection) to be
solved.
"Hard" systems thinking is any structured problem solving which bases
itself on this goal-seeking schema. It is a powerful framework. and it is
manifestly successful in a large number of real problems. When President
Kennedy in his "Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs" (1961) set
the American nation the objective. "before this decade is out. oflanding a man
on the moon and returning him safely to earth", no matter how extensive the
resources required to do it, it was NASA's systems engineering which was able
to ensure that the objective was achieved. When the American Department of
Defence asks the RAND Corporation to appraise various radar systems. the
RAND systems analysts are well able to produce a cost-benefit analysis of the
alternatives.
Further reflection. however, suggests that these are very limited problems
indeed. They are well structured problems. That is a way of saying that they
are capable of being expressed as a search for an end which is taken as given. It
is their structure which makes systematic work possible. which defines from
the start what will be recognized as "a solution". But what if ends are
themselves problematical? Methodology which requires the means-end
schema is fundamentally excluded from the myriad problems of the real
world. which are unstructured problems in which objectives cannot be taken
as given. What should be done about inner-city problems? How should we
design our schools? How can a "satisfactory" balance be achieved between
industrial development and preservation of the natural environment? What
level of the risks associated with nuclear power ought we to tolerate? These
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and countless problems like them find "hard" systems thinking inappropriate.
They are the kind of ill-defined, unstructured problem which "soft" systems
thinking atlempts to tackle.
SOFT SYSTEMS THINKING AND ITS "SYSTEMS APPROACH"
"Soft" systems methodology provides a structured way of tackling ill-
structured problems without imposing on them either the means-end
dichotomy of "hard" methodology or. indeed, any other assertive schema of
this kind. It takes as its starting point not a problem but a situation in which at
least one person has at least a sense of unease, a feeling that some elements are
problematical and hence worth exploring. The methodology moves from
finding out about the situation to taking aetion within it, and does so not by
relying on experience, which is probably the most popular method of making
this transition, but by doing some careful. formally organized systems
thinking ahout the problem situation.
The initial conceptualization is in terms of the following elements: a
"problem solving system" which aspires to bring about "improvement" in a
"problcm content system"; and the roles: "client", "problem solver" and
"problem owner". The occupant of the client (or "sponsor") role causes the
study to happen, hut he may not he regarded by the problem solver as the
problem owner. The problem solver is free to assign any person or persons he
wishes to that role. and it is always insightful to consider several possibilities.
In many versions of a systems approach, including RA NO systems analysis
and Churchman's conceptualization, 1 h it is assumed that the systems thinking
is at the disposal of a client who is also the problem owner. We have found it
very useful to separate the two roles.
It is of course the case that one person or group of persons may occupy more
than one of the three roles. Later in the study a fourth role, he who can cause
things to happen. or not happen. in the problem situation becomes important
as feasible improvements are formulated. This is the hasic initial framework
within which soft systems methodology is used. Its stages will now be
describcd briefly.
After an initial expression of the problem situation has been assembled (for
which guidelines are availableK ) the would-be problem solver names some
hopefully relevant "human activity systems" ,\ 7 re/('\'(fnt. that is, to exploring
the problematical situation. These systems are named in "root definitions".
and models are built of the systems named. Techniques are available both for
formulating root definitions and for building models of human activity
systems \K. I" The models should exhibit alternative ways of viewing the
human activity regarded as relevant to problem solving. (For example. models
of thc human activity whose real-world manifestation is NASA might be
based on perceiving it as an engineering activity, as a political activity -
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Kennedy's justification for the moon landing was political - or as part of
"showbiz", given NASA's commitment to the televizing of its more
spectacular exploits.) When built and checked for logical coherence, the
models are brought into the problem situation and used to provide structure
for a debate with persons involved in the situation, who ought if possible to
include the "problem owners" implied by the choice of relevant system. The
debate is set up by formally comparing the models with the real-world problem
situation. This frequently entails enriching the expression of the problem
situation, and this may cause new relevant systems to be selected and new root
definitions to be formulated. The purpose pursued in the debate is the
definition of changes which persons in the problem situation regard as
meeting two criteria simultaneously: that they are systemically desirable,
given the systems thinking embodied in the root definitions. models and
comparison, and culturally feasible for these particular persons in their
particular historical setting. ]1' changes meeting the two criteria can be found
(if not, more radicaL or more conservative root definitions may be needed)
then action may be taken in the problem situation to implement them: the new
problem becomes that of seeking implementation, and the cyclic learning
process begins again.
The methodology outlined in the previous paragraph (and extensively
discussed in 1) was arrived at experientially through an action research
programme now underway for a decade. The process followed was that of the
cycle shown in Figure 2.
hence
thodoloqy ----=-:..:.
Create me C ~n from use
hence ~ce
Use methodology h
FIG. 2. The AII!0l'oielic Sr.>l l' III o( 1"1' Aclioll Reselll'c"
This self-constructing (autopoietic) system is of course an organisationally
closed system; at the start of the research a forcible entry was effected by
taking hard systems engineering methodology as given, applying it to
unsuitably soft problem situations. doing what the situation seemed to
demand when the hard methodology failed, and generalizing the results from
a number of studies. About 150 studies, mainly in problem situations of
modest size within organizations of various kinds, have now been completed
by Lancaster University researchers, by their associated University-owned
consultancy company ]SCOL Ltd., by members of the Open University
Systems Group, and others.
The crucial characteristic of the methodology lies in the nature of the
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concept at its core: the notion of the "human activity system". In the case of
the systems, natural or man-made, with which hard systems thinking deals, it
will be possible to achieve descriptions of them on which all agree: these might
be publicly testable descriptions of a machine which a systems engineer
proposes. for example, or accounts of the logical structure of the decision
taker's problem with which the RAND analyst is trying to help. In the case of
the human activity systems of soft-systems thinking, however, there will be
many possible accounts of them, all valid according to different Wel-
/({llsC!lulIlIllgl'll. (NASA is, among many other possibilities, validly an
engineering system, a political system or a "showbiz" system according to
three different images of the world which an autonomous observer is free to
adopt.) Hence the methodology is crucially different from systems engineer-
ing. RAN D systems analysis and classic operational research. Its models are
Ilot models of part of the real world, they are "ideal types", models of pure
perceptions of parts of the real world; they are used in the construction of a
systems-based learning process which is made formally explicit.
Thus the two systems approaches implicit in hard and soft systems thinking
are rather different. The systems approach of systems engineering and systems
analysis is a systematic progress towards definition of the system which
achieves the objective, the alternative which best meets the defined need: the
paradigm is fundamentally one of opt ill1i:::atiol1. The systems approach of the
more recent work. however. is a systemic exploration of perceptions: the
paradigm is one of Il'urnillg. The relation between the two would seem to be
that the hard paradigm is a special case of the soft: occasionally, in a minority
of real-world problems. a root definition can reduce to an "objective" which
can he taken as given. and learning reduces to optimizing.
The sort methodology. orchestrating an examination of the social process
which Vickers calls '"appreciation".20 can also be seen as an enquiring system
which maps interestingly on to Churchman's treatment of such systems l6
(apart. that is. rrom his assumption that the client or sponsor is also the
prohlcm owner).
Churchman examines tex ts hy five historical figures - Leihniz. Locke, Kant.
Hegel and the American philosopher Edgar Singer - taking them to be would-
he dcsigners of systems to produce sure knowledge. Using a hasic Leibnizian
model or a system which builds nets of contingent sentences which, being
neither ta utologous nor scff-contradictory. are candidates for "likely truths".
he examines: a Lockean enquirer which seeks consensus among the
community of enquirers; a Kantian;Hcgelian (dialectical) enquirer which
hrings in its designer's Wl'ltilllscllllllllllg as well as the operation of the system
itscl f. and opposes every world view to its '"deadliest enemy" in the search for
higher-level truth; and a Singerian enquirer which accepts enquiry as never
ending and summons '"an heroic mood" to go on both defending the status
quo and attacking it.
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In these terms the debate stage of soft systems inethodology explores the
possibility of a Lockean consensus, but does so by means of a
Kantian/Hegelian structure in which the debate is fed and structured by
systems models which represent constructed images and counter images based
on opposed root definitions. Overall, the acceptance that, unlike a RAND
analysis or a systems engineering project, a soft systems study is never finally
complete, shows the methodology to be a Singerian enquirer. Certainly those
who have used it have no doubt of the appropriateness of Singer's "heroic
mood"! In the language here developed, the systems approach of the soft
school sees the approach as a form of Singerian never-ending enquiry; the
hard systems approach, on the other hand, reveals itself to be a Lockean
enquirer which can assume a consensus on the objective to be achieved or the
system to be engineered.
This essential difference between the systems approaches of hard and soft
systems thinking could in principle be explored by using systems metho-
dology. The evaluation and development of systems analysis includes the
rethinking of the whole concept of systems analysis now going on. This
rethink presents us with a problem situation of the soft variety to which soft
systems methodology could be applied. The Appendix records an attempt to
do this.
SYSTEMS THINKING, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL REALITY
Clearly, systems thinkers employing a systems approach to problem
solving, whether working within the hard or the soft paradigm. are prepared
to intervene - in their different ways - in what in everyday language we call
"social systems". Further illumination of the idea of a systems approach
ought thus to be obtainable by relating the two versions of "a systems
approach" discussed above to some of the history of social science. We may
usefully ask: What theories of social reality are implicit in hard and soft
systems methodology? How does the history of. for example. the sociologists'
attempts to deal with the complexity of social phenomena illuminate the
nature of hard and soft systems thinking?
This is not a common strategy. The literature of the systems movement, like
that of management science. has shown itself remarkably indifferent to. not to
say ignorant of. the state of developments in sociology. even though anyone
using systems methodology (or the techniques of management science) is
seeking to secure change in a social system. Writing in 1976 Bryer and
Kistruck 21 claim not to have found a single attempt by a systems theorist to
justify his approach in sociological terms. What follows summarizes an
attempt to do precisely thaL I
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Intellectual Traditions in Sociology
Were sociology able to point to a significant body of empirically-derived
publicly-repeatable results, then its literature would contain substantive
accounts of the laws governing social interactions. What it does offer,
however, is a plethora of discussions of the nature of social theory and the
relations between it and philosophy. This does not necessarily establish the
waywardness of sociologists, rather it reflects the peculiar difficulties faced by
a science which cannot assume that repeatable happenings characteristic ofan
external reality can be discovered by disciplined observation. The nature of
social reality and the proper ways of investigating it scientifically are still
problematical issues in sociology.
The unresolved issue might perhaps be summarized as the question: is
sociology to be the study of objective social facts which transcend the
individuals who make up a society, or is it the study of the individual
subjective understandings which persons acquire of their social situations?
Both strands of thinking are heavily represented in the literature. The
tradition ofjimctiolla!isl11 sees social reality as consisting of social structures
which transcend individuals; the so called action approach gives primacy to the
individual actors who pursue their own activity and in so doing create social
reality as a process. 2 2 The literature may be seen as a debate conducted from
these two stances; at the level of philosophy they are the stances of positivism
and phenome!1ology.
The major founding figure of the first (functionalist) tradition, Emile
Durkheim, urges in The Rules ofSociological Method: "Consider social facts
as things". 2 3 The sociologist, in his view, should discover the law-like patterns
in which societal constraints affect individual behaviour. Sociological
explanation is then either causal or functional, the latter being an account of
how a particular social fact or characteristic meets a societal need, a need of
the social collectivity rather than of the individuals. Durkheim's theoretical
and empirical work (he investigated, for example, such social facts as the
suicide rates of societies) founds the tradition which becomes "structural
functionalism" or. more generally, "functionalism". This stance, with its view
of a social system as a set of relationships persisting through time as a result of
functional sub-systems which contribute to the equilibrium-maintaining
processes of the system as a whole, is normally taken to be the paradigm
example of the application of systems thinking within social science. That this
is a limited view emerges from consideration of the alternative tradition, that
deriving from Max Weber.
Weber ( 1864-1920) was a contemporary of Durkheim (1858-1917) but his
writings surprisingly make no mention of Durkheim or his work, even though
they share a methodological interest in the use of "ideal types" for analytical
purposes and oppose each other on substantive issues. Weber opposes the
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reification involved in Durkheim's approach; for him the basic concept of
sociology is the single deliberate action by an individual directed to affecting
the behaviour of others. Sociology's concern is the scientific understanding of
the subjective meaning associated with such action. Weber's aim was to create
an interpretive social science based upon analysis of meaningful action by the
method of Verstehen, placing oneself in the role of the individuals observed,
and interpreting using generalizations about typical pure processes of action.
Philosophically, the Durkheim tradition of "social facts" is underpinned by
the philosophy of positivism, according to which all true knowledge is based in
empirical data. 24 Weber's interpretive social science links philosophically to
phenomenology. In the former tradition there is a fairly clear distinction
between two kinds of work: developing the philosophical base and the
working out of practical methods. In the alternative tradition of phenome-
nology the distinction is much less clear. There is no phenomenological
equivalent of, for example, Merton's paradigm for functionalist analysis. 25
The most important figure in the development of the phenomenological
stance, which yields primacy to the mental processes of observers rather than
to sensorial evidence of an external world, is Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).
Husserl starts from the proposition that philosophical thinking needs to be
reformed because it starts not from the basic data of consciousness but from
concepts which already presuppose various theories. He wishes to eliminate
these in-built assumptions. He returns to Descartes' initial position ofextreme
doubt in which Descartes doubts everything except that he is himself thinking
his doubt. For Husserl Descartes' doubt was not radical enough, the "I am" of
Descartes being for Husserl only "a pure possibility generated by the
meaning-constituting activity of transcendental subjectivity". 26 Distinguish-
ing between the "natural attitude" in which, in order to live our everyday lives.
we make common-sense judgements about the reality of the world and its
events. and the phenomenological attitude. in which common-sense belief is
suspended. Husserl tried to develop a new method for philosophical thinking
based on the latter. Borrowing an expression from his own original discipline.
mathematics. he speaks of putting the real world "between brackets" as he
seeks the universal types among the data of pure consciousness. 27
Husserl wrote mainly about the methodology of his philosophy; the
development of a phenomenological orientation to sociology was taken up by
Alfred Schutz (1899-1959).28.29 Schutz. like Weber. takes as a problem the
need to reconcile the individual free to attribute meaning to what he observes
with the requirements of a rigorous scientific method; and he turns to H usserl
for a theory of subjectivity. But where Husserl considered the lived-in
everyday world of experience only as a preliminary to making "the
phenomenological reduction" to the pure data of consciousness. Schutz took
the lived-in world. the Lehenswelt, to be his main concern: his programme is to
discover the structure of that world. to investigate the types ofeveryday taken-
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for-granted knowledge and to find out how they are socially structured and
distributed. For the individual his stock of knowledge, a sedimentation of
previous experiences and his definitions of them, will be relevant in three
senses: thematically, motivationally and interpretationally relevant according
to how typical or atypical we judge our current experiences to be. When
Sch utz writes that the task of social science is:
[0 investigate to what extent the different forms of systems of relevancy in the life-world -
motivational, thematical' and. most of all interpretational systems - are socially and
culturally conditioned
we can perceive links both with Vickers' notions of appreciative systems20
and with the content of soft systems methodology. There, the debate with
actors in the problem situation (at the "comparison stage") is set up by
comparing some pure systems models with expressions of the problem
situation itself: the task is precisely to elucidate the thematic, motivational and
interpretational relevance of these particular "relevant systems" for these
particular actors in their particular situation.
This brings us near to a position in which we can attempt to relate hard and
soft systems methodology, and their underlying assumptions, to the general
framework of sociological theory. But finally, in outlining that framework, it
is useful to mention briefly the contribution of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911),
philosopher of hermeneutics, the theory, art or skill of interpreting and
understanding the products of human consciousness.3o Dilthey, whose work
H usserl recognized as an anticipation of phenomenology, sought to establish
that the subject matter of the human sciences was intrinsically different from
that of the natural sciences, being concerned not with external facts but with
expressions of the human mind which become cultural artefacts. His
interpret.ive method for understanding society and history, the "hermeneutic
circle", is a means of learning to perceive social entities as both wholes and
parts. A preliminary overview of subject matter guides an examination of
what the parts denote: this clarifies the concept of the whole, which at the end
of the cycle must be perceived so that all the parts can be related to it. Thus
there are no fixed or absolute starting points, only an iterative cycle which
grad ually leads to increased understanding of social reality. The hermeneutic
circle opposes a Cartesian faith in any self-evident starting point - such as is
manifest in the hypothesis-to-be-tested of positivist natural science, in the
objective to be achieved in RAND analysis, and in the system-to-be-
engineered of systems engineering methodology.
To summarize this bare outline of some major intellectual traditions within
sociology: we have in phenomenology and hermeneutics an attitude towards
social science which takes as its prime datum not the world external to
observers of it, but the observer's own mental processes. This extension of the
interpretive tradition of sociology offers a "human-culturalistic" approach to
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compare and contrast with the "positivist-naturalistic" approach of the
Durkheimian tradition. J ! In the former, human beings in the social process
are constantly creating the social world in interaction with others. They are
negotiating their interpretations of reality, while those multiple interpre-
tations' at the same time constitute the reality itself. There is no "pre-given
universe of objects" but one which is "produced by the active doing of
subjects" (GiddensJ2).
The Two Approaches and their Models of Social Reality
We are now in a position to elucidate the models of social reality which the
hard systems approach (RAND systems analysis, systems engineering and
operational research) and the soft systems approach (soft systems metho-
dology) embody within their theory and practice. This can be done by trying
to place these approaches on the two dimensional typologies of social theory
which appear with some regularity in the literature of social science.
RuncimanJJ contrasts the axis holism-individualism with the axis positivism-
intuitionism; Robertson's axesJ4 are subjectively-objectively and sociality-
culturality. For my purpose the most useful typology is that recently advanced
by Burrell and Morgan. J5 Their axes are on the one hand: regulation-radical
change, and on the other: subjective-objective. This choice gives the
framework of Figure 3, in which the four quarters yield the sociologies of
"functionalism", "interpretive sociology", "radical humanism" and "radical
structuralism".
Sociology of radical change
Subjective
Radical humanis~ Radical structuralism
Anarchist ic
individualism
11"-- ......I~al', -----.....I theory \ ( Conflict )I , theoryI t
/\'~'I I ~\ Hermeneutics,
Phenomenology I SocialU' I systemp,henomenologlful theory
~~~ogy/ \......../
Interpretative sociology Funcltona list sociology
SOCiology of regulation
FIG. 3. A Tr!'o(ogy or Sociology (".tier BII,.,.d(alld Morgall")
Objecllve
They place "social system theory" in the cell which combines a concern for
regulation with a would-be objective approach to social phenomena. The
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Durkheim tradition resides here. Burrell and Morgan specifically mention
Bertalanffy,36 Parsons37 and Katz and Kahn 38 as relevant systems
theorists. It is clear that it is in this area that we find the social theory implicit in
systems engineering, RAN 0 systems analysis and formal OR, with their
emphasis on heing scientific and their supposition that the world contains
systems which can be observed, modelled, and optimized. But this is only one
of many possible social theories, as the Burrell/Morgan and the other
typologies demonstrate.
The social theory of soft systems methodology, with its emphasis on the
process or learning and its acceptance that its models of human activity
systems are models of perceptions, not models of complex reality, clearly lies
in the left hand cells of the typology, with hermeneutics and phenomenology.
But the position would not be too far left of the centre line because the
methodology will over a period of time yield a picture of the common
structurings or the social collectivities within which it works. Also, given the
would-be problem solver's complete freedom to select relevant systems which,
when compared with the expression or the problem situation, embody either
incremental or radical change, the area occupied must include some of the
subjective/radical cell. Here the extension of the area towards the "radical
change" axis will be limited by the desire to achieve action in the real world; in
practice. defining changes which are "culturally feasible" has led so far to
rather conservative use of the methodology - but this is a matter of practice so
rar. rather than principle.
This analysis illustrates sharply the difference between the systems
approaches of hard and soft systems thinking. It does not seem possible to
estahlish the proposition that they are identical; the possible link between
them is that in certain instances of real-world problem solving, shared
assumptions. overlapping Wellal1sc!lllllllllgel1, common "appreciative set-
tings" among persons in the problem situation may lead to agreement to
analyse rationally a particular decision. to optimize a particular system.
Sometimes a Singerian enquiry may find itself with a Lockean consensus: the
hard paradigm is a special case of the soft.
A modest test of the coherence of this examination of the social
assumptions or a systems approach emerges from the fact that the social
theory of soft systems methodology - the dotted area of Figure 3 - occupies
the area in which Burrell and Morgan locate the "Critical Sociology" (or
"Critical Theory") of the theorists of the Frankfurt School. 39 . ~o This was not
noted until the analysis had been completed, and derives some interest from
the ract that the leading theoretician or the Frankfurt School, Jiirgen
Hahermas, has mounted an attack on systems theory as he perceives it,
regarding it as one more example of the cultural manipulation of Western
society by the science-and-technology-dominated purposive-rational mode of
thought.-+ I Critical Sociology is certainly intrinsically opposed to hard
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systems methodology, Habermas arguing that although the model of a self-
regulating system could in principle be restricted to analytical purposes and
not used for design, in fact "the transferral of the analytical model to the level
of social organization is implied by the very approach taken by systems
analysis" .42 And that approach, for Habermas, leads to a negative Utopia he
seeks to avoid by achieving the "communicative competence"43 which
enables "public unrestricted discussion, free from domination, of the
suitability and desirability of action-orienting principles and norms".42 This
clearly distances Habermas from hard systems thinking; what of the
alternative paradigm?
Mingers has recently made a detailed comparison between Habermas'
Critical Theory and soft systems methodology.44 He finds a major difference
stemming from Critical Theory's overtly political stance, systems metho-
dology having no theory of how the structure of society (for example its
stratification) might limit fundamentally the debate the systems approach sets
up. But the similarities are perhaps more significant: both take seriously the
problem of human action, at once purposive/rational (hence capable in
principle of being engineered) and "natural", or unchangeable; both conclude
that hard systems analysis, tied to technical rationality, cannot cope
adequately with the multi-valued complexities of the real world; and both,
denying the inevitability of the divorce between rationality and values which
characterizes natural science, try to bring the two together in rational
communicative interaction.
So the case can be made for mapping the social theory of soft systems
methodology on to the dotted area indicated in Figure 3.
MATCHING SITUATION AND METHODOLOGY
Conclusion
I ha ve argued:
that the phrase "a systems approach to tackling problems" is usually
applied to that part of the systems movement containing hard (systematic)
systems methodology- RAND analysis, systems engineering etc. (areas
4.1, 4.2, of Figure I).
- that their paradigm of optimization links with an implied functionalist
social theory.
- that recent work on soft systems methodology offers a new view of "a
systems approach" (area 4.3 of Figure I) and develops a systemic process of
enquiry whose aim is learning rather than optimization.
- that soft systems methodology's implicit social theory is phenomenological
(offering a formal way of following the hermeneutic circle).
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- that the hard systems approach is a special case of the soft systems
approach.
Finally, in completing this examination ofct systems approach it is useful to
examine it from the point of view: the problems tackled, rather than: the
problem-solving methodology used. This further illuminates the notion of"a
systems approach"'.
Any belief in the value of coherently-organized enquiry assumes that the
world, both "natural" and social, is not capricious but shows regularities. In
the case of systems thinking the observer chooses to make systemic intellectual
constructions and anticipates useful learning from attempting to map them on
to real-world complexities. This suggests a way of looking at the types of
phenomena or problem situations which the world may contain. Such
phenomena and/or situations can be expected to show interconnectedness,
and this, we may anticipate, will lead to there being several different types of
phenomena or situations:
Trfll' J. Situations or phenomena characterized by interconnections which are
part of t!ll' rl'gu/l/ritil's ott/Ii' u/lil'cl"Sl.'. Examples would be frogs, foxgloves,
ecological systems. systems of chemical reactions.
Trflc ::. Situations characterized by interconnections which derive from the
logic of sit lIl/t iO/ls. Examples would be arrangements to manufacture or
assemble rroducts. or situations dominated by a decision about to be taken in
order to achieve a known objective.
Trflc J. Situations in which interconnections are cultural, situations
dominated by t!ll' /l/I.'imi/lgs a{{rihuted to their pcrceptio/ls hy aU{()f1OI1JOUS
O!JSCIT('/".I. Most real-world problem situations are of this type, both on the
small scale (e.g. how should we behave towards ageing parents?) and on the
large (e.g. should the nuclear deterrent be abandoned?).
In this perspective it is clear that the hard systems approach was developed
in. and is suitable for use in, situations of Types I and 2. (Natural science deals
with phenomena of Type 1). The soft systems approach is for use in the kind of
situation in which it was developed. which were of Type 3.
The most freq uent error in using a systems approach is to try to treat Type 3
situations as if they were Type 2. The logic of situations does of course playa
large rart in the real-world. but it is not necessarily a determining part. and
methodology based on the assumption that it is. is bound eventually to pass
the rroblems by.
In any case. examination even ora situation "c/I'l/rly" of Type I or Type 2
can most usefully start with an examination of the CO/ltl'xt in which a Type I or
TYre 2 situation is perceived. T!Iis CO/ltcxt Irill itsclfhl' l/ situalio/l of Typl.' 3,
since the decision to see a situation as "Type I"' or 'Tyre 2" excludes other
rossible attributions of meaning. This emphasizes again that the hard systems
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approach and its methodology needs to be seen as a special case of the soft
systems approach and soft systems methodology.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
The Changing Process of Systems Analysis:
An Outline Systems Analysis
Author's Note: During the meeting "Rethinking the Process of Systems Analysis" at IIASA
25th-29th August 1980, stimulated by the papers presented and by the importance of the
topic under discussion, I reflected upon the event itselfby carrying out a brief systems study
of it using the "soft systems methodology" I had discussed earlier in the paper "Rethinking
A Systems Approach". The outcome of that outline study was presented to the final
discussion and is summarized here.
INTRODUCTION
A meeting at which knowledgeable practitioners from several countries
discuss the process of systems analysis with a view to "rethinking" it, may
itself be regarded as a problem situation - one perhaps susceptible to systems
analysis? [I' so, it is not systems engineering or RAND-style systems analysis
which will be appropriate, since there is here neither a client seeking an
efficient means to a known-to-be-desirable end nor an obvious system-to-be-
engineered. It is this kind of unstructured problem situation in which (and for
which) soft systems methodology was developed. t What follows is therefore
a brief (and immediate) outline "soft" systems analysis of the problem of
rethinking the process of systems analysis.
METHODOLOGY
[n soft systems methodology a would-be neutral "rich picture" of the
problem situation is assembled. [n the light of it a few relevant human activity
systems are selected, "relevant" that is, hopefully, to bringing about useful
change. These relevant systems are named in "root definitions" and models of
the systems are then built which can be compared with the expression of the
problem situation. The purpose of the comparison is to provide a structured
debate about change, change which people within the situation deem both
desirable and feasible.
In the outline study presented here, the picture of the problem situation
suggested that what was needed was a way of viewing a complex many-
stranded debate within the systems movement, a debate which begins to
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resemhle a "paradigm shirr', in Kuhn's terms 2 Two relevant systems were
selected; in order to progress rapidly, their root definitions were set out in
terms of their necessary elements as expressed by the mnemonic CATWOE. J
The comparison was then done at the level of the root definitions, omitting
model huilding in the interest of speed. The comparison stage comprised
hringing together the C ATWOE elements orthe two root definitions and their
equivalents in real-world systems analysis. It was not possible to take the
study further, since what was now required was a dehate involving the real-
world owners or this prohlem situation (rather than recommendations based
only upon the analyst's own value system). However, it is suggested that this
small study docs provide a userul framework in which the issue of the future of
systems analysis can be discussed coherently.
RICH PICTURE
The rich picture here consisted of the many pages of notes through which I
had sought hath to follow and contribute to the discussions. The flavour of it
can he conveyed through some of the significant quotations I had recorded:
I. Mathematics is not enough ... how can SA cope with ethics ... this being
essential when people starve in a world of plenty.
"") Criticism is essential ... hest done via dialectics. 30 years ago OR was the
Antithesis to the then ways of managing ... now we hear people saying
"that prohlem is not OR".
3. The systems analyst places his expertise at the disposal or the legitimate
authority in the situation; he works within the decision taker's values.
4. There is need 1'01' proressionals to develop the allfi skills ...
5. SA seeks to improve "procedural rationality", the process of decision
making, rather than individual decisions.
6. There is a gap hetween theory and practice '" the "tool makers"
dominate the profession.
7. As professiolls emerge so do what they define as "prohlems". The
amateur landscape gardener of genius was known as "Capability"
Brown. not "Prohlematica'" Brown. He explored the capahilities of a
piece of terrain. not "solved" its "prohlems".
X. SA frequently serves political masters: hut the logic of politics is not the
logic of SA.
9. There is a long history of advisors priests, lawyers. court jesters now
we have systems analysts. Criteria for "good" or "bad" SA are not clear,
so exa mining its process is essential. IrSA is to adopt "t~dlibilism"(ra ther
than "falsification", which seems inappropriate) then we need the
"conventional" definition of "1~I1se" from I{,e COl/llI/lillity of workers.
Note that the other advisor-professions value highly the procedures not
the solutions ... note the lawyers' concern for the "due processes" oflaw.
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10. SA is in a paradigm shift. Social paradoxes (man in nature/man in
society) lead to logical paradoxes - the system of systems, the set of sets .
. . . Dialectical thinking might provide a new paradigm but obstacles to
its adoption arise from the condition of society.
II. Because SA leads to action (not learning) its theory is important. because
that theory will "validate" the action. SA joins clients in articulating and
elaborating the components of reflection he/iI/"(' IIclion.
12. SA needs better descriptions of methodological guidelines in context.
IIASA needs curriculum designers and text book writers as well as
research specialists. You have to be able to agree with oneself.
13. (In reply to the last sentence) No! No! No!
14. The direction now is towards "systems studies" in which many scenarios
are studied rather than the alternatives for one decision.
15. The emphasis is moving to "actors" not "organization", "legitimacy"
not "efficiency".
16. It is often said the field needs a Newton. It's a poor metaphor; it needs a
Jung or a Freud.
17. We need to ask what a dialectical theory of management would be like.
Dialectical debate needs assumptions to be surfaced and mapped.
18. A seminar of medical practitioners would not be like this.
ROOT DEFINITIONS OF RELEV ANT SYSTEMS
The very existence of a discussion like the one in question implies "an
analyst"' and "a real-world and its problems", a world in which the analyst
wishes to make useful inttrvention. He is assumed to possess a particular set of
reasonably unilied concepts and procedures. as is shown by the t~lct that they
have a name meaningful to many people: "systems analysis". At a very basic
level. then, a relevant notional human activity system is that shown in
Figure I.
Would - be problem
solver. ~he"systems ~.
analyst 1L
\ Possesses and
Intends to use
Relevant
to "
FIG. I. TI,,' I,,,s;c "',.d."'''''' SI"S/('II/
Obviously in such a system an important factor will be Ihe rrlll/ion o!"M 10
R, since it is unlikely that useful intervention will follow from too great a mis-
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match: a mathematical methodology M, for example, will have little impact
on an R which consists of aesthetic problems. With that in mind, and noting
that our problem theme is the nature of systems analysis, we may make a root
definition of the basic system in which R is taken to contain systems, to be
systemic and M is a systematic examination of those systems. This implies
systematic examination of systems in the real world as a means of problem
solving. This root definition, which we may call ,Paradigm 1, is clearly
mappable on to classic systems analysis and systems engineering.
Expressing Paradigm I in this way immediately directs thoughts to counter
definitions based on ditTerent world views. Ifwe transfer the systemicity within
the root definition from R to M, for example, we have Paradigm 2, a root
definition in which a systemic M in vestigates a problematical R. Clearly this
version will map on to soft systems thinking rather than hard. Let us proceed
with these two root definitions.
COMPARISON
Following the process of soft systems methodology within this study. we
can elaborate the root definitions which I have called Paradigms I and 2 by
enumerating the CATWOE elements. Ifweexamine the real-world versions of
these for "text-hook" applications of classic systems analysis/systems
engineering and soft systems methodology. we can by this means set up the
"comparison" stage of the chosen methodology. This will take us very quickly
through a !irst iteration of the methodology stages. and also yield analytical
clarity. Taking this approach does not deny that the exigencies of actual -
rather than "text book" . applications lead to what is often a rather messy
dealing with both hard and soft considerations.
[The reader will have noticed that I am myself in this study using the
methodological guidelines of soft systems methodology flexibly. It is an
example of what Naughton 4 calls the use of "strategic rules" rather than the
"constitutive rules" which define the methodology.]
Table I sets Ollt the comparison of Paradigms I and 2. done in the way
described.
When we compare the columns for Paradigms I and 2 with the sample
quotations which express the problem situation, we see that I'irtl/al/.\' al/ the
poillis the,l' II/ake eitha assat Paradigm I (jiJI' I!xil/llple lIl/otatiolls 3, 7.8)
assat Paradiglll:! (2,14.15) or cOlltelllp/atl! a slllji FOIII olle to the other ( I. 5.
f(). 17)
The next methodological step in this study (which happens to be using a
"Paradigm 2" methodology - soft systems methodology) would be to draw
the problem owners into the debate on the comparison between the root
definitions and the expression of the problem situation. the preliminary
comparison being that summarized in Table I and the preceding paragraph.
This is not here possible. of course. so it is necessary to end this !irst iteration at
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TABLE I. "Catll'oe" elementsJ for the root definitions paradigms 1 and 2
C "Customers"
A "Actors"
T "Transformation"
W "Weltanschauung"
o "Owners"
E "Environmental
constraints"
Victims and
beneficiaries of what
the system does
Those who carry
out the system
activities
What input does
this system
transform into what
output?
The world view
which makes it
meaningful to
consider this system
Those who could
demolish this
notional system.
could prevent it
from acting
The things in its
environment which
this system takes as
given
Paradigm I.
Hard systems
thinking
Decision-makers
who command real-
world systems
External analysts
and engineers
Information into
advice to decision-
makers
R is systemic
M is systematic
Optimization is
possible
Decision-
makers/clients
Power struct ures
and value systems of
the decision-maker-
clients
Paradigm 2.
Soft systems
thinking
Participants who
debate the
differences between
the models and the
expression of the
problem situation
Those who choose
to take part:
analysts and/or
problem owners
Information into
specific learning for
the "actors"
R is problematical
M is systemic
Learning is possible
"Actors" as defined
above. or the
analyst
As little as possible
compatible with
achieving change in
the problem
situation
this point. Although the work of only an hour or two, however, this study
serves to sharpen discussion of issues related to the future development of the
process of systems analysis. And it leaves us with a slightly sharper way of
expressing the problem. It leaves us with the question: what are the intelIectual
and institutional problems ofa changing mode ofenquiry as it moves from the
professional appraisal of a relatively welI-defined problem to a dialectical
enquiry which orchestrates the interaction of clashing value systems?
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Thought and Wisdom*
C. WEST CHURCHMAN
I still remember the astonishment I felt when, about 2 years go, I was called
to jury duty in Marin County, California. A group of us formed a panel, and a
random selection process asked one person after another to answer some
questions. One of the questions (apparently of central importance) asked the
prospective juror whether he or she could separate in his mind the process of
judging whether a certain young man was guilty or innocent of an armed
robbery of a restaurant, from the processes that would follow (e.g.
imprisonment or release).
To me the answer was perfectly obvious: of course not. Here was a system,
one of the components of which a jury trial. and another component was the
so-called criminal justice system which I'd long since decided was fraught with
inequities. The jury trial had a reasonable chance of throwing the young man
into the jaws of this criminal justice system. How could I conceivably stand up
and declare that the two processes - the trial and the subseq uent justice system
- were systemically separable?
But to my astonishment, one after another of my fellow citizens
unhesitatingly answered the judge in the affirmative. Indeed, none of them
even asked his honour to explain what the question meant (to a systems
philosopher its meaning is quite obscure). Not all the candidate jurors were
selected. (One loving wife of a police officer actually believed that officers
make more accurate witnesses than non-officers .- a devotion beyond the call
of marital duty, I'd say.) But none was rejected because he declared he could
not separate the trial from its possible aftermaths.
So I sat there with considerable nervousness as to what I should say when
called upon. My uppity ego was telling me to tell the judge "I am a systems
expert and the question is absurd since the answer is obviously 'no'. All social
systems are strongly nonseparable with respect to their components, and this
one is clearly no exception. If your honour would take the time to read a few of
my books, you'd know this is so and not bother us by asking foolish
* A revised version or this papa tirst given at IIASA became the tirst lecture in the ninth and
tinal Gaither Lecture Series. given at the University or Calirornia. Berkeley. May. 1981.
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questions'" My more cautious (cowardly?) ego asked whether such a reply
might not evoke a "contempt of court" sentence. "But I al17 contemptuous of
the court". said the brave ego. Luckily the random number system wisely
never got to calling me.
When I got home. I thought I could see why everyone else was so quick to
say "yes". To them, it must have seemed obvious that the young man had
entered the restaurant at a certain time and used a gun to demand money, or
else he had not done anything of the kind. The past contained one oflhese two
facts. and the jury trial was being used to determine which fact had occurred.
It was not heing used to draw inferences about what should happen in the
future to the young man; that would be up to thejudge, parole officers, prison
officers, etc.
But to me this piece of ontology was quite deceptive. One could believe,
reasonably enough, that history contains an episode at a certain place and
time (the happenings in the restaurant at 6.15 p.m. on a certain date), but
decide /lot to undergo the process of discovering whether history contains it.
To use perhaps too superficial an example. I do believe that beneath the
surface of my front yard there are some old gold pieces, or else not. But
nothing would induce me to take shovel in hand to try to find out, even if I had
found a letter in the house from some prior resident saying he had buried them
there.
The point is that once you dig for facts or coins. you change a lot of other
things as well, and these changes may not be ones you want. Ofcourse, I think
most of the potential jurors would recognize one feature of the situation that
makes fact-finding nonseparable from the aftermath, namely, that they
determine the fact incorrectly, a common enough mistake on the part ofjuries
no matter how sincere and "objective"' they try to be. But I suppose that most
of them believed the error could be as much one way as the other: to
incarcerate the innocent is (for them) about the same as freeing the guilty.
Indeed. they are not alone in this regard: science's typical way of expressing its
findings in terms of a sample mean plus or minus an error term expresses the
same idea. In the case of science, one often doesn't know the "other things"
that people will create from the findings, but surely a guilty man free in the
streets is a totally different event from an innocent man in a cell. Since I'm
fairly sure that the system that holds people in cells - innocent or not - is
incredibly inequitahle. how can I wilfully join a subsystem - the jury trial -
that so often puts people there'!
I really should not ha ve been too surprised at the behaviour of my fellow
jurors, because I've heen living a lifetime among fellow academics who firmly
helieve there is a clear distinction between the determination of facts and the
determination of ethical values. I suspect they have no adequate defence of the
argument just given which connects the two determinations ("should this
particular fact he determined?" is an ethical issue); but I also suspect they ha ve
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never posed the issue in this manner. What has been strange to me is that
operational researchers, city planners, policy analysts, and others of their
kind, also believe that the separation of fact-determination from ethical-
determination is real. Indeed, many of them do not seem to believe that the
determination of ethical values belongs in their business, which is essentially
an inquiry into plans.
To illustrate, during the past 16 years at Berkeley, the Center for Research
in Management has presented a series of lectures in Systems Science, the first
having been given by Charles Hitch 1 in 1965. With one exception, none of the
lecturers addressed the question of the proper determination of ethical values
at all. even though I believe that everyone of them assumed some ethical
foundation in his work. Hitch assumed that there should be a well designed
military administration in the USA. Schultze 2 assumed that there are good
and bad (evil?) budget designs. Rivlin 3 assumed that social experimentation
should be conducted for the good of the country. Macy4 implicitly assumed
that public broadcasting, if "properly" conducted, is a "good thing". well
worth fighting for. Vickers 5 believed that our social world is in peril. and
society needs redesigning of responsibilities to reduce the peril. Simon 6 said
that the use of artificial intelligence to bring some of us up to the level of being
"satisficed" is a good thing. Raiffa,7 whose topic surely called for an ethical
discussion since he dealt with arbitration and negotiation, cleverly shied away
from all ethical issues except those dealing with his version of logical
consistency. The exception was Jantsch 8 who did discuss at some length the
relationship between matters of morality and his theory of universal
evolution. But he lets method (paradigm) lead, and problems come second.
The story of the Gaither Lectures is repeated in many other contexts: city
planning departments which practically forbid classroom discussion ofethics.
operational research texts which never mention ethical issues the student may
confront in the future. public policy schools which ignore the ethical
foundations of policy, and so on. Schools of Business Administration in the
USA often have departments which teach courses on law and society where
ethical issues are addressed. but ethics is handled by case methods or exercises.
rather than reading the history of ethics.
If I may add one more mystery to the story. the avoidance of the issue of
how to determine ethically justified values is a fairly recent occurrence in the
so-called "scientific'" community. In the classical age of Greek science, from
the pre-Socratics through Plato. Aristotle. and on into the Hellinistic period.
the issue was central to all science. Much more recently. the age that saw the
creation of modern science, and most especially the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries in the West. regarded the issue as among the most
important ones that science must face. I leave it to those who are more astute
than I in understanding historical causes, to tell us what happened in the
nineteenth century that turned the intellectual community away from basic
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ethical issues. I sometimes suspect that my most beloved and admired Kant
had a lot to do with it. Rather, it was Kant's idea that the creation of
knowledge of the phenomenal world 9 is totally different from the creation of
moral knowledge that did the trick. The post-Kantian scientists then
concluded tha t intellectually one could dwell in the first world and simply have
"non-scientific'" opinions in the second, a conclusion that I am sure Kant
never intended.
The title of this chapter is '"Thought and Wisdom". Here I would like to
suggest one notion of the topic, namely, that wisdom is thought combined
with a concern for ethics. This is a highly intellectual idea about wisdom, and
may indeed emanate from thought itself. In any event, it leads me to say that
the science of Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was far wiser than the so-called science of the twentieth
century
I now would like to spell out in more detail the very common philosophical
position that in effect is one version of the epistemology of planning.
To give this epistemology a label, I'll call it bounded systems thinking. It
begins with the ontological assumption that the world of human affairs
consists of problems and possible solutions: problems really exist. and the first
task is to identify and describe them, a task that is not radically different from
an entomologist's description of insects in a given volume of earth.
These planners differ from the natural scientist in the manner in which they
assign importance to the problems they find. Problems, for them, become
important to the extent that people are legitimately concerned about them. If
possible, it is objectively neater if people's concerns are based on a certain kind
of legitimacy, say, economic cost. I recently served as chairman of a USA
National Academy of Sciences committee on how to get more USA drivers to
wear their safety belts (apparently only one in seven does so at the present
time). It was only natural for the committee members to try to show that the
concern about safety belts was legitimate, and to many of them the proof of
the legitimacy was the economic cost to the nation and its industries of the
failure of drivers to wear them. Apparently. basing legitimacy on economic
costs seemed to most of the committee members a calmer, more thoughtful
approach than simply getting angry at the carelessness of people who got
themselves and others killed by their failure to wear safety belts.
Now the reason, I think. that these planners want to formulate the problem
first. is that such a step provides feasible boundaries to the ethical issues, which
need no further defence. "All will agree that needless waste of economic
resources is highly undesirable, and that remedies must be found to reduce or
eliminate the waste." The keen interest the USA has taken in productivity is
just another example of this kind of thinking.
I don't believe I've ever seen a textbook in operational research or planning
that did not state that the first task was to formulate the problem, including
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the text that I and a number ofother authors wrote in 1957. 10 We are to search
among the insect population for those that do the most damage, and then
make models and gather data to tell us how to minimize the harm they create.
By behaving in this manner, we also reduce to a minimum our responsibility to
defend our planning activities on an ethical basis.
IIASA is a good example of the kind of planning I've been describing;
indeed, it has been organized by "problem areas", without any explicit
justification: energy, food, human settlements, etc. Its Charter announces that
it will address the problems of peace in the world, as though the problems of
peace could readily be separated from the problems of war. Perhaps a very
naive political question is to ask an Institute devoted to studying human
systems to explain what kind of system the Institute is, and to justify its
existence or nonexistence on the basis of its reply.
One takes a step from thought towards wisdom if one asks thought itself to
examine one of its most precious assumptions. To do this, suppose we explore
in a "'what if' mode for awhile. What if problems are not like insects that
populate a volume? What if the so-called problems are all tightly in-
terconnected, every problem being an aspect of all the others?
I can ask one of my mentors, Anaxagoras, to illustrate this speculation. In
the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., many brilliant Greek physicists were asking
about the nature of the reality we humans inhabit. They proceeded in their
inquiry by the method of analysis, which means breaking down reality to
irreducible elements, and then showing how the elements can be used to
explain all the complicated objects we observe: tables, buildings, grass, lakes.
mountains, etc. The process is very similar to the method that systems analysis
uses in building its models out of "elementary" variables. Water, or
water-air--earth-fire, or other possibilities were explored by these "pre-
Socratic" thinkers. Anaxagoras took a non-analytic approach. He said, in
effect. that no matter how far one goes in breaking an object down to parts and
subparts and sub-subparts, the resulting piece of reality still contains
everything: "in every thing is everything". He did add one strange exception:
not every thing has a "rational principle" ("nous"), a point nl return to in a
moment.
Hence. the "what if' I'd like to explore is this: in every so-called problem of
humanity is to be found all other problems, no matter how minutely we
analyse.
We can also add Anaxagoras' exception: in every problem is to be found all
other problems, except the rational principle. The "rational principle" I take
to mean the ethical principles that justify any approach we take to better the
social condition. That is. we need an "unbounded" systems approach which
must include a study of the ethics of humanity, not within a problem area. but
universally.
I should now add that the speculation I'm trying to design does /lot exclude
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problems from the reality of the planner. Indeed, all planning begins with a
problem. There is a close analogy here with the beginning of Kant's Critique of
P"re R('l/sol1, where Kant says "That all knowledge begins with experience,
there can be no doubt". The unwary are apt to conclude "here'sjust another
empiricist". except that Kant immediately goes on to tell us that knowledge
must contain more than experience. e.g. nonexperiential universals. By
analogy. my speculation says that all planning begins with a problem, but
should not be confined to the problem statement. Furthermore, the beginning
should not be a clear problem formulation, but rather should be an utterance
of moral outrage. John Dewey once said that problems arise from "felt
needs". but I think this is much too mild a statement. Problems arise for all of
us personally when we see people being badly treated by other people; for
example, helpless people treated in ways that arouse our moral feelings. One
very sad aspect of a great deal of planning research is that the roots of the
"Request-for-Proposals" are cut off at the very start; no wonder the plant
withers and dies as proposals. interim and final reports are written.
For example; the problem of world-wide starvation is morally outrageous:
that a species that has the resources to feed every member adequately and the
intelligence to do so. in fact lets millions starve. But my speculation says that
this problem should unfold into other problems, of national politics, of world
trade. of religion, of culture. etc. To try to define "starvation" carefully at the
outset tends. I think. to prevent the unfolding. so that we planners remain
stuck in the bounded problem region.
I should also add to the picture the idea that moral outrage does not judge
the importance of problems in terms of numbers. either numbers of people or
numbers of dollars. Recently, I was asked to write a piece about Locke.
California. a town that was founded by the Chinese railroad workers of a
couple of generations ago. Now there are only about twenty of the eighty-
year-old men left. The state planners want to make Locke into a state
historical monument for tourists. while a developer from Hong Kong wants to
make it a kind of "Chinese Disneyland". No one had asked the old men what
they wanted until a young man decided to make a video tape of the town. The
old men wanted to be left alone to die in their town. with no tourists and no
redesign. One could not help feeling moral outrage that the lives of the old men
were being treated as means only by the state planners and the developers. No
matter that there arc "only" twenty old men who will live for "only" 5 to 10
years more. The moral outrage is still quite strong. I might add, of course, that
if the numbers are very high. as in the case of murdered Jews in World War II,
or starving kids in the world today. then moral outrage may be accompanied
by moral astonishment and horror.
The point is that the problem of Locke will eventually unfold into the larger
and larger systems problem. to the problems of the aged in our society. to the
problems of resources for all the needy. and so on. The beginning. the image
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that starts us on the pathway of understanding, need not be very "large" at all.
The speculation I am trying to depict has an awesome quality which is
caught by the etymology of the verb "to decide", the meaning of which comes
from the Latin verb "to cut". A decision cuts away all the other possible
threads of human life, most of them never to occur in the reality of one
person's lifetime. This seems patently true to most of us as we reflect in ageing
on our decisions about marriage, children, jobs, education, friends, and
enemies. Imagination has no difficulty in showing us what "it might have
been", and as imagination performs its task of designing a film about our
other possible lives, mood accompanies the film with feelings such as "Thank
God it never happened", "What if it had happened?", or "What joy there
would have been".
The awe arises from the reflection that we humans were born into a world
where decisions to act cut off the realization of all sorts of possible designs of
human living, finally and forever. Speculative history can draw upon this
reflection as a rich source: a history where Lincoln decided not to go to Ford's
Theatre, or Caesar not to cross the Rubicon, or Hitler to invade England early
in World War II.
Now it is perfectly reasonable for thought to argue that all decisions we
humans believe we make are not real. Indeed, thought of the past had some
pretty strong arguments for the position that "decision", in the sense of
wilfully cutting off possibilities, is illusory. For a rationalist like Spinoza, who
believed that all reality is perfection, the existence ofan event in reality is like a
theorem in geometry. One cannot decide to make triangles with interior angles
summing to less than two right angles. In the same manner, one cannot decide
whom to marry. All events are inferences from the perfection ofGod. Leibniz,
who has much in common with present day operational researchers, said in
effect that God built a gigantic model (e.g. a nonlinear program), which
described possible universes, and since this God was a perfect computer, He
could use the model to calculate the design of an optimal universe, which He
then implemented (having no politics to prevent implementation).
The end of the nineteenth century witnessed a severe battle between
"merchanists" and "vitalists" about the reality offreedom ofchoice. The fight
was really between some leading physicists and some philosophical biologists;
the latter, e.g. Henri Bergson, wanted to use a non-physical "vital force" to
define life. But the physicists realized that the vitalists were ruining their game,
because in the physics of the nineteenth century. the aim was to state the laws
of nature without exception. If the vitalist won out, the poor physicist would
have to state the Second Law of Thermodynamics with the added clause
"except when vital forces are around".
Today, the fight has virtually disappeared. I will cite two intellectual
reasons and one humanistic why this is so. First, most philosophers have come
to the conclusion that the universe was not created by a perfect designer. nor
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does it operate according to perfect laws. One suspects at times that Jantsch's
enthusiasm for his evolutionary principle may be leading the way back to a
Spinozistic viewpoint, with evolution as the perfect force instead of deduction.
But I found in my friendship with Erich, that every time I tried to interpret his
work in the context of the history of philosophy, he most emphatically denied
the interpretation.
Second, we logicians have discovered that contraries (propositions that
cannot both be true) exist only in the context of a given language and its rules
of sentence-formation and deduction. In broader languages, the contrariness
disappears. Thus, Euclid's famous Parallel Postulate is false in so-called non-
Euclidian plane geometries, but both Euclidian plane geometry and non-
Euclidian plane geometry hold true for surfaces in three dimensional
geometry (where "straight line" is the shortest path between two points on the
surface). In the same manner, Singer!! showed how in a more general
language of science than either the language of mechanics or biology, one
could legitimately say that all events are determined and that some events are
freely chosen: "the world beha ves in accordance with deterministic (including
statistical) laws" and "the world in part behaves in accordance with
teleological laws of choice" are /lot contraries.
For me, the humanistic change is more to the point. To say that all human
decisions are pre-determined is a pure cop-out, for it removes from
humanity's concerns the responsibility of the plight of the world, its poverty,
pollution. overpopulation. and military threat. This point is probably in the
spirit of the Vickers' lectures, because he takes responsibility to be an essential
part of the structure of organizations, including nations. I'd be inclined to say
that the failure of the intellectual argument for determinism is morally
outrageous.
I began my discussion of an Anaxagoras' hypothesis with "what if?" Now I
would like thought to carry the speculation into reality, because there is an
argument that convinces me that the nonbounded approach to systems is the
correct one.
In defence of its correctness. I call as witness an old problem of systems
analysis. namely, the inventory problem. In one of its "simplest" examples,
the problem asks how many items should be ordered by a retail store and
placed on the shclfto respond adequately to consumer demand. The problem
is deceptively simple. because it seems to be a mere matter of the comparison
of two costs: the cost of over-ordering so that unsold inventories sit
un productively on the shelf. and the cost of being out of the item when a
customer is there and ready to purchase it. The simplicity fades away when we
ask how we should measure the first cost. What does it cost the store to keep
one thousand dollars worth of inventory on the sheil' for a day. The obvious
answcr is this: it costs the store the amount it could have made by using the
thousand dollars for money-making purposes. But this response is am-
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biguous, becau~e the thousand dollars could be used in lots of ways: it could be
gambled at the race track, invested in bonds or risk stocks, or to hire a brilliant
consultant for a day. The question, then, should be modified as follows:
"What is the best use of the one thousand dollars?" But this question asks how
a firm should best use its capital. especially in the form of cash. Since cash can
be transformed into other forms of capital, the question is what should be the
capital structure of the firm.
In other words, the "simple" problem of inventory requires for its
answering the answering of what appears to be a much more complicated
problem, namely, how the firm's capital should be managed. It is easy to see
that the question of purchasing for inventory also requires for its answering
the determination of the firm's marketing policies, since we need to know not
what demand customers do make, but rather the optimal demand pattern the
firm can create through pricing and advertising.
So the very often neglected problem of data-determination in operational
research leads us to the same conclusion as did the Anaxagoras speculation: in
a problem as simple as the question of the amount to purchase for inventory. is
to be found all the other problems of the firm. In any specific problem. one
finds the connectedness to all the other problems, and it is the nature of the
connectedness that is central to the planning of an organization.
I think that our failure to examine and plan around connectedness accounts
for the plight of the human being today. Of course, the problem is how we are
going to go about the task of determining the connections. Some systems
analysts want to build very large models, but I don't see how the size of the
model necessarily answers the question of the determination of the
"opportunity" costs I've just been discussing.
There are several interesting epistemological consequences of opportunity
costing. One is that the method of analysis called reductionism completely
fails, because as we pursue the question of how much the keeping of inventory
on a shelf really costs. the pathway leads us. not to simpler issues. but to more
and more complicated ones.
The second point is that an opportunity cost is not an empirical datum. or
"fact". There's simply no way to observe it. Nor is it a mere "appearance".
because it's real enough: what I sacrifice when I give up an opportunity to do x
because I do y instead is a real sacrifice. The exha ustiveness of a ppea rance and
reality in the old fashioned ontology of centuries of philosophy simply
disappears. Opportunity costs are "neither of the above".
It is reasonable enough to ask how we do in t~lct determine opportunity
costs in practice. One answer I've already suggested and rejected: that we
determine them by bounding the problem. If I go to Reno and have the
opportunity of playing blackjack or craps, I can perform an expected-return
analysis of these two options and select the one with the largest score. But this
doesn't answer the question whether I should be in Reno in the first place.
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I do know how some of our ancestors suggested we solve the larger
problem: namely, by trying to understand the nature of God. A perfect
intellect would have no problem with the fact that every problem of decision-
making, no matter how smalL is connected to every other problem, no matter
how large. Both Leibniz and Spinoza seem to have viewed God in this manner.
But neither seems to have asked whether a being that is simultaneously
omniscient and omnipotent can also be perfectly benevolenL 12 There seems to
be growing evidence in political history that the more technologically
powerful and knowledgeable a nation becomes, the less its benevolence with
respect to the helpless people of the world.
I also realize that opportunity costs are determined by politics, by the use of
political clout in getting Congress and other legislative bodies to allocate
funds. or in getting managers affirms. or hospitals, or ed ucational institutions
to support programs,
No doubt this discussion raises far more questions than it begins to respond
to. That's because my intellect is on the side of question-asking. I realize that
there are many who believe that what we need in today's messy world are some
down-to-earth, specific answers as to how we're going to feed the starving,
reduce militarism, clean the environment, and increase health. We question-
askers are very much afraid that, as in the past, so in the future, these very
practicaL realistic' feasible responses to the questions, if carried into action,
will ma ke the world worse than ever.
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Policy Analysis for Advising
Rulers'
YEHEZKEL DROR
I. SCOPE AND PURPOSE
This chapter considers main issues of policy analysis for advising Rulers, as
a task of much importance by itself; and as a "pure type" situation which
serves to bring out broad features, problems and requirements of policy
analysis.
My basic propositions, using the terminology of the book as a whole, are
that advancement of policy analysis for advising Rulers should constitute a
main dimension of rethinking the process of operations research and systems
analysis. And, that consideration of the needs of advancing policy analysis
for advising Rulers serves to identify and explore broader needs of increasing
the utility of policy analysis for handling complex and intricate policy issues.
My treatment deals with "policy analysis" in the sense of a profession-craft
clustering on providing systematic, rational, and science-based help with
decision-making - including problem identification, options development,
comprehensive impact evaluation, alternative future guesstimation, goal
development and so on (Dror, 1971). The chapter deals with policy analysis for
advising Rulers, looking at policy analysis both as a process ofderiving advice
to Rulers; and as a structure, in the sense of policy analysis units working for
and near Rulers. The term "Ruler" is used in the clinical and technical sense of
real heads of government, never mind their formal titles. With some
adjustments, the concept ·'Ruler" also covers collegial and collective ruling
bodies, such as Cabinets.
With some changes, main findings and recommendations of this paper
apply to a larger set of issues and circumstances. Thus:
- The term "Ruler" can be expanded to include other top level decision-
makers in central government and, with additional adjustments. top level
decision-makers in public and private organizations, such as enterprises
and local government.
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- Large parts of the paper, especially those dealing with methodology, apply
to policy analysis for advising Rulers from a distance, such as by
independent Think Tanks and by party research organizations. In such
cases, special problems of communication between the Ruler and the
analysis unit arise. Thus, it seems that. in the absence of a policy analysis
outfit near the Rulers to serve as a liaison between the Ruler and policy
analysis from a distance, the latter will ha ve difficulties to become relevant
to Ruler's concerns and to communicate its findings to the Ruler in a
useable form. Such special issues are not directly dealt with here, but much
of the discourse applies.
More difficult are adjustments and applications of my analysis to the variety
of Third World countries. In some of them, primary problems of nation
building and independence maintenance, as well as features of political
culture, together with scarcity of professional infrastructure, pose special
difficulties to policy analysis for advising Rulers. Many Third World
countries face a painful paradox, because policy analysis, together with
realistic vision, is essential for them in order to achieve very high
aspirations; while, at the same time, these countries pose strong barriers to
correct utilization of policy analysis as an aid to critical decision-making.
Exploration of special problems of policy analysis in Third World countries
in general and for ad vising their Rulers in particular, are left for another
occasion.
- Parts of the evaluation of contemporary policy analysis inadequacies and of
proposed progress towards what is called "ad vanced policy analysis" apply
to broader issues of the usefulness of policy analysis for handling complex
problems, at a range of decision levels. Thus, to move to the converse of
Rulers, an interesting problem exists of policy analysis for citizens at large,
to permit progress in the direction of more enlightened public opinion, both
as a goal by itself and as a condition for good policy-making in democratic
societies.
In contradistinction to such expanded applications of the core ideas of this
paper, a number of issues are excluded or neglected, even if in reality they
cannot be completely compartmentalized from policy analysis for advising
Rulers. Thus, I do not consider various supportive functions for Rulers,
fulfilled by other types of advisers. such as: emotioqal support; purely political
advice; help with ideology; and mass-media handling assistance. Also, I do not
discuss specialized advice, such as in economics. science and technology.
intelligence. and governmental reorganization: though some interfaces
between such specialized advice functions and policy analysis are touched
upon.
This is a technical chapter. dealing with policy analysis to help Rulers. A
prior question is. which Rulers should be aided: better technical support for a
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crazy or criminal Ruler will only increase the evils he is inflicting. Probably,
fanatic Rulers in any case cannot tolerate the rationality-base and pro-
fessional autonomy of policy analysis, depending instead on servile instru-
ments. But, this may be too optimistic an assumption, especially as the
spectrum of evil, but quite instrumental-rational, Rulers is too much of a
historic reality to be ignored. Therefore, policy analysts, as other persons of
knowledge, carry heavy moral responsibility when deciding for whom to
work. Such moral and ethical problems of policy analysis require separate
treatment (Dror, 1983, introductory part).
This paper is based on close study of realities of policy analysis for Rulers,
both from the inside and from a scholarly perspective, in most of the Western
Democracies and in a number ofThird World countries. But, regretfully, I am
not familiar with relevant facts in the Communist countries. Therefore,
applicability of my study in these countries has to be judged by professionals
who know the situation there.
Policy analysis for advising Rulers is a delicate and problematic subject, as
well as quite a neglected one. To advance policy analysis for advising Rulers,
concerted efforts by multiple groups with various experiences and mixed
disciplinary backgrounds in a diversity of political contexts, are needed. Also
essential is careful pilot testing and experimentation with novel designs and
methods. This discussion is devoted to encouraging such shared work in the
slowly growing informal college of practitioners and scholars of advanced
policy analysis.
The order of progression is as follows: First, to provide some of the
background against which policy analysis for advising Rulers should be
considered, I comment briefly on some causes for the crucial importance of
Rulers and of their decisions in contemporary highly-industrialized societies,
exposing some of their essential and expanding functions, including those in
which policy analysis should be of help. These pointers at the challenges of
policy analysis for advising Rulers lead into the main body of the chapter,
namely! a more extended discussion of main aspects of policy analysis which
need radical changes to become relevant to Rulers' decisions, including a
number of indicative proposals for advancing policy analysis in the identified
directions. It concludes with some observations on reality and prospects.
including partial exposition of barriers hindering advancement of policy
analysis for advising Rulers and ways for overcoming them. All this, as a
concise tour de force into terra incognita, poses more questions than providing
answers. 2
II. IMPORTANCE OF RULERS AND THEIR DECISIONS
To claim that Rulers and their decisions are very important in highly-
industrialized countries (and even more so in less developed ones) is not to
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sta te the obvious. If the fate of nations is viewed as determined by Fortuna,
either in the sense of exogenous events or/and in the sense of uncontrollable
domestic trends and infrastructures then all governmental policies. including
Rulers' decisions. are of little moment. Alternatively, if governmental
decision-making is seen as a collective process with little specific impact by any
one person. including top level politicians - then Rulers' decisions are of little
consequence. These two perspectives fit parts of reality. But, my strong
impression is that - within the perspective of policy-making, as distinct from a
bio-evolutionary view of HOlllo supiens as a zoological specie - the impact of
Rulers' decisions is real and significant. More than that, despite many
expectations to the contrary. the importance of Rulers' decisions seems to be
on the increase. This trend is related to Rulers and Rulership as a role and an
institution. with variations depending on the particular individuals fulfilling
the Rulership role. The trend is not a result of individual accidents and
particularities. but of broad societal and political objective variables.
Without presuming to present here a grand theory of the crucial importance
of Rulers in highly-industrialized countries and its causes, let me mention a
few aspects explaining and illustrating this phenomenon. as a background to
discussion of policy analysis as helping Rulers in fulfilling their augmented
functions. There are significant differences in this matter between various
countries. and also within the sub-set of highly-industrialized countries as
discussed here. But. main relevant factors operative in most of these countries
during most of current history can be identified. These include the following.
in no strict order. but moving from broader and more diffuse causes of high
importance of Rulers to narrower and more specific ones:
Socio-psychological/leeds. While this matter is far from adequate concep-
tualization and even further away from understanding. and while the intensity
of relevant variables differs between countries and periods. there seem
to exist strong individual-psychological and mass-psychological needs for
very visible political personalities. and Rulers in particular. The need for
Rulers to help with maintaining and reconstructing self-identity and collective
idcntity in a period of cultural and political turbulence serves to illustrate a
little more concretely socio-psychological necessary and presently augmented
functions of Rulers (Erikson. 1975. p. 22).
Giring directions to Societ\'. A main cause for the great and increasing
consequence of Rulers' decisions is the expansion of governmental responsi-
bilities for giving directions to societies, as a necessary response to changing
circumstances. In a growing number of countries there is an increasing need
for societal architecture. in the sense of bringing about significant structural
changes in important facets ofsociety. Energy (Hafele. 1981). welfare (GECD.
In 1). re-ind ustrialization (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government
Policy. 1980) and labour markets (Scharpf, 1981) serve to illustrate domains
needing societal architecture in Western highly-industrialized societies. This
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increasingly essential governmental function cannot be carried out without
active, powerful and effective power centres - the core of which includes
Rulers and a main modus operandi of which are Rulers' decisions. Important
to understand in this connection is the architectonic and radical-change
nature even of attempts to reduce the scope of governmental activities, going
on in a number ofcountries. To design and implement effectively such a trend-
shift, excellent governmental capacities are needed, with much of the burden
for such an endeavour falling necessarily on Rulers' decisions. It may
sometimes be possible to reduce the quantitative scope of activities of central
governments, but - under present and foreseeable conditions - not their
qualitative importance. When the scope of governmental activities increases,
as is the case at present in a number of countries and may become so in more,
then the burdens on Rulers ofgiving directions to society may indeed impose a
mission all-but-impossible with present tools.
Charisma. Present problems in quite a number of countries require policy
shifts and societal architecture which cannot be undertaken without power-
concentrations and consensus-building, often beyond the capacity of
coalitions between partisan interests. This objective need for charismatic
power produces a favourable setting for Rulers that have relevant potentials
(Tucker, 1981).
Policy entrepreneurship. Policy changes are essential in most countries to
meet shifting challenges. Normal bureaucracies usually are unable to produce
options going against the grain of their policy traditions. In a large majority of
countries, urgently needed are far-reaching paradigmatic policy innovations,
depending on top-level policy-learning and entrepreneurship, in turn building
up the power and importance of Rulers who can meet these needs.
Power Brokage. Increasing oligopolization and molecularization of power
create vacuums requiring powerbrokers, who construct meaningful con-
figurations through coalition building and rebuilding. Rulers are in a uniquely
suitable position to fulfill this function, which in turn significantly reinforces
their power. This role takes different shapes according to regime, but is
essential in all countries.
M ass media. The focusing of attention by mass media, especially television,
on heads of government serves to build up their power and functions, even in
cases where their formal position is one of prime inter pares.
Crisis management. International and domestic turbulence ca use many
crises, with crisis management emerging as an important mode of govern-
ment. In crises, Rulers' decisions fulfill central roles, both because crisis
management is usually concentrated in their hands and because many of the
usual checks-and-balances are suspended. in part because of time pressures.
Therefore, the frequency ofcrisis, including the "crisis" nature of a number of
economic circumstances, adds to the importance of Rulers (Preisl and
Mohler, 1979).
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Inler-deparfIllCnlalily. Objective needs for charisma and policy entrepre-
neurship may remain latent and unnoticed and have little effect on the actual
functions of Rulers. who do not know how to build upon such potentials. The
situation is different in regard to the widely recognized necessity for inter-
departmental integration. that goes far beyond traditional coordination. The
emts of non-integration become very obvious in all countries. especially in
intensely interacting issue-clusters that must be looked at as systems. such as:
defence. foreign policy. intelligence: economics. social policy. human
resources: as well as in respect to pervasive. inherently multi-departmental.
issues such as science and technology. energy, and environment. Such visible
needs for overall governmental perspectives serve to augment strongly the
roles of Rulers in looking out after multi-departmental and inter-
departmental policy integration.
SUI/III/if /Ileetil/gs. Summit meetings are very fashionable for dealing not
only with foreign relations. but also with economic. technological and other
prllblems. This increases the importance of Rulers. who not only go to summit
meetings. but benefit from their ritual and mass media glory and build on
them higher stature back home.
In ditferent societies. various mixes of these and other factors operate to
make Rulers' decisions more important. Further examination of relevant
variables leads to the conclusion that all-in-all the factors increasing the
importance of Rulers as a core element of societal problem-handling
capacities will continue to grow. Global scarcities. economic realities. societal
developments. cultural propensities. domestic-political trends. scientific-
technological innovations. demographic tendencies - all add up to problems
overwhelming present capacities to govern and requiring radically improved
policy innovation. societal architecture. direction-giving. consensus-
mobilization. value clarification. grand policy shifts and political will. To meet
such expanding requirements. outstanding Rulers' decisions are essential. To
contribute to these this is the challenge posed before advanced policy
analysis for advising Rulers.
Before taking up my main subject. namely changes required in policy
analysis to meet such needs and requirements. some warning against over-
expectations is necessary:
(a) Despite the growing importance of Rulers. they are one among a
number of core components of governance embedded in society.
Therefore. improvement of the performance of Rulers is only one of a
number of urgently needed redesigns in governance. In many countries.
the improvement of Rulers' decisions is the most urgent upgrading in
governmental capacities: but. it probably always must be supplemented
by other changes. to achieve in the aggregate needed effects. In some
countries. it may be more urgent to redesign other aspects of
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governance, though probably under contemporary conditions improv-
ing the performance of Rulers is an important need in all countries.
(b) Policy analysis for advising Rulers is only one approach among many
to improving performance of Rulers. Changes in their constitutional
power and standing. variations in their length in office. innovations in
the recruitment and career patterns of Ruler-candidates- these serve to
illustrate the range of possible approaches to upgrading of Rulers'
performance. The relative advantages of policy analysis for advising
Rulers include its inherent utility; its relatively higher feasibility. in
comparison to political changes in position and recruitment of Rulers;
and the speed with which it can provide positive fruits. But. its utility is
strictly limited by other factors. such as the personal qualities of Rulers
brought up by the political system.
These subjects are outside the scope of this chapter and therefore will not be
further considered here. But they should be kept in mind, so that advancement
of policy analysis for advising Rulers is seen in correct proportions. as an
important contribution to the capacity to govern, but not as a breakthrough.
Certainly, it is not a panacea for the present problems ofgovernance. though it
is part of a promising treatment cluster.
III. REQUIRED CHANGES IN POLICY ANALYSIS
Aim
To examine fully required changes in policy analysis so it can serve as a main
aid to Rulers' decisions requires further elaboration of the functions of Rulers
and their decisions. And, then. systematic exploration of potential contri-
butions of policy analysis to each and all of these functions. leading to
identification of changes needed in policy analysis to fully realize this
potential.
In the present chapter. constraints of space require compressed treatment of
the subject, by jumping over some phases of the examination and by focusing
'on concise presentation of main examples of required changes in policy
analysis. In doing so, I take up diverse illustrations, to demonstrate various
dimensions of required changes in policy analysis and to bring out the overall
configuration of needed innovations. at least in rough outline.
The basic conspectus of policy analysis for advising Rulers can be
formulated as islands of professional excellence near and fill' Rulers. II'hich
provide essential and unique help based on advanced policy anal.\ ..~is methods.
I deal with required changes in policy analysis under four categories.
according to the main elements of the above formulation. Within each part. I
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examine a few items, altogether sixteen, which are numbered consecutively
throughout.
The first category relates to islands of professional excellence. It includes
three items, namely: (I) institutional feature of policy analysis for advising
Rulers; (2) systemic functions of pol icy analysis for advising Rulers, within the
broader organizational and socio-political environments; with special atten-
tion to (3) the power ecology of policy analysis for advising Rulers, which
characterizes it thanks to location in the central antechamber of power.
Power ccology leads directly to the second main category, namely near and
tiJi' Rulers. Examination of this quintessential feature proceeds through
exploration 01'(4) single-person focus of policy analysis for advising Rulers; as
well as (5) debugging. debunking and iconoclasm as the main modi operandi,
with important implications for underlying models of policy analysis.
The nex t phase of our proceeding bring us to the third of the categories into
which this part of the paper is divided, namely the essential and unique help
which policy analysis can and should provide for Rulers, illustrated by: (6)
Comprehensive and long-term perspectives, with relation to societal architec-
ture and national planning in their different forms: (7) diagnostics, in the sense
of broad estimations of situations and problem perception, leading to
appropriate decision agenda setting; (8) innovative and unconventional
decision inputs. including devil's advocacy, counter-accepted and counter-
intuitive views, novel options and analysis-vision interfaces; and (9) policy
learning functions. Because of the interdependence between policies and
Institutions. policy analysis for advising Rulers must also consider (10) policy
implemcntation institutions. as essential for improving Rulers' decisions as
expressed in their actual impact on reality. In contradistinction to such broad
contributions. policy analysis for advising Rulers is also characterized by (11)
providing help with special Rulers' operations, such as crisis management and
bargaining and negotiations. To illustrate possible help by policy analysis in
facing changing and increasingly important tasks of Rulers, I proceed to
discuss (12) budgeting. To balance the treatment of help which advanced
policy analysis may render Rulers. I conclude this sub-set of subjects with a
discussion of (13) dangerous dysfunction potentials of policy analysis for the
quality of Rulers' decisions.
Ha ving thus surveyed a variety of facets of policy analysis for advising
Rulers. the fourth category is reached. which brings us to a main crux of the
subject. namely ({(/\'I/nad policy l/Jwlysis methods. This category is covered by
considering (14) a numbcr of broad methodological requisites and possibi-
lities. with an illustrative variety of necded advancemcnts in policy analysis
approaches. methods. tools and instruments. To supplement this list, two
special methodological issucs, which underline the particularities of advanced
policy analysis. especially for advising Rulers. arc discussed, namely: (15)
Social sciences in policy analysis; and (16) politics in policy analysis.
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These sixteen blocks, as divided into four categories, do not add up to a
complete edifice of policy analysis for advising Rulers. But, they provide a
skeleton which brings out the main outlines of required rethinking of policy
analysis and can serve as a partial basis for it.
In presenting a massive range of requisites for rethinking policy analysis,
which really add up to proposing a quantum leap towards advanced policy
analysis in general and advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers in
particular, I may be accused of building up a straw man (or woman) in order
easily to shoot him (her) down. Such a critique argues, that actual policy
analysis is much better equipped for helping Rulers than I assume and that the
main problem, as far as one exists, is that Rulers do not want the help of policy
analysis.
There does exist a serious difficulty in Rulers underdemanding policy
analysis; and inadequate political support is a main cause for failure of
professional advisory units for Rulers (Boston, 1980). But I strongly disagree
with the claim that contemporary policy analysis is well qualified to render
significant help to Rulers. Visits to more than thirty offices of Rulers in
Western and Third World countries; workshops with politicians and senior
advisors from even more countries; intense contacts with policy analysts in a
variety of contexts; examination of teaching programs in policy analysis and
related subjects; and perusal of the growing literature in these areas - all
produce and support findings on the inadequacies of contemporary policy
analysis for systematically helping Rulers' decisions. Personal experiences
with trying to aid Rulers decisions with the help of available policy analysis
craftmanship-knowledge further reinforced these findings.
The fact that a few outstanding policy analysts excel at handling very
complex problems, without any proportion to shared "public knowledge"
(Ziman, 1968) in policy analysis as a discipline-profession and in ways not
explained or at least indicated in their own writings, cannot compensate for
the weaknesses of the discipline. The requisites of policy analysis lor ad vising
Rulers, as an improvement of capacities to govern, cannot be met by
accidental appointment of single policy analysis stars to influential positions.
Such persons are a blessing when available and an essential ingredient for
advancing policy analysis as a craft and as a profession-discipline, but do not
constitute a sufficient basis for meeting needs, such as illustrated by policy
analysis for advising Rulers.
Turning now to the sixteen illustrative facets of policy analysis which
require changes and advancements to adequately aid Rulers' decisions, the
reader is reminded that these are overlapping and interdependent aspects of
an integral design for advanced policy analysis. Therefore, movement back
and forward in considering the subject is recommended.
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POLICY ANALYSIS FOR ADVISING RULERS AS ISLANDS OF
PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE
A main dimension of policy analysis for advising Rulers is brought out by
the formulation of "constitution an island of professional excellence". Some
involved characteristics include:
I. Institutional Features
The fundamental institutional problem of policy analysis for advising
Rulers is. how to meet the preferences and prejudices ofa variety of changing
and diverse Rulers. while preserving minimum essential requisites of
advanced policy analysis. Problems of institutionalization of policy analysis
for advising Rulers can be looked at as a particular. very important, instance
of what I call "self-imposed rationality": Rulers are asked and expected to
recognize their own limits and. therefore. to institutionalize arrangements that
help in augmenting their capacities and ofl-setting their weaknesses. In this
sense. one can also speak about Rulers binding themselves. according to the
metaphor of Ulysses and the Sirens (Elster. 1979). Historic, cultural and
political conditions significantly influence possibilities to move in such a
direction. As emerging in some countries. constitutional and legal status for
policy analysis units near Rulers can help. But. realistically speaking. in the
foreseeable future institutionalization of policy analysis units and their real
elfects depend on discrete Rulers. the insights of such Rulers into needs for
such units. and the Ruler's self-discipline in abiding by institutional
arrangements essential for rendering him needed. though often not sweet,
help.
Sometimes. institutionalization requisites cannot be met. The personality of
some Rulers may contradict minimum needs of policy analysis so intensely as
to inhibit any useful work. Short of such extreme, but not scarce, cases, a
maximum elrort must be made to elasticize the institutional features of policy
analysis for advising Rulers. so as to permit adjustment to diverse Rulers and
dil1crent conditions. while preserving essentials. Therefore. when exploring
institutional features of policy analysis for advising Rulers, a broad range of
,i1ternative arrangements should be aimed at. with special attention to
minimum requisites without which this function cannot operate usefully
(though other. less demanding. forms of advisory services may be feasible and
useful ).
Following this. I explore briefly some institutional issues of policy analysis
for advising Rulers. moving from essential minimum requirements to more
advanced arrangements.
A minimum must, is the institutional establishment of a distinct policy
analysis unit near the Ruler. as a kind of professional "islands of
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excellence". The task of this unit must be kept distinct from other functions
of Rulers' departments and the professional inputs of the unit into Rulers'
thinking and decision-making must be kept distinct from other needs of
Rulers, such as already mentioned emotional support, partisan-political
advice and more. It is the scope of activity and the special professional
nature, which constitute the novelty of policy analysis for advising Rulers,
as compared with the multitude of advisers to Rulers known in history and
contemporary reality alike (Cohen, 1980; Goldhamer, 1978).
- The unit must enjoy significant autonomy in its operations. Thus. selection
of subjects to be worked on should, in part, be up to the unit. The unit
should be able to withstand pressure to deal only with current issues,
devoting parts of its resources to broader examination of fundamental
choices and basic policy assumptions. Also. the unit needs leeway to study
sensitive subjects. Issues of explosive political potential and problems
requiring extensive study fit better Think Tanks further away from Rulers.
But. policy analysis units for advising Rulers must be able to tolerate and
even support and sometimes initiate such studies - as part of their
institutionalized autonomy and professional responsibility. This. subject to
appropriate diplomatic skills and due care in considering possible
implications.
- Related is the necessity for a professional core of persons to staff the policy
analysis unit. Difficult is the question, whether and how much of this staff
should be attached to a particular Ruler, moving in and out with him, or
should be semi-permanent. serving in the unit for a number of years
overlapping more than one Ruler. Available experience is too limited to
permit a reliable answer to this very important question, but some elements
of a range of acceptable solutions can be indicated:
(a) The policy analysis unit must be staffed with highly qualified
professionals. Other selection criteria. such as personal and political
acceptability to the Ruler, can be added, but not as substitutes for rigid
professional capacities.
(b) The half-life of the staff should approximate 3 to 5 years in the policy
analysis unit. If Rulers change more frequently. continuity of at least
parts of the staff in office over a number of Rulers is essential.
(c) When Rulers change at longer intervals, changeovers of most of the
policy analysis staff together with the Rulers is acceptable. But.
continuity of some of the staff is highly desirable, to preserve
institutional memory and transfer experience from one set-up to
another.
These alternatives provide limited elasticity to accommodate various
administrative and political traditions, while also requiring adjustments in the
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latter in a number of countries, as a sin£' qlla /10/1 for useful policy analysis for
advising Rulers.
Subject to such minImum requIsites of high-quality policy analysis for
advising Rulers, elasticity in main features and operations is a condition for
success and survival. This applies not only to the supreme test of survival as
an institution when Rulers change, but also to alterations in the needs,
preferences. perspectives and propensities of one and the same Ruler. Thus.
in Western Democracies, Rulers' concerns change not only with variations
in the situation and intra-personality dynamics, but also in correlation with
the electoral cycle. as demonstrated in many studies of economic policy and
a pproaching elections (Tufte, 1978). Often, the impacts of turnover, time
and political cycles are much broader, many of Rulers' concerns and
outlooks changing quite a lot from the honeymoon first few months (Bunce,
1981) till the Rulers' approaching willing, or more often, unwilling
evacuation of the Rulership position. This has complex implications for
policy analysis for advising Rulers, which must combine two contradictory
needs: to adjust to changing perspectives of Rulers; and to influence Rulers'
decisions so as to reduce fluctuations which ruin essential policy con-
sistency.
Strict secrecy in respect to all work is absolutely necessary. Any leakages or
indiscretions. also by former staff members, stand a high chance of ruining
the work and liquidating the usefulness, and even the very existence, of the
unit. A special case involves studies which the Ruler is interested to publish
and to ha ve supported in public by the unit, so as to mobilize support and to
inform public debate. Degrees of acceptable involvement of the unit in such
activities vary with circumstances, but should always be restrained so as to
a void 1ransformation of the main tasks from decision improvement to
decision marketing.
The minimum size of a useful policy analysis unit for advising Rulers is
probably somewhere around 10 to 15 persons, with 25 to 30 being a
preferable number. Larger units must be subdivided and take on a
somewhat different nature. In presenting this number, I refer to the policy
analysis functions. When additional tasks are undertaken, such as current
decision management. follow-up and implementation monitoring, etc. still
the minimum critical mass for policy analysis as such must be preserved and
protected against dilution with other functions.
The composition should include a mixture of various professionals, mainly
policy analysts and various subject and methods experts with a variety of
experiences. A good decision psychologist should be an integral part of any
policy analysis for advising Rulers unit - because of some of the soon to be
discussed special functions of the unit. such as Rulers' decisions debugging.
A scientific advisor may well be integrated into the unit, with a double
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function of adding a perspective to poticy analysis as a whole, while
advising the Ruler on science and technology policy, with direct access to
the Ruler as a possibility. Other special advisory functions should either be
fused with the policy analysis unit, or operate separately with coordination
to be worked out according to concrete circumstances. In doing so, care
must be taken to avoid too many centrifugal forces and specialized sub-
groups from disrupting the essential unity and cohesion of the policy
analysis entity.
- An infrastructure of policy research "Think Tanks", consultants, brain-
trusters and resources persons, ad hoc study groups, university institutes,
institutes for advanced study and similar policy analysis and policy thinking
capacities dispersed in society should be lightly coupled to the policy
analysis unit. This, to help in data collection and in-depth analysis of
problems which require massive work, as well as for handling problems that
require more distance from current pressures and emotions.
- The policy analysis staff must preserve some degree of personal autonomy
in recruitment base and alternative job opportunities, otherwise over-
socialization into court politics is hard to avoid. The choice of the head of
the policy analysis unit is critical. His personality, professional qualities.
innovativeness and, last but not least, his standing l'is-d-l'is the Ruler -
determine the fate of policy analysis for advising Rulers.
- The unit can be subdivided into nuclei for specific problem areas. such as
domestic affairs and foreign-defence issues. But, as already noted. it is
necessary to have at least a partly integrated unit. with a central core.
internal mobility and elastic work teams. This is essential in order to achieve
cross-fertilization, comprehensive perspectives and adequate attention to
very important interface problems and overlap domains.
- Relations with political advisers require careful attention. preferable
solutions involving close contact. but a mutually respected and understood
difference in perspective.
- Policy analysis should be compartmentalized from political marketing.
mass media contacts. pressure group handling, etc. Individual analysts may
be exposed to such activities, to improve their sense for reality - but on a
limited basis and not on behalf of the policy analysis unit. This. with limited
exceptions. as already discussed.
- To protect important policy analysis contributions against being overtaken
and displaced by current pressures and crisis conditions. some internal
institutional rigidities are essential. Thus, specific procedures and roles
should be responsible for look-out and longer-time perspectives. search for
unconventional opinions, encouragement of innovation. self-evaluation
and more.
- Relations with regular governmental departments. including both their
political and their civil service components. are another crucial problem.
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The need is for a mixed cooperative-adversary relationship. Too much
hostility will result in information blackouts and bureaucratic-political
warfare; too much cooperation may undermine the autonomy of the policy
analysis activity and corrupt some of its main functions. Building up an
informal network for collecting information and canvassing opinions is
important and. often. essential for success.
- Cont,lcts with the Ruler should. in part. be institutionalized with fixed
meetings. assured briefing opportunities and some personal contact
between all analysts and the Ruler. Parts of the communication can proceed
th fLJugh a very senior assistant to the Ruler or some kind of chief-of-staff to
the Ruler. But frequent direct access to the Ruler by the head of the policy
analysis unit is a must.
The work climate of policy analysis units for advising Rulers needs careful
handling. to avoid emotional overloads and preserve a collegial and
clinical-professional culture.
Constant learning should be institutionalized. with a memory system.
cxplicit self-evaluation exercises and periodic overview by select outsiders.
To increase innovativeness and preserve initiative and high-energy. the
half-life-time of statr members should be around 3 to 5 years. as already
mentioned.
These observations do not present a manual for setting up policy analysis
units for advising Rulers: many details must be worked out and adjusted to
particula r circumstances. But they hopefully do convey some of the flavour of
neccssary institutional features of useful policy analysis for advising Rulers.
2. SySll'mic functions
Policy analysis for advising Rulers involves intense interactions with much
broader systems. as already indicated when mentioning relations with
departments and with policy analysis and policy thinking capacities dispersed
in society. Policy analysis for ad vising Rulers also produces significant
systemic effects and second-order consequences. going beyond direct inputs
into Rulers' decisions. Understanding of these interactions and efrects is
necessary to get a realistic view of policy analysis for advising Rulers and its
dif1lculties: as well as to identify adjustments necessary in policy analysis. to
aid Rulers within given environments. while trying to increase beneficial
systemic side-etfects.
To explore this broad subject. let me move briefly through 7 systematic
interactions:
I. Strengthening the equipment of Rulers is not power ncutral. Establish-
ing policy analysis for advising Rulers creates a new political reality.
usually being decided upon without full recognition of the semi-
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constitutional consequences. In particular, such units augment the
power of the Ruler by providing him with tools for increasing his
quantitative and qualitative influence in and through decision-making.
This power-implication is strongly sensed by his colleagues and
competitors, who will first try to prevent policy analysis for advising
Rulers from taking off; then. they will try to reduce its impacts or/and
take it over; and, finally they try to offset its effects by establishing
counter-units of their own. to fight policy analysis with policy analysis
(which is often all for the better for the quality of decision-making as a
whole).
2. Policy analysis can easily be used and misused by Rulers to serve as an
alibi and a legitimation device. If this provides an entry for policy
analysis into doing substantively useful work. such side uses on a limited
scale may be acceptable. Otherwise. they pose very serious professional-
ethical problems to the policy analysts.
3. From a systemic point of view. policy analysis for advising Rulers adds
competition, multiple advocacy and positive redundancy to decision
processes. Departments lose their monopoly; proposals are double-
analysed from a different, more comprehensive perspective; Rulers get
an additional source for ideas; some devil's advocacy is assured; and so
on. This useful redundancy cuts both ways: Rulers' policy analysis units
should not try and monopolize inputs to their masters. otherwise a basic
rationale for their very existence is undermined.
4. On a broader level. policy analysis for advising Rulers may influence
public decision-making as a whole, by provoking adjustive responses,
such as encouragement of policy research and policy analysis throug-
hout the system and stimulating changes in style and argumentation of
public debates and political controversy. Hence. Rulers' policy analysis
units can fulfill useful indirect roles in upgrading the quality of policy
development and societal problem-handling capacities, in the broad
sense, throughout the system. From an egocentric and short-term
perspective. this may reduce the influence of the Rulers' policy analysis
unit by breaking its monopoly. From a broader governmental and
societal perspective. as well as from a longer-range view of the
opportunities and potentials of the Rulers' policy analysis unit itself,
diffusion of good policy analysis to many public decision centres
constitutes a main benefit.
5. Related to the above, as well as additional. systemic effects is the role of
Rulers' policy analysis units in developing highly qualified pro-
fessionals, with profound knowledge of top level government. Thus,
they produce an essential ingredient for advancing policy analysis. as a
societal tool as well as a profession-craft discipline.
6. Interesting and novel are the effects of development of an informal
---- ~--
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network of policy analysts. This is especially important with the
multiplication of p<?licy analysis units. In addition to informal contacts
in the machinery of government. policy analysis units for advising
Rulers Illay and will establish relations with similar units outside central
government. such as in legislatures, and also with units working for
Rulers in other countries. It is too early to evaluate the repercussions of
such networks. which may help communication. consensus building and
mutual learning. Traditional fears of "technocracy" ignore the much-
ohserved identification of policy-analysis professionals with the organi-
zations and interests for which they work. so that little danger is posed to
pluralism hy collegial relations between policy analysts dispersed among
different societal and governmental organizations. Encouragement of
such professional relations is a useful side task of policy analysts
working for Rulers. though the sensitivities of their position require
restraint in participation in collegial activities.
7. Special problems are posed by relations between policy analysis in
government and. especially. on the level of the Ruler. and interparty
political processes. Thus. an important question is, whether and how
policy analysis for the head of the opposition should be encouraged and
supported. to increase the quality of political argumentation and to
prepare the potential next Ruler for utilizing policy analysis. ifand when
he hecomes the Rulership incumbent. First steps in such a direction are
illustrated by arrangements in New Zealand and Austria to support
research stall's for the caucuses and parties respectively, including the
opposition. from public funds.
3. POIH'r Ecolog~
A distinct quality of policy analysis lor advising Rulers is its location in a
high-power ecology. Positioned in the centre of the antechamber of power and
serving as one of the main mindgates to the Ruler. policy analysis for Rulers
can easily hecome power-spoiled. Main pressures exerted on policy analysis
hy the power ecology include:
Overwhelming by acute and immediate problems. which provide a sense of
real impact and of Iceling the pulse of history and which, therelore, easily
displace longer-range considerations and in-depth analysis.
Interest pressures. external as well as bureaucratic-political, which push and
tempt to adjust analysis and transform it into advocacy.
Mass media attention. which beckons with momentary glory and with
opportunities to influence decisions by carefully manipulated leaks and by
tacit exchange arrangements with Illedia personnel.
Ovcrinvolvcment with court politics and bureaucratic infighting, initially as
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essential for building up and protecting the position of the unit, but rapidly
because of fascination with the various power games.
Attention and flattery, which result in ego-hypertrophia, with disastrous
consequences for analytical quality.
Oscillations between euphoria on influencing a Ruler and despair at being
ignored, ruining the concerned detachment that policy analysis should
contribute.
- Pressure-cooker emotional tensions with red-hot cognition easily overcom-
ing clinical detachment and a "cold" look, which should characterize policy
analysis and constitute a main contribution to Rulers' decisions.
Some of the presented institutional features serve to contain and handle
such pressures. But more is needed. Th us:
I. Policy analysts must learn to move in power mine-fields, without
compromising their professional roles.
2. Preserving and building up the power of the policy analysis unit itself
must be a concern, but not a main preoccupation. For example, even if
technically superfluous thanks to modern communication technology.
it is very important to locate the policy analysis unit physically near the
Ruler, inter alia to demonstrate proximity as a source of influence.
3. Special attention needs to be given to access to information and
presence at meetings, not only because of a "need to know", but also
because of power implications of such access.
The power environment within which policy analysis for advising Rulers
operates is a neglected issue that must be put on the agenda of rethinking the
process and nature of policy analysis. even if no simple "solution" is
conceivable or possible (Goldwin, 1980; Meltsner, 1976).
pouey ANALYSIS NEAR\ND FOR RULERS
The very definition of policy analysis for advising Rulers, adopted for the
pure type treatment of this paper. is "near and for Rulers". This is much more
than a definitional postulate, constituting a unique and overwhelming
dimension from which Illany requisites follow, including:
4. Single-Person Focus
A quintessential feature of policy analysis for advising Rulers, shaping all
features of that activity, is its single-person focus. There is one clearly defined,
very visible and highly personal client the incumbent of the Rulership, with
all his preferences, habits, pcrsonality traits and ideosyncrasies. (This also
applies, with suitable adjustments, to collegial Ruler-groups.) The pervasive
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impact of this dominating reality results in hard problems requiring significant
rethinking of policy analysis. Representative are the following facets, aspects
and issues:
(a) It is the duty of policy analysis for advising Rulers to adjust to their
client and serve him loyally. But, it is also the raison d'erre of policy
analysis for advising Rulers to confront their client. demand his
attention to their often not welcome findings and studies and to insist
on their professional autonomy. This constitutes a major inbuilt
antinomy of policy analysis for advising Rulers, with possible mutual
dynamic accommodations. but no stable saddlepoints. Especially
vexing is the ljuestion. where should adjustments to a Ruler's wishes
stop. with the ultimate possibility of resignation of the policy analysts if
their mission becomes impossible. To try and handle such tensions. a
main requisite of successful policy analysis for a Ruler is to study him.
so as to take into due account his judgement and to adjust to his needs
and preferences. Dangerous arc pathologies in two directions. namely
manipulation of the Ruler and of his decisions; and overadjustment, in
the sense of titting conclusions and recommendations to the pre-
dilections of the Ruler.
(b) Thanks to the present scarcity of policy analysis in governments and
politics. few Rulers bring with them any familiarity with it. Neither do
usual career patterns of Rulers convey knowledge related to policy
analysis. This situation may and should change. But. at present. policy
analysis is quite strange if not esoteric to most Rulers. and often also
somewhat frightening. Rulers are used to politicians, to civil servants
and to mono-disciplinary experts - but not to policy analysts.
Disa ppointments with professional advisers. such as economists, add to
Rulers' apprehensions about policy analysis. Such apprehensions are
reinforced by the presumptions of policy analysis to engage the Ruler's
most important decision functions. with a claim for some professional
autonomy. It is up to policy analysts to understand this situation and to
market their capacities to the Ruler. without overselling themselves.
This is ljuite a task. for which policy analysis is ill prepared.
(c) Interfaces between policy analysis and Rulers are conditioned by their
contrary-cultures. as illustrated by the following antinomies inbuilt into
their respective dynamics:
Polin' alla/nis
I. Clinical and semi-detached. with
concern
1 Uncertainty and complexity
explicating
Po/it in
Fighting and deep personal
involvement
Situation simplifying and
uncertainty ignoring
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Rapidly overloaded and option
rejecting
Avoiding clear-cut choices, in order
to maintain essential consensus
Pressing troubles are enough
Piecemeal approach dominates
3. Searching for more options
4. Posing need for decision criteria
and value choice
5. Long-term perspective
6. Emphasizing interrelations
between various problems and
decisions
7. Constraints and costs constantly
considered
Hopeful thinking and optimistic
assumptions preferred; sometimes
vIsionary
Dissonance repressing, biased to
see everywhere "successes" and
tending to escalate commitment to
doubtful decisions
This partial list illustrates unavoidable sharp differences in underlying
cultures. inbuilt dynamics and dominating perspectives of policy analysis and
Rulers. with resulting inherent tensions and clashes between them. Advanced
policy analysis is directed at helping Rulers achieve a higher quality of
decision-making. but not at making Rulers feel better. Indeed. policy analysis
will often cause pain to the Ruler, who may reasonably hesitate to swallow
bitter medicine about the final benefits of which he does not feel too sure. On
such contrary-culture tensions, mutual accommodation is possible. but on a
temporary and precarious basis only. This is one of the more central issues for
rethinking the process of policy analysis.
8. Doubtful and re-evaluation
oriented
(d) Policy analysts working near Rulers can easily slide into the role of
providing emotional support for the Ruler. thus deviating from their
main function. as already mentioned. It is not easy to draw a line
between taking correctly into account the Ruler's mood. e.g. by
delaying inputs which will upset the Ruler till he has a relaxed day
(which may mean quite a long wait); and getting overapprehensive
about provoking negative reactions. up to repressing important. but
very unwelcome. analyses. These dangers are especially acute the more
face-to-t~lcerelations develop between the main policy analysts and the
Ruler. Direct contact is essential. but the policy analysts can easily
become dependent on the Ruler emotionally. waiting for his smile and
fearing his frown.
(e) Inputs of policy analysis to Rulers go far beyond specific contributions
to discrete decisions. They include broad and often very important
functions of educating the Ruler to better comprehension of com-
plexity. more correct estimation of reality and less distorted self-
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evaluation. Careful delineation is necessary between serving as a
modernized version of Grey Eminences and Court Priests, not to speak
of Court Jesters, which are not appropriate functions of policy analysis;
and professional-tutorial activities, which are essential. An additional
very important educative function is to stimulate innovation and
encourage de-dogmatization, e.g. by devil's advocacy, by inputting of
unconventional opinions and by debunking pet opinions of Rulers,
functions to be discussed at greater length soon.
Problems of communication between the policy analysis unit and Rulers
put into sharp focus, on a less exalted level, some of the special issues of
ad\'anced policy analysis.
A basic dilemma is posed by the dependence of useful policy analysis for
Rulers on good communication between the senior policy analysts and the
Ruler. both orally and in writing, on one hand; and the fact that time and
energy arc the scarcest of all of Rulers' resources, on the other hand. Give-
and-take between the policy analysts and their Ruler-client; involvement of
the Ruler-client in the very process of policy analysis, from which Rulers may
benefit more than from any policy analysis outputs; bull-sessions, where the
policy analysts serve as a reaction group to the Ruler throwing out his intuitive
ideas: careful study by the Ruler of policy analysis documents, which do not
unduly distort contents by being truncated to fit a '"no more than two pages"
standing order these are requisites of effective policy analysis for advising
Rulers. But these. also, are near impossibilities: Rulers are mueh too busy and
merloaded to de\'ote more than a fraction of their time to policy analysis, and
e\en then their patience may wear thin rapidly.
Needs for communication go both ways: in addition to communication of
policy analysis to the Ruler. the Ruler must communicate his interests, values,
perspeL'li\es, plans and agendas to the policy analysis unit. Without being
pri\y to the Ruler's thinking, policy analysis cannot effectively help him,
neither in timing, nor in contents. This is an additional main reason why the
policy analysis unit must be presented at most of the Ruler's policy meetings,
as well as at a fair sample of his other activities. But, care must be taken not to
become part of the Ruler's entourage. neither physically and, even less so,
psychologically.
There is a communication threshold below which policy analysis for
ad\ising Rulers is futile: without some direct contact with the Ruler and some
of his time for oral briefings, for give-and-take and for study of policy analysis
memoranda. it is better to help lesser decision-makers or influence top
decisions from some distance. Concomitantly, a number of steps to adjust
policy analysis to the realities of Rulers' constraints are necessary and
possible. Broadening the concept of Ruler-client and including in it his main
personal assistants and intimate ad vi SCI'S may help, though it cannot serve as a
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substitute for direct contacts with the Ruler. More intrinsic to policy analysis
itself is the need to develop novel communication modes for reaching Rulers.
Thus, it is necessary to develop multimedia briefing systems for Rulers, where
complexity can be conveyed in comprehensible form without undue over-
simplification, thanks to utilization of multi-dimensional and dynamic media.
with attempts to move towards interactive systems that the Ruler can work
with on his own. 3 Subject to avoidance of gadgeteering, this is a neglected
potential for policy analysis inputs to Rulers' decisions.
Such problems of Rulers as the main focus of policy analysis are put into
even sharper relief by looking at debugging. debunking and iconoclasm as
main modi operandi of policy analysis for advising Rulers.
5. Debugging, Debunking and Iconoclasm
Some of the special features of policy analysis for advising Rulers and
resulting needs for significant changes in policy analysis itself are sharply
brought out by the Jebugging, debunking and iconoclasm functions. In brief.
these complex and sensitive functions and their underlying logic can be
described as follows: Rulers, by their very role and position. tend to a number
of decision mistakes, with individual differences within a statistical range. A
main way to help Rulers improve their decisions is, therefore. "debugging". in
the sense of eliminating some of the error-propensities and compensating for
them. This also involves some "debunking" and "iconoclasm". in the sense of
exposing to the Ruler his own mistake propensities. which is quite a delicatc
operation but an essential one to render him real help. To fulfil these
functions. policy analysis must (a) add to its "optimality" models debugging:
approaches: and (b) move into a decision-aiding role l'is-i1-\'is the Ruler which
permits "clinical" help in the sense of decision-psychological remedials.
While mentioned in single publications in a lower-level context (Janis and
Mann, 1977; Ripley, 1977). decision-therapeutics is a quite far-rcaching
proposal, in need of further thinking and experimentation before it is ripe to
serve as a full-fledged recommendation for revamping policy analysis for
advising Rulers. The debugging function is more operational and less radical,
but potentially of very high importance,
Policy analysis, as well as most of operations research. tries in the main to
improve decisions by moving. explicitly or implicitly. towards some kind of
normative model, either a "rationality" model for decision-making or, more
recently and somewhat more ambiguously. some systems model for decision-
making (Ackofl', 1981). True, experienced policy analysts are better than their
objective knowledge, recognizing the limits of normative decision models as
guides for action and overcoming those through reliance on applied skills.
often hidden behind the term "common sense". But. as already discussed.
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practical insights are sporadic and cannot compensate for formal weaknesses
of a discipl ine. Explicit. "optimality"-conditioned policy analysis approaches.
as presently developed. are only of limited utility when facing Rulers'
decisions. Even when supplemented by theoretic recognition of the impor-
tance of extra-rational components in preferable decision-making. which is
still more an exception than the rule (Dror. 1983. Part IV). policy analysis
models suffer from neglecting the situational dynamics within which Rulers'
decisions take place. On the basis of bitter experience. capable policy analysts
learn with time to admit this fact. but on superficially pragmatic a level which
is not integrated with their professional knowledge.
One of the more serious omissions of con temporary policy analysis is
ignorance of decision error propensities inbuilt into the very situation of
Rulership and their interaction with the personality of Rulers, with inexorable
nega tive clfects on Rulers' decisions. within a range of individual variance.
Inputting of "norma'" policy analysis into Rulers' decision-making be-
haviour. without taking into account and counter-acting such negative
dynamics. is a mistake in two respects: (a) the policy analysis inputs may be
mis-processed. with counterproductive decision results; and (b) the wide
possibilities of improving Rulers' decisions through direct efforts to reduce
error propensities are not taken up. Advanced policy analysis for advising
Rulers should accept as a main task the improvement of Rulers' decisions
through reducing inbuilt decision-incapacitators of Rulership. This requires a
"debugging" (as well as "debunking'") approach. with policy analysis
contributing to the ljuality of Rulers' decision-making by counteracting
pltLtlls. biases. distortions and errors typically inherent in that very process.
O\erloads, strain and stress. information manipulations. court politics,
power paraphernalia. deference- these are among the decision-ruining inbuilt
!C,ltures of Rulership. They produce main decision-mistakes. such as:
cognitin: map distortions; pendulum between delay and hyperdecision-
acti\ ity: closed positive-feedback loops. insensitive to real results: options and
LTeati\it) repression and many more (Buchanan. 1978; Janis. 1972; May,
1972). II' we add decision-inca pacita tors inherent in the problems Rulers must
dcal with such as tragic choice (Calabresi and Bobbitt. 1979). radical
uncertainty. and high complexity; and if we take into account the difficulties of
all deci,ion-m,lkers in racing stressful problems as multiplied by the special
lCatures of Rulership the inescapable conclusion is. that improvement of
Rulers' decisions reljuires policy analysis to adopt a strong debugging (as well
as some debunking and iconoclasm) posture. This necessitates decision-
PS) chnlogical ideas and models (Axelrod. 1976: de Rivera. 1968; Holsti and
George. 1975) to be added to the main bases of advanced policy analysis
(George. 1980j.
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POLICY ANALYSIS FOR RULERS AS PROVIDING ESSENTIAL AND
UNIQUE HELP
The main purpose of policy analysis for advising Rulers is not to become
institutionalized, nor to be located near Rulers and claiming to work for them.
The main raison d'elre of policy analysis for advising Rulers, for which
institutionalization and location are but tools, is to provide essential and
unique help, such as:
6. Comprehensive and Long-Term Perspectives
A main contribution of advanced policy analysis to Rulers' decisions is to
further comprehensive and long-term perspectives, both in respect to
background world views and underlying assumptions of Rll;ers and in respect
to discrete decision issues. This is salient for the task of Rulers in assuring
inter-departmentality and overall governmental outlook in reviewing and
approving proposals coming up from the ministries and, especially. for the
growing role of Rulers in giving directions to society as already discussed.
Operationally, this function involves a variety of activities, ranging from
preparation ofalternative comprehensive futures to evaluation options within
a broad horizon, in terms of domains and time alike. In more technical
terminology: This function involves enlarging the systems perspective of the
Ruler and of his main decisions.
Handling of longer-range and more comprehensive perspectives necessarily
fuses some aspects of policy analysis for advising Rulers with some aspects of
national planning. Examination, clarification and improvement of the
relations between these two approaches to decision improvement is, therefore.
necessary within the rethinking of policy analysis, both on a theoretic and a
professional-applied level.
At present, relations between policy analysis and national planning are
quite unclear. in part because policy analysis developed mainly in countries
with little national planning, especially the United States. From a sociology of
knowledge point-of-view. it may be that the absence of national planning
made policy analysis all the more necessary. while in countries which have a
lot of national planning. much of the content of policy analysis is covered by
part of planning theory. Nevertheless. even when the variety of meanings of
"planning" in different worlds of discourse is taken into account (Dill and
Popov, 1979; Lompe, 197\; Steiner. 1979; Wilson, 1980), two distinct features
seem quite clear:
- Policy analysis tends to concentrate on the improvement of discrete
decisions, neglecting interconnected decision sets moving from the present
IO~ Yehc:kcl Dror
into a longer-range future. Also. present policy analysis deals mainly with
secondary decisions. regarding grand policies and main policy assumption
as beyond its domain. though a few grand policy analyses do exist (Kahn
and Pepper. 1980). Socio-economic-political conditions are accepted as
gi \ en. ra ther than as targets for intervention and directed change through
critical decisions. grand policy innovation. societal architecture etc.
Planning tends in reality. and despite much theory. to concentrate on
detailed programming. again neglecting underlying assumptions. guiding
decisions and critical choices.
Consequently. a shared omission urgently needs attention. never mind if
under the heading of "planning" and/or "policy analysis"; These are the
planning assumptions. critical choices. policy guidelines. societal architecture
principles and similar underlying macro-choices. at present neglected both by
most of policy analysis and by most of planning. Hence. the importance of
advanced policy analysis. including policy analysis for advising Rulers, as a
shared need of more planned and less planned societies alike. Growing needs
for innovative societal direction in all highly industrialized countries (and,
eyen more so. in Third World countries). which urgently require supreme
quality decisions by Rulers as one of the conditions for success. make
advanced policy analysis an especially urgent need. whether as a basis for
programming and detailed societal management. or as a basis for other
intervention technologies. such as social market mechanisms. 4
7. Diagnostics
I t is am,l7ing that problems of estimating situations are neatly ignored in
policy analysis. This omission becomes shocking when one bears in mind that
delcnce intelligence is a governmental endeavour highly endowed with
resources - and distinguished by a permanence of dismal failures (Betts. 1980;
Hughes. 1976; Jarvis, 1975). When the situation is misread. when fundamen-
tally wrong world perceptions serve as underlying assumptions, when
obsolescent frames of reference determine formulation of problems for
analysis. then decisions must be dismal; with their initial errors being
multiplied and reinforced. rather than corrected. by narrow policy analysis
postulated upon misleading foundations.
These dangers waylay in particular Rulers' decisions. Situational pressures.
inherent ambiguities. sensitivity to ideological and political pressures and
'iimilar typical fcatures of issues reaching Rulers. plus partisan over-
simplification of information inputs characterizing much of their in-
communication all these strongly aggravate misdiagnosis of situations and
L'onseq uen t pro blem-m isform ula tion. To red uee such decision-ruining pheno-
mena. policy analysis must move into diagnostics. including methods for
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estimating complex and ultra-dynamic situations and for multidimensional
and self-corrective problem formulation. This is a critical phase in advanced
policy analysis for advising Rulers.
Especially necessary is policy analysis aid in diagnosing overall situations,
rather than the decomposed sub-issues. Thus, diagnosing broad issue-areas as
either on a downward slope or an upward slope is essential for considering the
need for innovative grand policies by Rulers, with search for continuity-
breaking decisions being the overriding mission when important societal
facets are on a downward slope and incrementalism being appropriate for
societal facets that are on an upward slope. 5
Another illustration of diagnostic requirements is the need to overcome
"issue-attention cycles" (Downs, 1972) and identify basic needs and problems
in statu nascendi, much before they ordinarily reach Rulers via organizational
processes, political channels or mass-media. Such looking-forward and
looking-outward diagnostic functions are necessary in order to improve the
decision agenda of Rulers, which is a prior requirement to improving
decisions themselves.
Closely related to diagnostics, while going beyond it, is the already
mentioned requirement that the policy analysis unit for advising Rulers enjoys
some freedom in choosing subjects to work on. Many subjects will be dictated
by circumstances and the will and needs of the Ruler. But. to be able to fulfil its
main functions, the unit should initiate study on subjects which it diagnoses
as important, though not yet recognized as such by the Ruler and not included
in the explicit policy agenda. Sensitizing Rulers to neglected issues and being
well prepared when problems suddenly become acute - are important
contributions of policy analysis for advising Rulers.
All in all, diagnostics can constitute one of the most important offerings of
advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers; but, this presupposes quite a
jump in present policy analysis capabilities.
8. Innovation and Unconventionality
Policy analysis for advising Rulers is a professional-craft activity; as such,
there are limits to its contributions. Thus. wild futuristic ideas, radical social
alternatives, ideological visions and purely symbolic activities are beyond its
domains. But marginal improvements and incremental enhancement, while
well within the competence of present policy analysis, are of little use for
Rulers in a period of turmoiL turbulence and ultra-change. Therefore.
innovation and unconventionality are essential contributions to be supplied
by policy analysis for advising Rulers. within the limits posed by the
fundamental constitution of a professional and rationality-based activity.
Some illustrations will serve to identify a few of the possibilities and
impossibilities of advanced policy analysis. in this respect:
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(a) II is a relatively easy assignment to serve as "devil's advocate", in the
sense of lid hoc adoption ofassumptions, reality images and predictions
contrary to those on which the Ruler's decisions usually are based. If
such Gedll/1ke/1experime/11S result in definitely impossible constructs,
they are dropped. But if. as frequently will be the case, devil's advocacy
reasoning looks absurd only to contrary-committed mindsets, without
any clear-cut falsification being possible, then the bases of decisions
must be broadened accordingly and encompass a more diverse range of
assumptions, images. predictions and so on.
(b) It is a ditllcult question, how far to go in exploring alternatives beyond
and contrary to basic ideologies and philosophies of the Ruler and of
society as a whole. Probably, such exercises are too speculative as well
as threatening to take place in policy analysis for advising Rulers, being
better left to units not tied closely into government. But, care must be
taken to distinguish between basic ideologies and philosophies, that
should be accepted, more or less. as bases for policy analysis for
advising Rulers in given situations: and dogmas. fixed ideas and various
"holy cows" the debunking and ieonoclastics of which is an essential
duty within the closed walls of the Ruler's work habitat.
(c) Psychology and epistimology confirm the findings of the history of
ideas (Geertz. 1973. pp. 116 no: Pocock, 1971) that comprehension of
events is bound by existing models, concepts and Wel/(JI/.\·clwuul1[;efl.
This is a constraint limiting even the most outstanding policy analyst
and policy-maker (Dickson, 1978). On the other hand, many of the
more ominous problems facing societies and their Rules have no
solution within contemporarily available policy paradigms, known
alternatives being more-or-Iess equi-final in unsatisfactory results.
Therefore, policy analysis for advising Rulers must try to advance at
least a little beyond historic boundaries, if not on its own then through
drawing upon outstanding thinkers on an ilI1 !Ioc basis. so as to expose
analysis to stimulus that can enrich perception and alternatives.
(d) Llsier is the task of developing counter-intuitive thinking, through
consistent analysis in neutral symbols. Confronting "common sense"
with a superior sense of extra-conventional and counter-conventional
findings is one of the main contributions of advanced policy analysis.
which Gin help to get Rulers' decisions out of serious cul-de-s(Jcs.
(e) Invention of new policy options is a major must of better policy-
making, but one which cannot be '·programmed". A main task of
policy analysis for advising Rulers is to canvas policy inventions
wherever they take place, encourage them and inject their results into
analysis. In this, as well as other matters discussed a bove policy analysis
for advising Rulers serves as a channel for unconventionaL non-
bureaucratic and non-partisan-political thinking to be canvassed.
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stimulated, distilled and introduced into the analytical work and into
Rulers'decisions.
(f) When societies move into crises, as may well be the case for some at least
of the highly industrialized countries and perhaps for Western Culture
(in the encompassing sense of that term) as a whole, a dominant need
may be for new or renewed realistic visions. This is a task beyond even
my enlarged vision of advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers.
But, advanced policy analysis must consider and partly specify the
needs for such visions and contribute to their uses in societal
architecture, when semi-utopias must be translated into reality-shaping
critical decisions. This requires moving from policy analysis as the craft
of achieving the possible effectively, into advanced policy analysis as the
craft of helping to make the desirable and necessary approximately
possible.
(g) To balance the somewhat over-optimistic tone of the policy analysis
tasks considered above, let me conclude the enumeration of innovation
and unconventionality contributions of policy analysis for advising
Rulers by postulating what should probably be the first and most
important assignment. Before one moves into approximating hopes
and visions, catastrophe must be avoided. Therefore, work to develop
disaster scenarios and to design policies which reduce their probability
as much as possible are a must, with creativity and unconventional
thinking to be geared to inventing possible distopias and their
avoidance. This is an unpopular and thankless job. distasteful to most
Rulers. But. it is an important innovative and unconventional contri-
bution of policy analysis for advising Rulers.
To conclude this subject on a more operational note, let me mention the
preparation of surprises to be thrown at history as a concrete illustration of
innovative and unconventional tasks of policy analysis for advising Rulers
(Axelrod, 1979; Dror, 1975; Handel, 1981). When diagnosis identifies some
important policy areas as being on a declining curve or when cascading reality
produces rapidly disappearing opportunities or suddenly crystallizing grie-
vous dangers, the preferable response may be to try and transmute parts of
emerging reality so as to aehiew some hopes or to prevent some evils. Shock-
interventions with history arc risky, but in some situations not attempting
them may be Illllch more dangerous. To design suitable surprises to be thrown
at history and to develop them into concrete options for Rulers under suitabk
contingencies this is a supreme test of the capacities of advanced policy
analysis in fulfilling its innovation and unconventionality functions.
The "innovation and unconventionality" function is closely related to the
noted req uirement of policy analysis units for advising Rulers devoting parts
of their resources to broad issues, rather than getting more and more
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pr~occupi~d with current decision issues. The sensitivity of broad issues
look~d at in innovative and unconventional modes is all the more a reason to
include them within th~ mandate of poliey analysis for advising Rulers, with
due care being taken to keep such work protected against harmful leakage.
Availability of high-quality Think Tanks to engage in in-depth study of such
issues at a distance, in close cooperation with the policy analysis unit but
separate from it. may often providc a preferable solution.
9, Policy Learning
Recent literature in policy analysis and soine of its practice pays increasing
attention to "evaluation", but neglects "policy learning". This is a confusion
quite typical of the need for rethinking some basics of policy analysis:
Evaluation, after all. is an approach, method and set of techniques aimed at
permitting and accelerating policy learning. Developing techniques for a
process which itself is left in the air is rather doubtful.
Policy learning is a difficult function of advanced policy analysis and an
essential on~. It is difficult. because:
Results of complex policies arc difTus~, disperscd and take a long time to
become visible.
Sunk costs, mainly political and psychological ones, reinforce dissonance-
reducing tendencies. in the form of regarding all but the most flagrant
failures. and som~til1les even these, as successes, near-successes, the best
possible achievements. or as due to unforeseeable causes.
Even if policy results arc perceived as weak, "learning", in the sense of
drawing correct conclusions. is still far ofT. Typical incorrect lessons of
cxperience arc escalating commitment. as if a failing policy is essentially
correeL but has not been tried hard enough. Or. in case ofcalamities, panic-
learning with wild results tends to take placc.
Valid policy learning is more of an unnatural than a self-sustaining process.
This is in particular true of Rulers' decisions, where many screens against
presenting failure-information. as well as other distortion processes sur-
rounding Rulers. add to non-learning and mis-learning. When critical
decisions arc largely "fuzzy bets". then constant learning and re-learning
hecome a main mode of containing costs and improving decisions (Holling,
19XO). Under such conditions. the conseq uences of inadequate policy learning
arc dire indeed.
Hencl:. the importance of policy learning as a function of policy analysis for
advising Rulcrs. This requirl:s. illlet alia:
Building up an "institutional memory" of Rulers decisions and their
conscq uences.
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- Broadening the basis for learning, through comparative study of relevant
episodes in other countries and in other periods, as an integral dimension of
advanced policy analysis.
- Initiating evaluation of the results of Rulers' main decisions and transform-
ing findings into explicit policy lessons, to be stored in the institutional
memory and used for policy revision, as well as to be presented to the Ruler
for his personal learning.
- Applying the above activities in intensified form to the policy analysis unit
itself, together with periodic self-evaluation and external review.
It should be noted, that none of the above activities implies that policy
analysis for advising Rulers should itself engage in decision implementation
control or detailed evaluation studies, which would over-dilute its own
miSSIOns.
10. Policy Implementation Institutions
Restructuring institutions is a main component of a broad range of policies,
ranging from administrative reforms to societal architecture. At present, our
concern is with a different kind of engagement of policy analysis for advising
Rulers with institutions, namely in the context of implementation and
feasibility considerations.
Feasibility of policy options is a main concern of advanced policy analysis.
Here, a sharp distinction (even though blurred in reality) should be made
between feasibility with present implementation institutions being viewed
more-or-Iess as given, as contrasted with fcasibility achieved through
revamping and changing implementation institutions. This is especially
important because of the quitc clear lesson from historic studies that
innovative policies have little hope of implementation without far-reaching
reforms and nova-designs of implementation institutions (Bhlck. 1975;
Findley. 1980; Orlovsky, 1981). Hence, the necessity to include institutional
changes as an integral part of innovative policy options, as a precondition of
feasibility.
This does not imply that advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers
should deal with administrative reforms, implementation management and
similar detailed organizational matters. To move into such items cannot but
ruin the essence of policy analysis as focusing on policy-making. Policy
analysis should consider implementation institutions to gauge option feasi-
bility and propose institution redesign directions when essential for imple-
mentation. But not more than that. Thus, when Rulers become active in
administrative reforms, as they often must, they should be aided by special
outfits separate from their policy analysis unit.
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II. Special Operations
To aid Rulers' decision realistically. advanced policy analysis must build up
the capacity to contributc to specific operations inherent in the functions of
Rulers. in addition to the broader contributions discussed so far. Two
illustrations of such special operations already mentioned are crisis manage-
ment and summit negotiations. In crises. Rulers dominate the scene and can
exert impact beyond the feasible under normal conditions. Also, in crises. the
costs of decision mistakes may be very high and even catastrophic. Therefore,
helping Rulers with crisis management is a main task of advanced policy
analysis. more often than not quite neglected. Similarly. negotiations are a
main !IIodus ojJcrill1di of Rulers. with summit meetings providing unique
opportunities and dangers. Therefore. assisting negotiations, both by advance
preparation and by real time backup. constitutes another main "special
operations" challenge to policy analysis. again largely ignored in the present
state of the craft.
These neglects arc a 11 the more symptomatic of the urgent need for a radical
rethinking of thc process of policy analysis. because crisis management and
,ummit mectings are very important opportunities to help Rulers. and build a
strong ba,is for enhancing policy anaiysis opportunities to help them even
more, Th us:
(a) Crisis management is a main mode of Rulcrship, with many relatively
minor crises and a few major ones taking up much of its energy.
Therefore. helping with crisis management will be of visible importance
to the Ruler. contribute to improvement of significant decisions and
provide policy analysis with credibility.
(0) Decisions made during crisis or summit meetings become important
parts of policy reality. hard to revise when time is found to compare
these decisions with contingency plans, policy papers etc. Therefore,
inllueneing crisis decisions, as well as summit declarations, is essential
for policy analysis influcnce on major decisions.
(e) Crises constitute unique opportunities as wcll as dangers. of bringing
about 1~lvourabkor lInfavourabk shifts in reality. Such passing periods
or loosening-up of constraints are main occasions for critical decisions
and for contributions of advanced policy analysis to the latter.
Additional special operations arc attractive candidates for attention by
advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers. Thus. speech writing for Rulers
is a main way to inl1ucnce their thinking, as well as to get specific decisions
announced. and then approved. How t~lr to engagc in such activities is a moot
question. depending a lot on specifics of concrete situations. Policy analysis
for advj,sing Rulers cannot ignore them and must not be exhausted by them.
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12. Budgeting
An interesting case is posed by budgeting. Usually, Rulers serve as
mediators and arbitrators between competing departments, leaving most
decisions to a Ministry of Budgeting, Ministry of Finance or special
Budgeting Office which, even if formally part of the Ruler's Office, operates
mainly on its own (Berman, 1979). Thus, the potentials for using budgeting as
a main opportunity and tool to reconsider and reallocate priorities are little
used, with some shifts being limited usually to the first budget prepared under
a new Ruler (Bunce, 1981). This becomes less and less satisfactory, especially
when economic difficulties pose harder choices and societal architecture
requires sharp shifts in priorities. Hence, Rulers' involvement with budgeting
is changing in quality and quantity, with more critical choices being tied into
Rulers' decisions within the budgeting process. This require,., (a) novel ways to
organize budgeting decision-making, so as to permit meaningful choice on the
level of Rulers (as illustrated by some Canadian efforts, Privy Council Office,
1981); and (b) advances in policy analysis, to permit help with budget-related
decisions, such as priority setting, beyond the inputs of economic advisors.
13, Dangerous Dysfunction Potentials
Balance rethinking of the process of policy analysis requires consideration
of possible dangerous dysfunctions, in addition to sketching enticing hopes.
This is very much the case in respect of policy analysis for advising Rulers
where a number of features, such as proximity to the centre of power,
aggravate potential consequences of dysfunctions possibly introduced by
advanced policy analysis itself. Such potential dysfunctions require, therefore.
careful preview and prevention. Under conditions where dysfunctions may
outweigh benefits, establishment of policy analysis for advancing Rulers
should be avoided, till conditions change.
Leaving aside corruption in its various forms and assuming a high
professional quality of the policy analysis activity. nevertheless quite a
number of insidious and, in the aggregate. very dangerous dysfunctional
potentials do exist. These include. for instance:
- Policy analysis can be misused by Rulers. to serve as a scapegoat for
failures. as legitimation for decisions taken without the benefit of analysis.
and as a device to delay and put off inconvenient issues.
- Policy analysis for advising Rulers can drive out other sources of ideas.
options and analysis, monopolizing the Ruler instcad of serving as one
important producer of advice in a competitive setting. Such monopol-
ization will impair the quality of Rulers' decisions and. with timc. thc
quality of policy analysis itself.
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Policy analysis for advising Rulers may have negative self-fulfilling
prorhecy elkcts, especially when declaring options as non-feasible.
Difficulties in adequately appreciating the strength. for better and worse, of
visions. dogmas, ideologies and beliefs in human action constitute a fallacy
inbuilt into much of contemporary policy analysis, because of economic
models and rationalistic assumptions (Dror. 1980. chapter 1). This bias can
lead to serious harm in situations when the nearly impossible must be
attempted, or when high aspiration levels might serve as a driving force.
When visions arc crucial, it is necessary to circumscribe appropriate roles
for policy analysis at the Rulers' level, so as to benefit from policy analysis
inputs in making vision-approximating decisions. but without too much
disenchantment being generated by over-'"realistic" analysis; especially
when based on narrow methods.
Policy analysis may overwhelm Rulers with uncertainties. complexities,
broad perspectives. counter-intuitive findings and all its other blessings.
This may result in strain and stress, depressing decision quality; in
indecisiveness. which sometimes is a benefit but often a curse, producing
stalemate and policy paralysis: in decision procrastination: or in rejection of
all or policy analysis. including its many positive contributions.
To sueh potential dangerous dysfunctional effects must be added the
simple. but ominous, possibility of wrong analysis. resulting from the many
weak nesses. fallacies. inadequacies and pitfalls of contemporary policy
analysis (as discussed. in part. in Majone and Quade. 1980).
Three main conclusions emerge from consideration of such possible
dangerous dysfunctional cfkcts of policy analysis for Rulers:
(a) Rulers should be sophisticated about possible benefits and dangers of
policy analysis as an aid to their decisions. This can be promoted by
suitable. informal and on-the-job tutorials by the policy analysis unit
ibelL and. sometimes. by providing tailor-made learning opportunities
for Rulers or. which is easier. for potential Rulers-to-be.
(b) Policy analysis for Rulers should engage in self-debugging and self-
debunking. partly in conjunction with the already mentioned need for
self-learning and self-evaluation; partly through institutional arrange-
ments, such as stafr rotation: and partly by strict quality control.
(cl Improvement of policy analysis methods is a sille qua lion.
AU\'A"CEU POLICY ANALYSIS METHOUS FOR ADVISING RULERS
The dilkrcncc bctwecn traditional advisers to Rulers and policy analysis for
advising Rulers is in the methodological base of the latter, which permits
special qualities ofeontributions to Rulers and their decisions. But. to achieve
this distinctiVl' capahility. policy analysis must undergo a deep transfor-
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mation, especially in its methods. I express this verbally with the term
"advanced policy analysis".
It is to some illustrations of the latter that I now turn.
14. Methodological Requisites and Possibilities
All policy analysis functions and tasks considered till now converge and add
up to a needed transformation of policy analysis methodologies. To provide
significant help to Rulers' decisions. policy analysis must enlarge its methodo-
logical repertoire and advance to quite different levels of comprehension
and sophistication. The real need is for integrative, or at least combinational,
methods that can handle problems the main parameters of which cannot be
quantified with presently available scales and important parts of which defy
conceptualization. In other words. purposeful and semi-structured heurisms
must be added as a main content of advanced policy analysis. Some
beginnings exist. but the vast majority of present policy analysis literature and
large parts of policy analysis practice are oflittle help to most of the important
choices facing Rulers.
Systematic consideration of these needs requires examination of existing
methods and their sufficiency and insufficiency for fulfilling the various main
functions of policy analysis for advising Rulers, including inter alia those
discussed already; identification of lacunae, and indication of main methodo-
logical innovations needed to fill the large empty areas. Here is not the place
for such a comprehensive treatment, nor for presenting a compendium of
methods of advanced policy analysis. Instead, in order not to leave the central
thrust of this chapter completely vague. a partial conspectus of methodologi-
cal requisites and possibilities of advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers
can be summed up as follows:
- Additional languages to conceptualize messy realities, ranging from non-
metric measurement scales to processing of impressionistic insights.
- Guides to the utilization of history, anthropology and psychology for
evaluating situations, examining problems. gaining perspectives and
analysing issues.
- Broad "policiographic" approaches to collect. process and apply policy
knowledge and policy experiences from a large range of countries. periods
and situations.
- Special approaches to handle what has been called "large-scale policy
making" (Schulman, 1980) where issues cannot be decomposed into simpler
and easier to analyse problems and where dynamic interrelations between
components require comprehensive decisions with high threshold para-
meters.
Related to large-scale policy-making, as mentioned above, but not identical
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with it: capacities to comprehend and manage intense complexities (La
Porte, 1975; Warfield, 1976).
Methods fitting conditions of ignorance, when important decisions must be
viewed as "fuzzy bets" and allocation of subjective probabilities may be in
error. Combination between gambling studies and structured learning
opportunities indicate some appropriate ways to proceed.
Value analysis. facing the unavoidability of "tragic choice" with tools from
analytical philosophy. value mapping from anthropology, goal clarification
from psychoanalysis. concept clarification from some branches of seman-
tics. multi-goal scaling from welfare economics, and value aggregation
theory from collective choice logic (Klages and Kmieciak. 1979).
Designs for handling the speculative, such as schemata for "thinking
ex peri men ts",
Approaches to policy alternative invention, with idea canvassing, creativity
stimulation and "alternative thinking" exploration. Special attention
should also be paid to unusual sources of options. such as technological
shortcuts (Etzioni and Remp. 1973).
Crosscutting and combining some of the above clusters and applying them
ditkrently to improving Rulers' decisions: decision error research and
experimentation, to debug, debunk, off-set and counter-balance error
propensities.
Broad look-out and prediction methods, able to canvas future possibilities,
without covering up inherent indeterminance and irreducible ignorance
(Choucri and Robinson, 1978; Whiston, 1979),
Approaches to macro-organizational analysis, based probably in part on
merging components from organization theory with components from
political science and political sociology. together with canvassing of
historical experiences with the help of modern conceptual tools.
Evaluation methods, together with social experimentation techniques,
transposed to the level of policy-making and based on available experiences
and theories (Ferber and Hirsch, 1981).
Time-compressing quick-response methods. based in part on preset
analysis schemata. to permit preferable inputs under intense time pressures.
Intcgrated tools ror analysing bargaining and negotiation decisions, from
theory or games. through psychological profiles, to external-event canvass-
ing ,Ind controlling.
Crisis handling improvement designs. ranging from crisis exercises to stress-
containing psycho-tools (Hermann and Hermann, 1975; Smart and
Stanbury, 1978).
Display techniques. to help with the communication of complex analysis to
busy Rulers, without spoiling oversimplifications.
Principles ror reasoning. judgement and drawing of conclusions, encom-
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passing also appropriate ideas from aesthetics, jurisprudence, rhetorics (in
its correct meaning as the theory of sound argument) and additional
branches of purposeful activity (Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1979).
- Beginnings of a philosophic underpinning for advanced policy analysis
methods, such as: elements of philosophy of knowledge and science;
fundamental approaches to the nature of ""decisions" and their effects or
mis-effects in influencing futures; general systems theory; and fundamental
treatment of concepts of ""rationality" in their metaphysical, positivistic,
sociological and cultural world of discourse (Michalos, 1978).
Progress on the lines mentioned above is essential for applying policy
analysis to complex. high level and indeterminate issues. It is an impera tive for
policy analysis for advising Rulers.
Further insights into needs for methodological advancements arc provided
by looking at two requisites more distant from the mainstreams of contem-
porary policy analysis, and operational research in general, namely: social
sciences in policy analysis and politics in policy analysis.
IS. Social Sciences in Policy Analysis
The needs for rethinking policy analysis and for methodological in-
novations are well brought out by problems of social sciences in policy
analysis. At present, applied social sciences are capable of providing data
helpful for policy issues, such as current surveys (Rich, 1981). Applied social
sciences are also useful in a number oflow-level issues. But. with the exception
of economics, social sciences are still of little use in the handling of major
policy problems. The difficulties of applied social sciences for high-policy
issues are well-illustrated by recent undermining of the reliability of the
bastion of successful policy-contributions by a social science discipline,
namely economics. This leaves policy analysis for advising Rulers quite
lacking, because suitable social science knowledge inputs are essential for
handling a growing range of challenges, especially in societal architecture and
in transincremental decisions in general. Therefore, there is a necessity to
introduce changes in social sciences and in policy analysis. so as to build a
basis for improved Rulers' decisions.
The satisfaction of this need meets multiple, strong and mutually sup-
portive barriers, such as:
Inadequate knowledge by applied social sciences of policy analysis and
prescriptive decision approaches in general. with resulting: (a) insufl'icient
and often also incorrect processing of social science knowledge into policy
recommendations; (b) inadeq uate design of social science research so as to
meet advanced policy analysis needs. Thus. contemporary applied social
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sciences eschew historical and comparative studies, which are essential for
many policy purposes; and (c) little help to policy analysis in learning to
integrate correctly available social science knowledge.
Misapprehension by policy analysis of social sciences, with inadequate
understanding of the potentials and limitations of contemporary social
science paradigms. As a result: (a) the social sciences are expected to
produce findings fitting policy analysis schemata of quite narrow a format,
which ignore the inherent characteristics ofthematerial dealt with by social
sciences: (b) policy analysis is often unable to utilize correctly social science
knowledge which is available, and frequently does not even reach that
material: and (c) policy analysis does not provide helpful guidance to social
sciences on those of its needs that could be satisfied by present social science
capacities, if correctly applied.
Behind this mismatch, more fundamental factors may be at work, such as
(a) ditlcrences in personality type and value profiles between many social
scientists and many policy analysts: (b) ditl'erences in basic attitudes to
working in and for governments and establishments. These, in turn, may be
related to ditfen:nces in actual and desired societal functions, with social
scientists in some countries tending more to roles of social critics, and policy
analysts more to roles of improvers of policy-making from within
governments; and (c) possible differences and also divergence between
philosophy of science bases and assumptions of social sciences and policy
analysis.
Prod uctive interface between policy analysis and social sciences is not easy
to achieve, as evidenced by the scarcity of fruitful mixed activities between
highly-qualified social seicntists and highly-qualified policy analysts. The
absence of successful combined policy analysis and social science teaching
programs is also symptomatic. despite the success of combined programs
bet\\.een policy studies on one hand and law, public health and additional
subjects on the other.
To this must be added, that despite much insightful literature in applied
social sciences (Rein. 1976: Scott and Shore, 1979: Weiss, 1980) the needs for
and problcms of more convergcnce between applied social sciences and policy
analysis is very seldom taken up and even more seldom perceived correctly.
16. Politics in Policy Analysis
Problems of applied social sciences in policy analysis preview, in part, some
of the difliculties of adeq uately handling politics in policy analysis, though the
latter is even more urgent a need and even more difficult a task. After all,
Rulcrs arc predominantly political decision-makers. with politics permeating
their thinking and behaviour and political considerations necessarily placing a
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pivotal role in their choices. Therefore, policy analysis for advising Rulers
must squarely face the issue of how to take politics into account.
Many of the responses by contemporary policy analysis to the needs of
handling politics are inadequate for advanced policy analysis and, in
particular, policy analysis for Rulers. It is doubtful to view politics as an
"enemy" (Churchman, 1979) to regard politics as ripe for reform by policy
analysis, to adopt narrow concepts of "political feasibility testing" as a main
mode to accommodate politics in policy analysis, or to regard political
constraints as inferior to technological or economical ones. 6
Adequate treatment of politics in policy analysis for advising Rulers must
start with a distinction between various overlapping contents of the term
"politics", looked at from the point-of-view of Rulers' decisions: (a) expected
responses from targets of his decisions, domestic and external; (b) possibili ties
for gaining support for various options, each one separately and for a number
of them as packages; (c) longer-term impacts of his decisions on domestic and
external politics, as a main goal for Rulers' decisions; (d) impacts of his
decisions on his own political stature; (e) politics as expressing ideologies and
belief systems, which a Ruler may accept as a commitment and base for his
decisions.
Policy analysis must clearly consider these and additional dimensions of
politics as very salient for Rulers' decisions.
Handling of politics in policy analysis for advising Rulers can either try and
do a maximum job in considering politics. within the limits of present and
emerging methods, or can prefer to do a minimum job. which still must
include quite a lot. Choice between these extremes and in-between positions
depends on the political ideology and culture of different countries, as well as
different structures of Rulers' units, which mayor may not include various
types of political advisers other than the policy analysis island.
Maximum handling of politics in policy analysis for advising Rulers
includes, in the main: (a) mapping of political fields within which decisions
operate and attempts to predict responses and supports as well as oppositions;
(b) efforts to generate options morc favourable in political responses.
including special attention to decision marketing as part of advanced analysis;
(e) some consideration of impacts on Rulers' own political power, but
subd ued and left mainly in the hands of political advisers, in close interaction
with them; and (d) basic acceptance of Rulers' ideological position as a frame-
of-reference for policy analysis, but with constant struggle for distinction
between ideological values and dogmatic fiats and with intense efforts to
expose Rulers to alternative perspectives and counter-dogmatic options.
Minimum handling of politics in policy analysis for advising Rulers still
requires full understanding of the political dimensions of Rulers' decisions,
but accepts a different division of labour with political advisers, leaving to the
latter most of the tasks of working out political dimensions. But, unless close
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communication is maintained between policy analysts and political advisers
and unless each understands the other's functions and perspectives, both the
quality of policy analysis help for the Ruler and the quality of the political
advice help for the Ruler will suffer, with dire consequences for the quality of
Rulers' decisions.
Minimum inclusion of politics in policy analysis for advising Rulers does
require much rethinking of the process of policy analysis. Movement towards
maximum inclusion of politics in policy analysis, which may well be needed in
quite a number of situations, probably requires paradigmatic innovations in
policy analysis.
It is fitting to conclude our circumnavigation of special features of policy
analysis for advising Rulers, which req uire rethinking the process of policy
analysis. with politics in policy analysis. It is the special duality of Rulers as the
political heads of their countries and as in charge of the policies of their
countries. which causes and conditions the special features of policy analysis
for advising Rulers.
IV. REALITY AND PROSPECTS
Let us turn from proposed specifications of advanced policy analysis for
advising Rulers to the actual equipment of Rulers with policy analysis or
policy-analysis-approximating help. Excluding countries on which I have no
material available and basing generalizations mainly on field study and the
little available literature, the emerging picture can provisionally be summed
up as follows:
A general trend to build up staff supports for Rulers can be discerned. There
is a large disparity in the size of such staffs. ranging from five to ten aides up
to Prime Ministerial and Presidential offices with up to two to three hundred
professionals, in a few countries.
Some countries have quite sophisticated set-ups, with special Rulers'
research centres and planning units, separate policy and political advisory
staffs. integrative policy review units, etc. But, in most countries, such units
arc ill s/a/lis lIuscclldi.
In most countries, Rulers' units are staffed with regular civil servants. In a
few countrics, outsiders inc! uding professionals are also recruited.
Only in single countries do Rulers' units partake some of the characteristics
of policy analysis staffs, as discussed in the paper. Usually, intuition and
experience arc rclied upon. augmented with some economics and tradi-
tional social scicnccs at the most. Professional policy analysis for advising
Rulers is. at prescnt. an anomality.
Howevcr overgeneralized this picture may be, it does pose the question why
policy analysis for advising Rulers is distinguished by its absence, despite
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uneasiness felt by most contemporary Rulers and search on their part for help
in confronting overwhelming challenges.
The main factors inhibiting demand for policy analysis to advise Rulers can
be illustrated, as follows:
(a) Conflict between Rulership and political dynamics on one hand and
policy analysis dynamics on the other hand, as discussed earlier. As a
result of such conflict, policy analysis causes obvious pain to Rulers,
while benefits may seem quite ephemeral.
(b) Political costs of setting up such units, when the building up of Rulers'
equipment is resisted by constitutional norms, political conventions,
ideologies, coalition structures and so on.
(c) Personal risks to the Ruler of putting his trust in a professional island of
excellence, not bound to him by traditionally proven chains of trust.
Instances of indiscretion in a number of countries strengthen such
apprehensions about policy analysis professionals.
(d) Bureaucratic resistance to the introduction of novel methods into
government, which break civil service monopolies and discount
experience and traditional skills and knowledge.
(e) Pragmatism as an ideology, with deep doubts about any claims in the
name of "scientific" approaches. Disappointment with economics
strongly reinforces nowadays such pragmatic reactions, with Rulers
and their counsellors being very sceptical, if not cynical, about the
potential contributions of policy analysis and any similar approaches.
(f) Inability of policy analysis to deliver the goods, assuming such units for
Rulers are set up. This, as a result both of the underdevelopment of
policy analysis, as discussed in this paper; and the scarcity of highly
qualified analysts, who might do a good job thanks to their subjective
knowledge. The absence of necessary infra-structures, such as Think
Tanks and public policy schools, in most countries further aggravates
this barrier.
(g) Assuming policy analysis units for Rulers were set up. they probably
would fail unless Rulers themselves know something about the main
features of policy analysis and give a helping hand to accelerate
maturation of their policy analysis unit. But this is to demand quite a
lot.
As against these doubts about the chances of advanced policy analysis for
advising Rulers, some hopeful signs become increasingly visible, such as:
- An actual tendency, in a small but growing number ofcountries. to build up
integrated professional advisory units for Rulers. While not yet policy
analysis based, such units do search for a professional foundation and serve
as a potential opening for policy analysis for advising Rulers. The successful
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contributions of some such units to Rulers' decisions and their survival of
changes in Rulers are important antecedents for institutionalization of
advanced policy analysis 'for advising Rulers, on lines discussed in this
paper.
Increasing awareness in more and more countries, including among top
decision-makers, that contemporary governmental equipmentsare unequal
to the challenges and are becoming rapidly obsolescent
In policy analysis itself, in conjunction with embracing disciplines such as
operational research and policy sciences, a recognition of insufficiency in
the face of societal and global problems, with readiness for rethinking - as
evidenced by this volume, too,
Therefore, opportunities for setting up policy analysis for advising Rulers
do exist and can be expected to multiply, either as the result of systematic
endeavours to redesign governments better to meet challenges, or thanks to
innovative Rulers, or as the result of avalanching crises that crack open
systems to new experimentation, To search for such opportunities and to be
ready to I'ulfilthe tasks of advanced policy analysis for advising Rulers - this is
a heavy responsibility lying upon the professionals of policy analysis itself.
Rulers dcrive their legitimation from the political processes which bring them
to their fateful positions, The only justification for policy analysts to enter
the chambers of powers is their professional capability to make a substantive
contribution to high-level decisions,
It follows, that the-state-of-the-craft of policy analysis must be rapidly
upgraded, on lines such as discussed here or on better ones, to be identified
after further search. This is an assignment mainly for the informal in-
ternational college of high-quality policy analysts and related professionals.
Professional associations, university departments and policy research organi-
zations, such as IIASA, can do a lot to help such activities.
To try and help progress in that direction, let me conclude with three
operational proposals for preparing policy analysis to move into advanced
policy analysis for advising Rulers, as well as for helping with major societal
problems and global issues at a variety of decision loci.
I, Specific work focused on policy analysis for advising Rulers, in
conjunction with endeavours to advance policy analysis as a whole
should be organized, Thus, mixed workshops with actual advisors of
Rulers and policy analysis professionals can serve to specify needs and
possibilities of policy analysis for advising Rulers. Shared study projects
with decision psychologists can deal with operationalization of de-
bugging and debunking functions of policy analysis for Rulers. Mixed
projects with social scientists provide hope for introducing applied
social scienccs into advanced policy analysis. And a variety of activities
with practising politicians, political correspondents and other persons
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knowledgeable in politics, including some political scientists, are
essential starting points for upgrading the handling of politics in
advanced policy analysis.
2. The infrastructure for upgrading policy analysis must be further
developed and diffused. Thus, appropriate professional training pro-
grams in advanced policy analysis should be established in more
countries, and on a cross-national basis, based in part on the ex-
periences, for better and for worse, of the United States public policy
schools. Inslitutional settings for research on policy analysis methods
need also strengthening, with special attention to merging applied
experience with theoretic work.
3. Rulers, as well as other main decision-makers, must be sensitized to the
potentials as well as the limits of policy analysis as an aid to their society-
steering roles. This may require unconventional activities, such as
workshops and treatizes specially designed for Rulers, ruler-candidates,
and ruler-producing cadres, and also for other Ruler-influencing
advisers. 7
Let us bear in mind that policy analysis for advising Rulers, as treated in this
chapter, is not only a subject very important by itself, but also serves as a pure
type tool for exploring broader needs of rethinking the processes of policy
analysis. Advanced policy analysis can become an important augmentation of
hard-pressed human capacities consciously to influence collective futures
through deliberate choice and action. Therefore, progress towards advanced
policy analysis, including but not exclusively in the form of policy analysis for
advising Rulers, is a most urgent task.
FOOTNOTES
I. This chapter is indebted for encouragement and support from a number of institutions.
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William Plowdcn. Max Singer. H. Vcrwayen. Warren Walker and Michael Wearne.
2. I ~ope to expand this chapter into a book-length version. with more adequate treatmcnt or
main issues and problems. Readers are invited to help in this endeavour by letting me benefit from
thcir commcnts and observations.
Thc cxpanded version will provide extensive bibliographic guidance and discussion of relevant
litcrature. In this paper [limit myself to a fcw rcferences. as illustrations and s:lInples from a rather
largc list or publications processed as part or my study.
3. It is amazing how little work has been donc on designing multi-dimcnsional bricfing
arrangements for top decision-makers. Military bricfing is oftcn highly developed. but tcnds
towards scrious ovcrsimplifications. such as in handling uncertainty. Good graphic display
systcms, such as at thc Department of Commercc. Washington DC and thc National Council of
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Science and Technology in Mcxico City. provide some starting points. as does some work on data
supports to decision-making and some experience with data processing for Rulers' offices (Fick
and Sprague. Jr. 1981: Grigg. 1980: Harden. 1980).
Some Rulers havc situation rooms. hut those few I have seen are overstatic. simplistic,
underusL'd and sometimes gadget-prone. Few try to move from simple data series presentation to
issue-mapping and policy analysis presentation. (Some attempts are described in Beer. 1975: Beer.
1981, ""TIlL' Course of History": and Szanton, 1981. pp. 98 If) This is a neglected area. mgently in
nL'ed 01 illlense wnrk. I think development of well-designed problem-presentation multi-media
setups for Ruins is hoth kasible and useful. Such equipment. ifcorrectly used. can be of real help
in making advanced policy analysis servc improvement of Rulers' decisions.
It is interesting to speculate on the impact on future Rulers of getting used from an early age to
interactive games and home computers. This serves to illustrate the implications of hroader
cullllral-technological developments lor policy analysis possibilities. Speeding up development of
homecomputcr software inculcating decision sophistication. such as in facing uncertainty.
illustratL" L'ven wider possibilities to inAuL'nce decision culture as a whole. The scarcity of such
progranb despite significant m'lrket potentials raises interesting questions. beyond the scope of
Ihis chapter
4. The term ""policy analysis" may well be too narrow to fully express needs. the combined vcrbal
symhol ""policy planning and policy analysis" being perhaps preferable especially. in order to
convey tbe contents of what I discuss in this paper under the term ""advanccd policy analysis".
5. A fascinating illustration is provided by a historic analysis of Francc between the First and the
Second World War (Young. 1978). The basic thesis is. that most French foreign policy and
deknce decisions during the studied period were incrementally correct. But as France was on a
hislnry-produced downwards slope. disjointed "cost effective" decisions could not help. To
optitlli/e on a sinking curVL" this is worse than usel~ss: but. this is all that most of contemporary
policy analysis can do. in thL' absence of situational diagnostics and advanced prescriptive
methodologiL's. Also worth pondering in this context is Gelb and Betts. 1979.
1>. Typical is the following statement. made while discw,sing the design of desirable futures and
attn specifying that technL)logical kasibility should be acccpted as a constraint: ""All other types
"f extcrnally imposcd c"nstraint for example. economic, political and legal - should be
disregarded". (Ackotl. 1978. p. 72.)
With due respect to the distinguished author. assuming a priori that human nature. on which
politics is hased. can he changed produces liction. just as unrealistic technological assumptions
would do. Why outstanding systems scientists tend towards wishful thinking when human
\ dflablcs are concerned this is a question deserving much thought. Whatever the answer may
he. here is a main root for the narrow utility of large parts of policy analysis.
7. Some experimentation with a Works!lop ill {'olic.!' Plallllillg and Polic.!' Allolrsis which I run
\\ tth such persons in a numher of counlries leads me to the tentative impression. that lack of
suitahle olrning arc a contributing cause of underequipment of Rulers.
Similarly symptomatic is the absence of books written for Rulers and adjusted to their special
needs. Lkspite the long tradition of ""Mirrors lor Rulers' at other periods. 1 try to take up parts of
this L'halkngc in a forthcoming T!lillkhook /01' RlIlel'.l.
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7
Change in the Paradigms of
Systems Analysis*
DR. JANOS FARKAS
As a matter of fact, when we have a closer look at this issue, and investigate the structure of
exact sciences more thoroughly, we at once notice that the whole edifice has a dangerously
weak point this one being its base itself.
Max Planck
The same thing has happened to system analysis and the system modelling
relying on it as it has to several other scientific disciplines: its spectacular and
swift rise has come to a halt: it did not prove to be efficient enough, and strong
reservations and anxiety have appeared as the first signs of attempts to find a
way out of the problem. Thomas Kuhn has already given a general outline of
this process as well as concrete examples concerned with physics. I Re-
searchers conduct their activities on the basis of assuming ··paradigms". The
normal development stage of science comes, however, to an end when the old
paradigm proves to be too narrow to mould the new results and experiences
into a theoretical and methodological framework. The "rebels" of the
discipline concerned discard the old paradigm and replace it with a new one.
This is the revolutionary stage of the development of science.
Therefore, in the case of systems theory, too, the crisis phenomena do not
indicate anything else but the fact that the old (positivistic) paradigm seems to
be exhausted and a theoretical renewal will soon get under way. The present
chapter itself poses the task of contributing to this change in paradigms.
The main theses are the following: we have to negate certain lacking or
erroneous presuppositions of systems analysis. We have to introduce new
presuppositions; namely a type of modern anthropology which corresponds
to modern social theory. It is a case of lack ing presuppositions when scholars of
systems theory conceive of social products as phenomena of nature, and
specific socio-human factors are not reckoned with. It is a case of errol/COliS
* This paper is an abbreviated. modified version of my paper entitled The Hidden. Lacking or
Erroneous Presuppositions of Systems Analysis. IIASA Symposium. Laxenburg. Aug. 1980.
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pre.I'UPI)().liliOI1S when the concept of society and the individual is in existence,
yet it is obsolete. By "hidden 1' presupposilions I mean that the number of theses
can always be augmented and no system has an optimal and final solution.
I. The first question can be formulated as follows: Is it true or is it wrong to
state that today systems theory is in the state of changing paradigms? My
answer to the question is an unequivocal yes. Namely, classical systems theory
was based on the posilil'isl II/odel of science.
As a matter of fact, the participants of the seminar agreed that the positivist
model of SA has to be replaced by a more adequate model. It was Checkland
who outlined the differences between the two types of paradigms most
vividly.2 In addition, Churchman and Mitroff not only at the seminar but in
earlier writings expressly suggested "dialectic" as a new method. 3
This method has the characteristic that it conducts research into pheno-
mena examined by natural sciences through quantitative measures which of
necessity do not cover the world of consciousness, subjectivity and socio-
human characteristics, In spite of this, the methodology was applied to social
systems. too. This methodology being reductionist, it was only able to depict
social phenomena by such simplified models that they necessarily failed when
put into social practice. Thus, the problem identified by Susman-Evered
arose: the failures of systems theory are to be ascribed to the epistemological
crises brought about by the positivist model of science. 4 In a discussion paper I
have made an attempt to transcend this view in some respects. I state that the
rise, flourishing and failure of both the positivist method and all methodo-
logies can be traced back to social causes. Production carried out in
manufactures has its corresponding link in the Descartes' type of thinking
based on logical rules: the positivist methodology corresponds to machine-
factory production; and the anti-positivist methodology corresponds to
prod uction carried out in the form of scientific-technical revolution. The
direction of the inter-relationship is that the given type of production cannot
be derived from the logic of cognition, but the other way round.
Not only at the seminar but earlier in the technical literature there were
Illany signs that indicated the negation of the positivist methodology. For
example. Majone urged for an SA oriented not at result but rather at the
process.;; Checkland, too, emphasized that according to the new paradigm SA
is a process and not a product. h All those who have become aware of the
process-like structure of being have practically adopted dialectic. However,
the debate could be continued on some philosophical issues. Checkland, for
example, has suggested giving preference to the outlook of phenomenology,
as against positivism. 7 I could challenge his view, since the phenomenologist
is. as a matter of fact. a consequent positivist. This is the only consequent
method since it does not aim at examining the given state of affairs in a
selective way. It does not examine whether the thing that is given for him, that
appears in front of him is, as a phenomenon of his consciousness, derived from
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experience or from elsewhere. How could he know what is really valid, what is
a really reliable experience? Is it a phenomenological analysis to describe that
which is given for him and not to transcend this level? Yet, does this lead
anywhere?
Naturally, I recognize that it was phenomenology which got closest to the
description of the basic structures of everyday life and behaviour. This trend
raises a real problem, yet its "solutions" are not fully adequate epistemologi-
cally. At the same time, Marxism is at present regrettably not yet capable of
giving a description to be operationalized on the facts of every-day life and
behaviour. It was perhaps Gy6rgy Lukacs who offered the most in this
respect in his works Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen and Zur Ontologie des
gesellschaftlichen Seins.
I also have some doubts in connection with the thesis put forward, mainly
by Churchman and Checkland, according to which the methodology of SA
could be constructed through the help of Kantian and Hegelian dialectic. 8
For example, Kant has described the antinomic structures, because he
thought over the bourgeois tendencies of rationalism. The oppositional
systems based on the separation of human abilities necessarily lead to
irrational solutions. Kant, too, was tempted by this possibility when he
thought that intuition could be a solution which reconciled contradictions. I
regard the idea of the Renaissance emphasizing the possibility of individual
unity and manysidedness as much more fruitful; Marxism is the sole
continuation of this idea. To be sure, I do not state that idealist types of
dialectic cannot be made use of in SA - yet, personally, I see more possibilities
in the application of materialist dialectic. Regrettably, the scholars of this
latter trend still have to make great efforts to render this dialectic operational.
2. However, by a mere registration of the phenomena of crisis in systems
theory which appear of necessity beca use of methodological limits, the basic
problem is not yet solved: can we construct systems models that adequately
reflect the nature of complex social phenomena? The second question. too, is
answered by an affirmative yes. II' we succeed in theoretically reflecting such
phenomena - characteristic of social quality - as interest, need, value,
property. power and the conflicting forms thereof. then the new methodology.
too. can be constructed. This. in turn. will cause a change of paradigms in
systems theory. Before that. some erroneous presupposition of classical
systems theory have to be discarded. First of all I discuss the concepts of
ratio!lulity and optimality and point out that behind these key concepts an
erroneous abstract image of man and society lacking social determination is
hidden. According to the character of social production. earlier thinking
divided the individual into isolated sections: homo (,co!lomicus. hO//70 politicus.
homo ('ticus. Under circumstances of contemporary production. however all
essential features of man merge into a unity and the homo Illlil'CfSalis takes
shape. A principal change is also necessary in anthropology. too. Society,
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however cannot be deduced from anthropology. The characteristics and
behaviour of the individual are socially determined by social existence, by the
totality of social circumstances. Thus we must have such a concept of society
from which anthropology itself can be deduced.
The idea according to which anthropology as a concept of man is only
secondary as compared with the concept of society could be set forth in the
following: society is not only a duster.of individuals connected by individual
relationships, but it is a system of oh/ative relationships. Individuals enter
various groups as the carriers of these latter relationships and not as '"pure
individuals". Society consists not of individuals, but it expresses the total of
those aspects and relationships which link the individuals with one another.
The "secret" of the methodological drawbacks of some anthropological
group researches is that the individual is regarded as the object of research '"by
itseW' and is deprived of its "social determinateness". The individual is not
regarded as the carrier of objective social relationships. However, it is also true
that the above-mentioned principle of methodology is not easy to assert in
researches, its concept uaJization is hindered by many obstacles.
When I say that the relatio/1ships of determination exert their influence on
small groups and individuals starting out from the circumstances and facts
that determine the character of society as a totality (ownership relations,
distribution of labour. economic mechanism, political structure, etc.). I by no
means state that here we face a determination of '"pure", total and direct
character that can be pointed out in each individual case directly. It is just this
lack of tot,1I and direct macro-structural determination that creates a scope
for the activity of groups and individuals. Yet, the vast theoretical problem
hasn't been solved yet that the ecological and other peculiarities of the social
medium. i.e. the social system in a broader sense be introduced into the study
and interpretation of the formation of interpersonal relationships. Kurt
Lewin's significant considerations related to "psychological ecology" are
hardly elaborated by others. Instead. it is formal research into the com-
munication structures that started to flourish which hinders the elaboration of
the social determinateness taken in a broader sense of anthropology.
The self-movement of social totality independent of consciousness cannot
bc merely regarded as the .llIhse({IIi'/1t synthesis of individual target-settings,
because it is at the same time also their precondition. If this were not the case,
then all the decisions made by individuals would be made in a void. The scope
provided by society in which individuals move and make decisions does not
merely consist of the "surroundings" but it is the sum total of the life
conditions of the individuals. These conditions arc shaped into the
individual's essence from childhood: the individual is exposed to external
influences, then he enters the process of reproduction and he occupies his place
in the technical and economic structure of work activities which have arisen in
the course of history. According to this. he gets a certain proportion of the
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gross social product. The possibilities of the satisfaction of given material and
intellectual needs which are determined socially and historically depend on the
mode and extent of the acquisition of the social product i.e. in the last resort
on the relationship to the means of production. These possibilities determine
the values and objective interests of the individuals. The individual becomes
interested in the reproduction or change of certain circumstances. The
individual is, therefore, the externalized, subjective form of objective imper-
sonal external relationships. The activities which turn the assimilated society
into something external are directed by individual consciousness: objective life
circumstances can assert their decisive influence only through its medium.
Needs and interests exert their influence not directly, but through their
personal reflections, i.e. through the practical and theoretical hierarchy that
manifests itself in the personal system of interests and norms. In a direct way,
therefore, consciousness determines the action based on its subjective
standards, i.e. dependent upon the ideology and capacity of cognition shown
by the individual.
The study and knowledge ofanthropology is important, because the general
social life conditions and their most important elements, i.e. the relationships
of ownership, cannot unequivocally determine factors which are individual,
and accidental compared to them. Therefore, determination has different levels.
The general life conditions determine the structure ofsociety, but that of the
historical situation only partly. They determine the transformation ofsociety
and the main content of its ideological and economic development, but they do
not determine the concrete form of transformation or daily events. The lower
the level of generalization is, the closer it is to the individual, the greater is the
number of accidental factors. In this case, however, it is not the level of
determinateness that increases, but determinateness prevails on other planes.
Therefore, anthropological necessities account for accidental phenomena from
the point of view of the general outlook of social theory. Thus, the duality of
social theory and anthropology as a concept of society and a concept of the
individual serves the simultaneous understanding of general and concrete
aspects.
3. In our day, systems theory moves of necessity in the direction of the
change of paradigms. Several signs of those manifest themselves. Majone
speaks of "pitfalls"; Churchman of "enemies"; Tomlinson of "semi-truths".
Mitroff uses the term "re-interpretation"; Sadowsky-Blauberg sees "para-
doxons" in the theory. Some authors expound the necessity of introducing
into systems theory the "dialectic" method as a positive programme.
Therefore, the paradigm is dialectic. 9 The declarative statement thereof is,
however, not sufficient.
In our discussions the SA method was called "behaviour dialectic" by
Mitroff and "procedure dialectic" by Majone. 10 The essence is that dialectic
has to be conceived ofas a concrete methodology. In my opinion, the difficulty
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is caused by the fact that it is always easier to move from the concrete to the
abstract, than the other way round. Therefore, at present, Marxist dialectic is
still difficult to operationalize, since the system or mediations filling the
vacuum between the abstract and the concrete is missing. In the abstract
thinking that has detached itself from reality, mediations are often ignored.
Therefore, all proposals serving the concrete operationalization of dialectic,
contribute to the overcoming of dogmatic rationalism.
Blaubcrg differentiates between the philosophical, methodological and
applied levels of dialectic II and thereby, in my opinion, he has made a useful
contribution to the study of the system of mediations. To be sure, dialectic has
to be applied also for the present-day objectionalized systems, but the finding
of the mediations bctween individuals and greater groups of individuals is also
really important. Though with a limited validity, it was Freud and existen-
tialism which gave the best picture of the individual's psychological frust-
ration. To be sure, Freud's phenomenological description starts out primarily
from the psychology of the Vienna petit bourgeoisie. Its validity is relevant for
bourgeois consciollsness, and not for the human psyche in general. Therefore,
all efforts aimed at discovering the more general dialectic structure of
behaviour have to be welcomed.
Before starting operationalization, we have to assess on two planes
theoretically: what docs dialectic mean from the aspect of the logic ofcognition
and what does it mean from the aspect of the o/1tological movement ofsociety.
What is more important, the relmio/1ship of subjective and objective dialectic
and logic has to be clarified. Classical German philosophy - in the first place
Hegel really offered a rich heritage ofdialectic. However, we must not stop at
Hegel, because with him the various objectivations - among them the social
ones are to be deduced from the self-realizing process of the spirit. Therefore,
from Hegel's idealistic dialectic we have to move towards dialectic, according
to which the dialectic of the social existence elicits the peculiarities of a
dialectic nature of the mental sphere.
4. J have devoted a separate section in this chapter to logical pre-
suppositionl. The insight into scientific cognition becomes so gradually
prevalent that thc prohibition of contradiction is not equal to the measure of
truth: indeed the most important relationship is the contradiction. By this
insight. the essence of logic bccomes the dialectic. In pre-Kantian logic the
contradiction was evaluated as a "mistake", as an unhealthy state of the
intellect. as a sophism. I present several examples which indicate that in
traditional formal logic, and the scientific methodology based on it. pro-
hibition of contradiction is but one rule of thinking, created by man and set
before thinking. The principle of contradiction, however, is an inherent law of
the nature of objcctively existing thinking. Traditional logic, therefore, must
be renewed which would also mcan a change of paradigms - it must be made
capable of exprcssing thc contradiction in thinking. Therefore, the principle
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according to which if we find a contradiction we have to do our utmost to
eliminate it - two statements cannot be true at the same time - has to be
discarded from systems theory.
5. Besides the subjective dialectic of cognition, I have suggested the
inclusion of the objective dialectic of society as presuppositions of systems
theory. Naturally, I think here of basic theses, for example how social
existence determines the superstructure and what a dialectic relationship
exists between the development of the forces of production and the relations
of production, etc. Other theses belonging here are: What kind of differing -
and in most cases antagonistic - relations of distribution and property come
into existence owing to the given order of production?
How is power structure based on material relationships? How do class
relations develop and corresponding to that - mainly in the satisfaction of
demands - how do interests and their collisions and conflicts take shape? Ifwe
do not strive to clarify the objective dialectic of society before drawing up the
model, then the introduction in systems theory of aspects of value-orientation
is in vain. 12 (Classical systems analysis completely neglected this and today's
striving for reform tries to include the problem of value in order to scrutinize
decision-making. )
In SA the interests of at least three groups of people have to be
distinguished; namely the analysers of the system, the decision-makers and the
interests of those persons who are directly affected by the consequences of the
realization of the systems model. The interests of these three groups of people
are generally conflicting, and conflict resolution is possible only by arriving at
a compromise among values. Dror has called attention to one of these three
groups - the decision-makers - who have to be educated for the reception of
SA. 13
If the scholars of systems theory do not clarify the social process of the
emergence of values, then only new failures can be expected. Social
transformations cannot be understood from a change in the system of values
but this also applies to dynamics and intensity of needs. The empiric sociology
of value, conceiving of values as a "subjective factor", cannot and will not
comment on those social processes in which values. i.e. these "stable factors of
inter-subjective preference", take shape and from which - according to the
needs of various social strata common and contradictory values can be
understood and from which these values acquire their power of normative
guidance over individuals. Ifwe omit from the scrutiny of values history social
needs and interests, i.e. all kinds of determination from the aspect of content,
then the system of values . in accordance with the teachings of neopositivism -
is totally ungrounded.
Also changes in value can become totally accidental and therefore not to be
grasped. In saying this I wish to point out that it is not sutllcient by itself to
refer to dialectic. It has to be decided whether it is a case of materialist or
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idealist dialectic. Therefore. in itself the inclusion of goals, values, norms,
behaviours and other human-subjective values into systems theoretical
analysis is not sufficient. It is important to decide whether they are ultimately
decisive factors or determined by the material life conditions of society. To
regard the problem from the side of logic, it is decisive how we conceive of the
rela tionship between subjective and objective dialectic. If we consider these as
complementing one another or if we regard the latter as a function of the
former we bring into systems theory erroneous presuppositions.
6. Finally, I should like to summarize my thoughts on epistemological
presuppositions. On the one hand, we witness the crisis of both traditional
rationalism and traditional empiricism. This manifests itself in various terms
used by the authors in this book (paradoxes, pitfalls, etc.). In my view, a new
kind 0/ rationalism may be necessary in the light of which it would become
clear that in most cases it is only from the aspect of traditional rational
cognition that things seem to be irrational, or have become a pitfall.
Therefore, this calls for a methodical change in paradigms. On the other hand,
it has to be recognized that objective social reality can pave the way to
irrational behaviour and social paradoxes, etc. These objective irrationalities
stem from existing totality, and the basic contradictions of the socio-economic
structun: of societies split by conflicting interests. This contradiction is also
reflected in the relations of countries and groups of countries. Therefore, the
scholars of systems analysis have to discard their idyllic views of society if they
want to draw up models that work in reality, too.
The question is whether social reality is willing to obey our desires or not.
We therefore ret urn to my important point, that the scholars of systems
analysis if they want to be successful - have to free themselves of their
erroneous ideological presuppositions be they covert or overt.
Therefore, in my view, the new - dialectic - paradigm of systems analysis is
already in the making, but because of socially conditioned ideological barriers
it is to be expected that many obstacles will arise to its acceptance and
application.
As for me, I am optimistic, and hope that the renewal of SA on a dialectic
basis will contribute to the alleviation and solution of the basic problems of
individuals, nations and the whole of mankind. To be sure, Churchman's
scepticism is not totally without foundation. 14 All of us are aware of the truth
put in poetic form by Sophocles in his Antigone: "If someone knows
something which is wonderful and wise he can make use of it for good and evil
purposes." If. however, the need so often voiced to develop SA as a
"community" enterprise is fulfilled, then it may, in all probability, become the
means through which scholars of SA will aim for the good, and not the evil.
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Current Methodological Problems
of Systems Analysis and Its
Application
O. I. LARICHEV (USSR)
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Part of the basic thesis of the workshop sponsors is that the smooth stage of
systems analysis development is over and there are signs of current diffi-
culties in its application to practical problems.
To better understand the current state-of-the-art of systems analysis
methodology one has to trace the history of its origins and development.
Undoubtedly, systems analysis originated as a means of handling certain
military and engineering problems as described in the well-known book
Analysis/or Military Decision by E. S. Quade.! The majority of these problems
resembled those in operational research. The objective description of the core
of the problems was considered quite possible. The methodological features of
the operational research approach may be easily traced using the example of
the well-known "cost-efficiency" method, considered by many as an integral
part of systems analysis. Originally cost-efficiency models were developed just
like models in operational research (transportation problems, assignment
problems and the like). It was supposed that a researcher was able to define
objectively the existing features of a problem and to reflect them in the model,
and that the studied phenomena lacked "behavioural freedom". The differ-
ence in the approach to synthesizing the cost and efficiency estimates boiled
down to the consideration of the decision-maker's opinion. Complex as they
may be, the problems first subjected to systems analysis were, in our opinion,
at the interface of well- and ill-structured ones. These problems, however,
required an independent methodology of systems analysis comprising the
known stages of the systems approach, i.e. to define goals; find alternative ways
ofachieving them; develop a model integrating the goals, means and parameters
of the system; find the rules to select the best alternative2 as well as a cost-
effective method for comparing alternative methods of accomplishing the
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goals. It is worth pointing out that Quade distinguished quantitative
differences rather than qualitative ones between operational research and
systems analysis.
2. New applications
Great difficulties were encountered in extending the methodology to ill-
structured problems wherein the qualitative, poorly-defined, aspects tend to
dominate. In our opinion, the major features of these systems are as follows:
The impossibility of constructing objective models of the investigated
system.
[n fact, the majority of ill-structured problems lack an objective, scientifi-
cally based model integrating the system parameters in a unified whole.
Consider, for example. the problem of R&D project estimation. Here we find
that the quality of the project depends on such factors as the scientific skill of
researchers. the value of the end result of the completed scientific tasks, cost of
the project etc. However. one cannot say there is only one correct mathemati-
cal relationship between these factors which defines the general utility of the
project. There can be many relationships, as well as factors, and the choice is
made by the decision-maker according to his experience, intuition and world
outlook. Another decision-maker may prefer some other model. It is
noteworthy that the factors included in the model are very difficult to measure
quantitatively.
Thus. we are now in the world of subjective models. The lack of objective,
scientifically valid. relationships make us regard the system's parameters as
criteria for eval uation of alternative solutions. The problems acquire a multi-
attribute nature.
H. Rittel and M. M. Webber in their intcresting paper J write about
"wicked" problems with many possible approaches to their definition. where
the goals are influenced by the method of approval adopted. There is a great
variety of such problems, e.g. development of tourism in a country or region.
allocation of resources for basic research, selection of manuscripts for
publishing in a publishing house. One could say that all strategic problems
have features of wicked ill-structured problems. It is quite understandable
that the original methodology of systems analysis was not fully able to cope
with thc peculiarities of such ill-structured problems; giving rise to many new
problems which are excmp[ified in the application of the PPB system to civil
problems. I. R. Hoos in the excellent book "Systems Analysis in Public Policy;
a critique"4 writes about unsuccessful attempts to use quantitative indicators
and to construct "cost-effectivc" models.
Systems analysis in its primClry form implied from the beginning that there
would be a sequential analysis of the problem, from the goals to the means.
Experience shows that this systems approach is not a universal solution to all
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problems. As a constructive tool for comparing alternatives, systems analysis
implies using the "cost-efficiency" method. Now it is clear that the con-
struction of "cost efficiency" models for many problems is characterized by a
great degree of subjectiveness and can be done in various ways.
It is also clear that the methods used in comparing alternatives greatly
influences the entire systems analysis methodology with respect to its
applicability.
3. Modern key methodological problems: practical view
Systems analysis in the 1970s differs undoubtedly from that in the 1960s; the
problem analysis is more flexible, improved multicriteria methods are applied
to compare the alternatives.
In modern systems analysis one can distinguish three directions. The first
one is not connected directly with decision making. It is directed at the
investigation of the entire problem or its parts in order to establish a basis for
decision-making.
Although such projects are mostly undertaken on the instructions of the
decision-maker, his policy preferences are hardly, if at all, taken into account
in the course of investigation. Such applications of systems analysis can be
called system studies. System studies of ill-structured problems may include
detailed verbal descriptions of all the system attributes identified, of all
possible decision estimation criteria, of forecasts with respect to the system
and to changes in the environment, and so on. Some problems may be
approached with mathematical models.
The second direction of systems analysis relates to decision-making
situations, where no decision-maker or a group of decision-makers can be
identified; for example, where it is necessary to solve a social problem,
touching upon the interests of a large group of people, but where there is no
organization responsible for handling this problem. Thus, there is a decision-
making problem but no decision-maker whose preferences could serve as a
basis for a decision rule.
The third direction concerns the estimation of the decision alternatives and
th'e selection of the best alternative.
Since the decision in ill-structured problems should be developed on the
basis of the decision-makers preferences, research is carried out not only on
the decision-makers instructions but also with his direct participation. In such
cases systems analysis can be viewed as a synthesis of the systems approach,
methods of multi-criteria alternative estimation and decision-maker's ex-
perience, preferences, intuition. In applying systems analysis in its present
state to practical problems one encounters, in our opinion, the following
major main methodological problems:
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I. The difficulty of measuring the qualitative concepts characteristic of il1-
structured systems.
Today, the qualitative concepts are mostly brought in line with numerical,
quantitative scales. A lot of methods used for measuring the decision-maker
and expert preferences employ lotteries, number scales etc. Such measure-
ments can often distort the actual human preferences. At present there are no
techniques for quantitative measurement of many subjective criteria of
decision estimation such as, for example, scientific quality, organizational
prestige, and so on. It is wel1-known, however, that ordinal scales had been
used for many physical variables (heat, length) until quantitative scales were
developed. Nevertheless, at present we lack any reliable method for quanti-
tative measurement of variables in ill-structured problems. Consequently,
ordinal scales with verbal labels of quality degrees must be used. These scales
make it possible to get eq uivalent descriptions of il1-structured problems in
natural language. 5
Great skill must be used in employing natural language in this way so as to
preserve pithy and qualitative descriptions at every stage of decision-making.
2. Development of decision rules in ill-structured problems.
Since the alternative estimation models have to account for the decision-
maker's preferences, one must be able to identify these preferences and utilize
them in decision rule construction. In this case the main problems are
connected with the psychology of decision-making.
Reccnt investigations6 show, that a number of limitations inherent in the
human cognitive apparatus sharply reduce its possibility to cope with
information and the reliability of this information. For example, we know,
that duc to the limited capacity of short-term memory people have to resort to
a number of heuristic methods for the analysis of multidimensional infor-
mation.
Thc major tcchniques are:
(i) dropping of a number of criteria:
(ii) neglect of small differences in the estimations by one criterion;
(iii) successive consideration of the criteria.
These deviccs are vcry important for the human being since they help him to
cope with complcx problems. On the other hand, however, the same methods
Icad to contradictions and crrors 7
One of the major current problems of systems analysis methodology is how
to cnhance and extcnd human capacity so as to process multidimensional
information in a rcliable and non-controversial manner.
We are trying in our investigations to develop special decision making
techniq ues 5 which would take into account the data processing capabilities of
a man and extcnd them.
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3. The problem of applying the systems approach to the analysis of ill-
struct ured systems.
The application of the systems approach to real life complex situations of
decision-making is only possible by an interactive approval, examining many
ways of moving from changing goals to changing means in order to find a
single (or several) "solvable" representation of the problem for a decision-
maker.
4. Current trends in systems analysis
The current state-of-the-art of systems analysis makes a complex picture.
Problems continue to be studied (and sometimes successfully) with objective
cost-effectiveness models, similar to the approaches used in the earliest
applications of systems analysis. As the boundaries between various types of
problems are fuzzy, there are continuing attempts to build objective models
for problems where inadequate, objective information must be supplemented
through subjective judgement. Very often. due to the lack of any data source,
the consulting analyst "patches the holes" on the basis of his own knowledge
of relationships between the system parameters. In complex models this
"patching" affects the final results in an unpredictable manner. The developed
models to a great extent reflect the belief of their creators that the world is
arranged in that way. and not some other way.
Sometimes the qualitative dependences between model parameters are
quite explicit but it is difficult (or impossible) to determine the exact strength
of these dependences. By filling the gap the consultant also strongly affects the
result.
The resulting pseudo-objective models are unacceptable for decision-
makers as they are not based on the executives' experience. intuition,
preferences. As a result the model builders often do not exert any influence on
decision-making.
Though the well-known and popular definitions of systems analysis
emphasize its direct orientation towards decision-making. the same term
(systems analysis) has often been associated in recent years with the
development of mathematical models with a view toward creating "banks" of
models with potential use in decision-making. A realization of the fact that the
application of systems analysis represents a combination of "art" and
scientific analysis. was used actually as an excuse for the "separation" of the
analytical aid from the "art" and its further study. This approach has resulted
in the emergence of a great number of mathematical models: but there is little
evidence relating to their practical application. We believe that practical
problems possess characteristic features which can be reflected only by a
model built specially for the problem. Many models (e.g. so-called global
models) contain a lot of assumptions and premises of their creators,
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intermixed with certain objective dependences. Hence, application of such
models in decision-making is simply dangerous.
The experience gained from unsuccessful applications of systems analysis to
problems with a subjective struct ure brought about two directions of research.
The first one "policy analysis" is concerned with solution of public policy
problems. The research conducted along these lines place a strong emphasis
on the art of problem analysis, problems of organizational mechanism of
decision implementation, etc. As an example of interesting research con-
ducted in this field. we shall mention the article by H. Rittel and M. M.
WebberJ
The second direction is connected with systematization of the experience of
applying systems analysis, identifying standard mistakes and miscalculations.
It is worth mentioning E. S. Quade and G. Majone's book PitFalls ojAnalysis8
recently published by the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis. The book attempts to systematize the unsuccessful approaches to
problem analysis. model formulation, consultant-decision-maker in terre-
la tionships. etc.
For all this. extremely little attention has been paid to improving the
methods and procedures for the analytical comparison of alternative de-
cisions. As usual, one encounters in the literature, descriptions of cases of
applying the "cost-effectiveness" techniques to such problems as storage of
radioactive waste, construction of atomic power stations, though these
problems undoubtedly involve various subjective and objective factors. An
impression is gained that the authors of these papers have overlooked popular
critical articles and books.~· <) Actually, major research in the methods of
comparing complex decision alternatives are conducted at present by
specialist decision analysts and not by systems analysts.
5. On the crises in systems analysis
One symptom of a crisis in systems analysis is doubt as to its capability to
solvc complex practical problems. This doubt follows from several causes.
One cause arises from unsuccessful attempts to evaluate decision alternatives
using pseudo-objective models. Another cause follows from attempts to use
the systems approach as a universal and constructive method for solving ill-
structured problems. In addition the abundance of useless mathematical
models (developed in the name of systems analysis) docs not at all increase the
attraction of systems analysis.
All these causes are linked to a considerable extent with the aspiration
(sometimes subconscious) to convert systems analysis to an "exact science"
like opcrations research. The main potential value of systems analysis arises
"'Oreralillm Research" is used here in the narrow sense of mathematical model building. (Ed.)
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just from the differences which distinguish systems analysis from operations
research. *
From our point of view the most valuable thing that system analysis has
introduced into the methodology of complex problem solving consists in the
understanding of the fact that subjective judgemcnt must be accompanied by
deep analysis. The methods of this analysis can, and must, change and
improve. We have defined above the three major directions of improvement of
these methods.
It must always be remembered that the application of systems analysis is a
combination of art and science, where art prevails. The logical analysis of a
problem is an art; the search of the ways to construct alternative estimation
rules is an art. As this art improves new techniques and methods emerge that
can be scientifically proved and their application area mapped. The
methodology of systems analysis should not be regarded as something rigid
but as a tool for the analysis of complex problems changing both under the
influence of the researcher-analysts. Let us hope that these changes will take us
to new and perfect methods.
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The Craft of Applied Systems
Analysis
GIANDOMENICO MAJONE
l. HOW SCIENTIFIC IS APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS?
Like the legendary phoenix, the question: How scientific is systems analysis?
(or operational research, or management science) keeps rising alive from the
ashes of past methodological debates and official definitions. For instance,
more than 20 years ago, the Operational Research Society of Britain adopted
a definition of OR in which the word "science" or "scientific" occurred three
times. Operational research was proclaimed to be the application of the
methods of science to complex problems, a discipline whose distinctive
approach is the development of a scientific model of the system being
analysed, and whose purpose is to help management determine its policy and
actions scientifically.
Similarly, Quade! observes that "It is easy to find statements in the
literature ofoperations research which imply that analysis to aid any decision-
maker is really nothing more than the 'scientific method' extended to
problems outside the realm of pure science," where "scientific method" is
interpreted to mean that analysis advances through the successive steps of
formulation, search, explanation, interpretation and, hopefully, verification.
And according to Olaf Helmer, "in comparing operations research with an
exact science, it is with regard to exactness that operations research falls short,
bllt not necessarily with regard to the scientific character for its methods".2
Can anything of value be learned from these methodological discussions,
anything, that is, that is useful to applied systems analysis (ASA) as it is
practised today? In this section I shall try to show that questions about the
"scientific character" of ASA are, today, rather irrelevant, when not positively
misleading, if taken literally; but, also, that they can be reformulated in a way
that makes them highly meaningful for the practising analyst.
One problem with the older methodological discussions about the scientific
nature of ASA is that, when the meaning of "scientific method" has not
remained implicit (and hence open to a variety of different and often
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contrasting interpretations), it has been construed in terms which con-
temporary epistemology finds unacceptable, or at least in need of substantial
revisions. Few scientists and philosophers of science still believe that scientific
knowledge is. or can be. proven knowledge. If there is one point on which all
major schools of thought agree today, it is that scientific knowledge is always
tentative and open to refutation. And while the older history of science was
little more than a chronicle of the irresistible advance of the different sciences.
the contemporary historian tries to understand "how such sciences can
succeed in fulfilling their actual explanatory missions. despite the fact that, at
any chosen moment in time. their intellectual contents are marked by logical
gaps. incoherences. and contradictions". 3
However. the conceptual revolution that has taken place in the philosophy
and history of science in the last three decades - a revolution commonly
associated with the names of Popper. Kuhn. and Lakatos - is having its
impact on systems analysis and closely-related disciplines, as shown by some
recent contributions to the literature. 4 But even these methodologically more
sophisticated and updated discussions often fail to explain what lies behind
the persistent preoccupation with the scientific status of ASA.
It is. of course. no secret that the claim to scientific status has in the past
served an important ideological function by increasing the collective con-
fidence of a group of new disciplines striving for academic and social
recognition. But today science (or. rather. folk-science) has lost much of its
ideological appeaL and it would be difficult to explain the scientific aspirations
of the ASA profession on such grounds. Also. fallibilism - the currently
accepted doctrine that scientific arguments are never conclusive and always
perfectible· seems to be a poor principle from which to derive mechanical
rules of method. Finally, traditional claims to scientific status for ASA have
always been faced by what appears to be an insoluble contradiction: if ASA is
scientific, its task is not to prescribe or suggest a course of action, but to
provide scientific explanations and predictions: if. on the other hand, ASA
aspires to guide action. it must be prescriptive (and. I shall argue, persuasive as
well). and hence cannot be scientific - not, at any rate. according to the
received view of scientific method. Some writers have attempted to solve the
dilemma by arguing that ASA offers "scientifically based" advice. But such an
argument is logically unsound and runs immediately against the Humean
impossibility of deriving "ought" from "is".
So the question about the scientific status of ASA does indeed seem to lead
nowhere, except into a thicket of conceptual obscurities and logical dilemmas.
But then. why do methodologically conscious analysts keep raising it? The
reason, I suggest, is that behind this question loom two issues which people
rightly feel to be of crucial importance. even if they are unable to clearly
articulate them. First: what is the language of ASA, i.e. what is the logical
status of the different propositions which an analyst produces in the course of
The Craft of Applied Systems Analysis 145
his work? Second: which standards of quality and rules of methodological
criticism are applicable to the different kinds of propositions?
2, THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS OF QUALITY
Even if we interpret "science" in the broadest possible sense ofan organized
body of knowledge (the sense suggested, for example, by the German term
"Wissenschaft"), the existence of generally recognized rules ofevaluation and
criticism is a necessary precondition for any reasonable claim to scientific
status. Only in immature fields of inquiry, as Ravetz has pointed out, criteria
of quality or adequacy cannot be taken for granted.
The dilemmas facing the leaders of an immature field of inquiry have been
shrewdly analysed by Ravetz:
The present social institutions of science, and oflearning in general, impose such constraints
that the growth and even the survival of an immature field would be endangered by the
simple honesty of public announcement of its condition. For these institutions were
developed around mature or rapidly maturing fields in the nineteenth century. If the
representatives of a discipline announce that they do not fit in with such a system, they can
be simply excluded from it, to the benefit of their competitors for the perennially limited
resources. The field would be relegated to amateur status, and thereby pushed over to the
very margin of the world of learning; it would be deprived of funds and prestige. 5
He continues:
An immature field, in chaos internally, experiences the additional strains of hypertrophy; its
leaders and practitioners are exposed to the temptations of being accepted as consultants
and experts for the rapid solution of urgent practical problems. The field can soon become
identical in outward appearance to an established physical technology, but in reality be a
gigantic confidence-game ... To thread one's way through these pitfalls, making a genuine
contribution both to scientific knowledge and to the welfare of society, requires a
combination of knowledge and understanding in so many different areas of experience. that
its only correct title is wisdom'"
What, then, does the "wisdom" of ASA include (assuming, as I think we
must, that it is a still-maturing field)? ASA is concerned with theorizing (at
different levels of generality), choosing, and acting. Hence its three-fold
character: descriptive (scientific), prescriptive (advisory), and persuasive
(argumentative-interactive). In fact, if we look at the fine structure of an
analytic argument we usually discover a complex blend of factual statements,
methodological choices, evaluations, recommendations, and persuasive de-
finitions and communication acts. An even more complex structure would
became apparent if we were to include (as we should, in a complete treatment)
the interactions taking place between analysts and their audience of clients,
sponsors, policy-makers, and interested publics. Moreover, descriptive pro-
positions, prescriptions, and persuasion are intertwined in a way that rules out
the possibility of applying a unique set of evaluative criteria, let alone
conclusively proving or refuting an argument. Whatever testing can be done
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must rely on a variety of disciplinary standards, corresponding to the different
techniques and methods used in the study, on the plausibility and robustness
of the results. on the quality criteria of the clients, and even on such hard-to-
formalize qualities as style and persuasiveness. For this reason, the historical
pattern of development of ASA can be seen as "the slow business of getting to
grips with the problems of devising patterns of criticism, of constructing
critical methodologies, for those areas not readily dealt with by the methods
built up over so long a period in the natural sciences".?
But why has the analytic profession been so slow in recognizing the
importance and the necessary complexity of a relevant body of criteria and
mechanisms of quality control? The reasons are, to a large extent, historical.
The pioneers of systems analysis and operational research were natural
scientists, many of them of outstanding ability. with a long experience in the
actual conduct of empirical research. Their most important contributions to
the new fields of inquiry were not advanced theoretical insights or sophisti-
cated research tools, but active minds, and a set of superb craft skills in
recording, analysing, and evaluating data, in establishing quantitative
relationships, and in setting up testable hypotheses. Their main goal, as they
saw it. was "to find a scientific explanation of the facts". For, as C. H.
Waddington writes. "[o]nly when this is done can the two main objects of
operational research be attained. These are the prediction of the effects of new
weapons and of new tactics"'~
Given this paradigm. the relevant standards of criticism were, of course,
those of natural science. Indeed, the situations investigated by operational
researchers during World War 2 were particularly well-suited for this
approach. Typically, military operations could be regarded, without distor-
tion, as representative of a class of repetitive situations "where theories built
up in response to earlier examples of the situation could be checked out
against later examples, monitored while proposals for improved action were
in usc. and used to detect their own dwindling validity as the situations
changed"'" In the years immediately following the War. industrial appli-
cations of OR, exemplified by L. C. Edie's classic study "Traffic delays at toll
booths", 1 (J still followed the standard pattern, and explicitly appealed to the
established criteria of evaluation and criticism.
But soon the situation began to change. While people like Blackett and
Waddington were returning to their laboratories and research institutes, a
new generation of analysts was entering the scene - people primarily
interested in the more formal aspects of scientific research, and often lacking
the craft skills and the maturity ofcriticaljudgement of the old masters. At the
same time. the problems claiming the attention of the analysts were becoming
increasingly abstract and complex. Direct empirical verification of the
conclusion was often impossible (as in the case of the strategic studies done at
Rand). and the very notion of solution, except in the simplest situations,
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tended to become a matter ofmethodological agreement. In sum, as allegiance
to the traditional standards of criticism were weakened by changes in the
disciplinary background of the profession, the standards themselves were
becoming increasingly irrelevant to current professional practice.
3. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND PROBLEM SOLVING
And yet, the pioneers of OR were correct in asserting the existence of a
strong similarity between operational and scientific research. Their mistake,
from our present viewpoint, consisted in thinking that the similarity was to be
found in the outcome ("scientific explanation of the facts", "prediction of the
effects of new weapons and of new tactics"), rather than in the process, that is
to say, in the basic craft aspects common to all types of disciplined intellectual
inquiry. Shifting our perspective from outcome to process, the following
points become almost obvious: 11
I. Like scientific research, ASA is essentially a craft activity, or, as some
authors prefer to put it, an "art"; 11.
2. However, the objects to which analytic work is applied are not physical
things and phenomena, as in the case of traditional arts and crafts, but
intellectual constructs studied through the investigation of policy
problems;
3. The work of the systems analyst (and of the scientist as well) is guided
and controlled by criteria which are mainly informal and tacit, rather
than public and explicit. It is the task of a methodology of ASA to make
these criteria as explicit as possible, as a precondition for a critical
discussion of their validity;
4. The standards and criteria of quality used in evaluating analytic work
must reflect the threefold nature of ASA: descriptive, prescriptive, and
argumentative. These standards are partly technical (reflecting the best
practice in the field), and partly social (since their effectiveness depends
on the existence of professional organizations and other institutional
arrangements).
In the discussion of these theses, the notion of "problem" plays a central
role. In fact, ASA can be described as problem solving on intellectually
constructed objects; and the different stages of analytic work roughly
correspond to the phases of problem solving, from formulation to proposed
solution. Thus, the craft character of the work is seen most clearly in the early
stages, where the analyst interacts with the external world (collection of data,
assessment of their reliability and transformation into information, modelling
of the system under investigation, etc.); the social character is exhibited in the
methodological choices and judgments which guide and control the analyst's
work; the abstractness of the objects of inquiry is most obvious when we
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consider what is involved in "solving" a policy problem; while the influence of
social processes is evident in the transformation of analytical recom-
mendations into actual decisions and institutional changes. Perhaps the first
thing to be noted in our characterization of ASA as problem solving is the
difficulty of finding explicit criteria by which scientific problems may be
distinguished from policy problems. Consider. for instance, the characteri-
za tion of scientific problems that has been proposed by Ravetz: 12 a major part
of the work is the form ulation of the question itself: the question changes as
the work progresses; there is no simple rule for distinguishing a "correct"
answer for "incorrect" ones; and there is no guarantee that the question, as
originally set or later developed, can be answered at all. Only a moment's
reflection is needed to see that policy problems exhibit the same characteris-
tics: and if supporting evidence is wanted, this can be easily found in the
literature of systems analysis. Thus. according to Quade, "the 'typical'
systems analysis problem is often first: What is the problemT'; "The problem
itself does not remain stationary. Interplay between a growing understanding
of the problem and of possible developments will refine the problem itself';
"There is frequently no way to verify the conclusions of the study."i3 Again:
"The problems an analyst can be asked to tackle in the public sector are
particularly frustrating. Usually they are urgent and ill-defined. Often they are
complicated, and sometimes t!lcy c!l(fllRc radically dUl"il1R the il1l'c.lfigation."14
Or see what Eilon has to say about solving decision problems under
uncertainty (which is. of course, the natural condition in any policy problem):
"In all decisions under uncertainty ... actual results often deviate sub-
stantially from predicted 'expected' results (based on subjective probabilities).
To say that the decision is still valid because one should compare the expected
results not with the actual results but with their mean value (had the 'one-off
reality been repeated many times) is of little help. since the statement is not
testa ble."] ,
Th<lt policy problems may have no solution under the economic. political,
and institutional constraints existing at a given moment in a given country
should be obvious to anyone familiar with its administrative and legislative
history. Indeed. it can be argued that the proper role of the analyst consists in
esta blishing the conditions of feasibility of a proposed course of action, rather
than in accumulating evidence in favour of a pet solution. As I have written
elsewhere. "Too often we take it for granted that any social problem can be
solved. if only sutlicient resources are available. But the manageability of a
soci<ll task cannot be rationally discussed until wc have specified the
acceptable means ofcollcctive action. as well as the limitations imposed by the
a vaila biJity of resources. knowledge. and organizational skills."1 b
Thus, Ravetz's criteria do not allow one to separate policy problems
sharply from scientitic problems. The similarity is further emphasized by the
shared abstract q uali ty of the objeets of both seientific and analytic inq uiry. In
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this respect, systems analysis is actually more "theoretical" than.many natural
sciences. For, if it is true that even basic concepts, like "substance" in
chemistry, or "force", "particle", and "field" in physics, are purely in-
tellectual constructs, the more descriptive natural sciences operate largely
with concepts whose concrete correspondents are fairly obvious. 1 7 On the
other hand, because of the abstract character of social and economic relations,
all concepts appearing in the formulation or solution of a policy problem are
necessarily the product of convention and definition. This is obvious in the
case of terms like "price", "cost". "GNP", "efficiency", "need", "urbani-
zation", "pollution", but is equally true for concepts like "poverty", "health",
"unemployment", "crime", which acquire operational meaning only when
expressed in terms of legal or administrative definitions. Indeed, as Alan
Coddington has observed "economic statistics are extremely abstract things",
the product of "arbitrariness" and "convention". 18
The same holds true, afortiori, of the social data (but even of most technical
data) which represent such a large part of the numerical input of analytic
studies.
Although I have spoken, so far, only of problems, creative analysis usually
begins with something less than a problem; we may call it a "problem
situation". This is an awareness that things are not as they should be, but there
is no clear conception, as yet, of how they might be put right. An important
part of the problem situation is the historical background and the "issue
context" in which the policy debate takes place. It is obviously important for
the analyst "to know as much as possible about the background of the
problem - where it came from, why it is important, and what decision it is
going to assist". 19
But notice that, although the problem situation is in a less specified state
than the problem to which it may give rise, it is already a very artificial thing.
The very existence of a problem situation presupposes a matrix of technical
materials: existing information, tools, and a body of methods including
criteria of adequacy and value.
4. APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS CRAFT WORK
Although craft aspects are evident in every phase of thc analyst's work, I
shall discuss them here with reference to the categories of data, information,
tools, and pitfalls.
Data. Data are the results of the first working up of the materials relevant to
the investigation of a problem. In ASA data are often "found" rather than
"manufactured", i.e. they are produced by observation rather than by
experiment. This requires craft skills that are rather different, and in many
respects more difficult to acquire. than those nceded for the analysis of
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experimental data. For instance, the sampling process through which the data
are obtained is very much influenced by the methods used, the skill of the
samplers, and a host of other factors which may lead to results quite
unrepresentative of the general situation. Also, data are collected according to
categorical descriptions which never fit perfectly the objects of the inquiry at
hand.
Data pertaining to preference and probability assessments are notorious for
their subjectivity and unreliability.
Even when data can be obtained from experimentation, as in the case of
some recent large-scale social experiments, there is no guarantee that the best
experimental design offers sufficient protection against dangers and pitfalls, of
which the "Hawthorne effect" is only one of the best-known examples.
Since perfection ofdata is impossible, the standards ofacceptance will have
to be based on a common judgment of what is good enough for the functions
which the data perform in the problem treated by the analyst. Thisjudgment
depends in turn on the criteria of adequacy generally accepted for the solution
of such problems. Thus. the simple judgment of soundness of data is a
microcosmos of the personal judgments and accumulated social experience
which go into analytic work. 20
III!imllali(JII. At least in quantitative terms, an excess, rather than a scarcity,
of data is the usual situation in ASA. Hence the need to reduce the mass of
data, to refine them into a more useful and more reliable form. Data
transformation involves a new set of craft skills, with the application of new
tools (often of a statistical or mathematical nature), and the making of a new
set of judgments. This new phase of the analyst's work, the production of
information. can be illustrated by a number of examples: the calculation of
averages and other statistical parameters, the fitting of a curve to a set of
points, the reduction of data through some multivariate statistical technique.
The operations performed on the original data may be involved or quite
simple, but they always represent a crucial step. Through these operations, the
raw data have been transformed into a new sort of material, and from this
point on the analysis is carried out only in terms of these new entities.
This transformation of data into information involves three basic judg-
ments. which all prcsent thc risk of serious pitfalls. The first is that the
advantages achievcd through data reduction compensate for the probable loss
of information: generally speaking, the existence of "sufficient statistics", i.e.
of summaries of the data which contain exactly the same amount of
information as the original sample. is the exception rather than the rule. The
second is a judgment of the goodness of fit of the model to the original data.
The third is that this particular model, among the infinitely many possible
ones, is the significant one for the problem under examination. All the
operations and judgments involved in data reduction, transformation, and
testing arc. of course. craft operations.
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Tools. Analytic tools may be roughly classified in terms ofdata production,
manipulation, and interpretation.
The category of interpretive tools, which is of special importance here,
includes "tool disciplines", i.e. other fields of natural or social science which
must be mastered to some extent in order that competent analytic work may
be done.
Each set of tools has'its characteristic pitfalls, and, if major blunders are to
be avoided, the user must develop a craftsman's knowledge of their properties.
For instance, the dangers inherent in the use (and abuse) of statistical tools
have been often pointed oUI, although serious fallacies can still be detected
even in standard applications.
These dangers are made particularly acute by the prevailing metaphysics,
according to which a field becomes more genuinely "scientific" as it more
closely resembles theoretical physics in its mathematical formalization. Thus,
in an attempt to give a more scientific appearance to his conclusions, the
analyst is often induced to use formal tools that exceed the limits of his
mathematical or statistical sophistication, and whose range of meaningful
applicability he is therefore unable to assess. The consequences have been
well-illustrated by the mathematician Jacob Schwartz:
Mathematics must deal with well-defined situations. Thus, in its relations with science
mathematics depends on an intellectual effort outside of mathematics for the crucial
specification of the approximation which mathematics is to take literally. Give a
mathematician a situation which is the least bit ill-defined he will first of all make it well-
defined. Perhaps appropriately, but perhaps also inappropriately.... The mathematician
turns the scientist's theoretical assumptions, i.e. convenient points of analytical emphasis,
into axioms. and then takes axioms literally. This brings with it the danger that he may also
persuade the scientist to take these axioms literally. The question. central to the scientific
investigation but intensely disturbing in the mathematical context -what happens to all this
if the axioms are relaxed? - is thereby put into shadow.... That form of wisdom which is the
opposite of single-minded ness, the ability to keep many threads in hand, to draw for an
argument from many disparate sources. is quite foreign to mathematics. This inability
accounts for much of the difficulty which mathematics experiences in attempting to
penetra te the social sciences. 2 I
It is important to realize that the influence of tools on a field is more subtle
than a mere opening up of possibilities. The extensive use of a tool involves
shaping the work around its distinctive strengths and limitations; one can
rarely apply a new tool to an ongoing stream of research without modifying it
strongly. In the best case, as new tools come into being and are judged
appropriate and valu:.ble by people in the field, they alter the direction of
work in the field, and the conception of the field itself. In the worst case, we
assist the phenomenon of "new toolism", a disease to which operational
researchers and systems analysts seem particularly predisposed.
Those affected by this disease "come possessed ofand by new tools (various
forms of mathematical programming, vast air-battle simulation machine
models, queuing models and the like), and they look earnestly for a problem to
which one of these tools might conceivably apply".21
152 Giandomenico Maione
Pil!;iI/s. The craft character of systems analysis can be seen most clearly in
the concept of "pitfall". A pitfall is the sort of error that destroys the solution
of a problem and nullifies the validity of a policy recommendation. Perhaps
the most reliable way of assessing the maturity of a practical or theoretical
discipline is by the degree to which the ways around its common pitfalls are
well-charted. and those encountered in the applications of the discipline to
new fields of inquiry can be sensed in advance. Hence. the increasing
realization of the many pitfalls which can be encountered in the application of
systems analysis to policy problems is a sign of increasing maturity. rather
than an admission of weakness.
Quade 2 J distinguishes two categories of pitfalls in applied systems analysis.
Those internal to the analysis itself. and those concerned with getting it used.
Internal pitfalls arc further subdivided into those that are inherent in all
analysis. and those introduced by the analyst himself. Most important among
the internal pitfalls of the first type are those associated with misconceptions
in the treatment of uncertainty and of the time element. with the selection of
inappropriate criteria of choice or measures of cost and effectiveness. with an
incomplete analysis of feasibility conditions (e.g. the disregard of political and
administrative constraints) and of the distributional consequences of the
proposed policy.
Of the pitfalls introduced by the analyst. the most serious is probably that of
personal bias. both in the form of preconceived notions concerning the nature
of the problem. and of inflexible commitments to a given solution. Another
common pitfall is a misplaced pragmatism which suggests "getting started"
with the analysis. before the problem has been sufficiently understood.
Examples of external pitfalls arc many kinds of errors arising in the process
of communicating the conclusions of analysis; for instance. the arguments
supporting a conclusion may be unsuited to the type of audience to which the
analyst is addressing himself. A particular form of this pitfall is what Quade
calls the "myth of a unique decision-maker";
Analyscs arc ordinarily dcsigncd and carried out. although perhaps not always deliberately.
as if thcy werc to assist a solitary dceision-maker who had full authority over acceptance
and implemcntation. This may sometimes be thc casc but it is not the usual situation. even in
thc military. and almost ncver whcn broad social issucs arc involved. Even when there is a
Single dccision-make'r his stalrat a minimum supplies the details of any policy that is set. ..
Influcncing organizational behavior can bc quite diflerent from influcncing the behavior of
an Individual and. sincc wc understand so little about it. can constitute a pitfall for policy
an~d) "j ..... ..:.1
In ma t ure disciplines. the a voidance of pitfalls is accomplished primarily in
two ways by the charting of standard paths. through a body of standard
techniques which can be safely applied as a routine. which skirt them; and by
each researcher becoming sensitive to the clues which indicate the presence of
special sorts of pitfalls he is likely to encounter in his work. 25 Systems analysts
have up to now followed the second approach. but as experience in the
The Craft 4 Applied Systems Analysis 153
conduct of analytic studies accumulates, we can expect that standard
procedures for the avoidance of the most serious pitfalls will be systematically
developed.
5. THE COMPONENTS OF ANALYSIS
Having described the activity of the applied systems analyst as craftsman's
work applied to the soiutibn of problems involving intellectual constructs, it is
now appropriate to examine the constituents making up a solution or policy
proposal. As it turns out, the basic categories introduced by Aristotle in his
analysis of the craftsman's task can be adapted to our present purposes. 26
Aristotle examines a task in terms of four categories or "causes": material,
efficient, formal, and final. These four causes correspond, respectively, to the
physical substance which is worked on; the activity of the agent in shaping it;
the shape which the object finally assumes; and the purpose of the activity, or
the functions of the object itself.
In adapting the Aristotelian scheme, the crucial difference to be kept in
mind is that the purpose ("final cause") of the analyst's activity is not the
production of a material object satisfying certain requirements but the
analysis of a complex situation and the presentation of proposals. The "form"
of the analysis is an argument in which evidence is cited and from which a
conclusion is drawn. In turn, the evidence will contain a more or less explicit
description of the "efficient cause": the tools, techniques, and modcls that
have been used, and perhaps, difficulties and pitfalls encountered and
overcome. Finally, the intellectual constructs and the data in whose terms the
policy problem is formulated are the "material" component of the analyst's
task.
In the preceding section, [ have discussed the significance of the abstract
character of the objects of analytic inquiry, and the connection between the
tools and the personal craft judgments of the analyst. Here I shall concentrate
on the other two constituents of analysis: the argumcnt (with thc important
related category of evidence), and the conclusion.
The Argument. The argument represents the link between the material and
efficient components of the analysis and the conclusion. In spite of its crucial
importance. surprisingly little has been written on this topic by methodo-
logists of'systems analysis. The three-fold nature of thc language of ASA
(descriptive, prescriptive, argumentative) is reflected in thc complex structure
of an analytic argument, which will typically includc mathematical and logical
deductions, statistical, empirical. and analogical inferences, as well as
evaluations and recommendations. This unavoidable complexity of the
argument prevents any direct testing of its adcquacy as can be done, for
instance, in the case of a mathematical proof or a simple syllogism. Rather, the
testing is done by applying, often implicitly, the critcria of adequacy that are
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accepted in a particular field, or by the particular audience to which the
argument is directed.
The adequacy of an analytic argument only in part can be judged according
to scientific or professional standards; in fact, the nature of the testing process
is more social than logical. This can be seen from the fact that the argument is
never addressed to an abstract. "universal" audience, as in the case of purely
deductive proofs. but to a particular one (client, decision-maker, special
interest group. etc.) whose characteristics the analyst must keep constantly in
mind if his argument is to carry conviction and affect the course of events. In
discussing external pitfalls. I have already mentioned the fallacy ofassuming a
monolithic decision-maker. but the relation between the analyst and his
audience(s) is more complicated than is suggested by this single consideration.
For. while the analyst must adapt his argument to the audience (and this
requires a careful selection of data. methods, and techniques of com-
munication). it is also true that the audience is, to some extent, the creation of
the analyst: 2 7 the structure of the argument and the style of presentation will
largely determine the type of audience that can be reached and influenced by
the conclusion.
It is interesting to note that two rather typical procedures of systems
analysis. the so-called {/ ./iJr'iori and break-even analyses, arc essentially
techniques of argumentation. The argumentative purpose is, in fact, indicated
very clearly in the following quotation:
M"I"L' thall all) "thLT single thing. the skilled use of (/ jimiori and break-even analyses
sL'rarates the prokssiLlnals from the amateurs. Most analyses should (conceptually) bc
donL' in 1\\() stagL's: a first stage to find out what one wants to rccommend. and a second
'itagL' tln{ IJ/(/f...('.\ ,!Ie /Tc(Jf11n1l'lu/aliol1s uJJ1\'incinR {'1'{!/1 fO a hostile and dishe!iedng, hut
!J1!('!{,gCIl1 lIw!ieHCl,.21"
In the con"truction of an argument. evidence occupies a central position.
Although the terms "facts" and "evidence" are often treated as synonymous
in common parlance and also in some methodological discussions, a useful
di"tinetion can be made in terms of the relevant audience. "Facts" are pieces
of (suppo"edly objective) information presented to an audience of persons
who arc experts in a given field. Evidence. on the other hand, is information
embedded in an argument, for the purpose not so much of prol'ing an
assertion. but rather of cO/ll'il/cil1g the audience of the reasonableness or
convenience of a proposal. The contemporary fashion for using mathematical
formalism at every possible point of an argument tends to blur this distinction,
as it induces a tendency to accept statistical and other kinds of information as
facts. rather than evidence.
The category of evidence is most easily recognized in fields where problems
involve both complex arguments and large masses of information, and where
the reliability and relevance of the information cannot be easily assessed by
standard methods. This is a common situation in ASA but also in other fields
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like law, where there is a highly developed "law of evidence" for the
presentation and testing of information offered as evidence in court cases. In
the natural sciences, on the other hand, one usually has either a large mass of
information with a relatively simple argument, or a complex theoretical
argument needing evidence at only a few points. Hence, neither descriptive
nor theoretical natural sciences generally require highly developed skills in
testing evidence beyond the standard tests for reliability and relevance already
involved in producing information. 29
The assessment of the strength and fit of the evidence is considerably more
complicated than judgements about the validity and reliability of data. For
this reason, there often arise disputes about the adequacy of a proposed
solution of a policy problem which cannot be settled either by an examination
of the data and information, nor by an appeal to accepted criteria of
adequacy. Such situations seem to justify a certain scepticism of the ability of
systems analysis to provide concrete help to the decision-maker. It should be
noted, however, that even in the field of "pure" science this aspect of the
objectivity of scientific knowledge, which is really a result of a successful social
tradition of producing and testing the materials of that knowledge, breaks
down more often than the outside observer usually assumes.
The Conclusion. The conclusion of a policy study is not concerned with
"things themselves", but with the intellectually constructed concepts and
categories that can serve as the objects of an argument. The contact with the
external world of economic, social, and political phenomena is always
indirect. Ofcourse, the analyst tries to probe as deeply as possible into the part
of social reality with which he is concerned; but his assessment of the problem
situation can only serve as the basis for evidence which is embedded in an
argument whose objective validity can never be formally established. A
different conceptualization of that reality, different tools, a few different
personal judgments made at crucial points of the analysis, can always lead to
radically different conclusions. This is unavoidable in any form of intellectual
inquiry, including that of the natural scientist. Moreover, it is usually
impossible to verify whether or not the decision-maker made a right decision
based on the analysis. One cannot be judged by what actually happens, for
there arc always circumstances beyond his control. Even when social
experiments can be carried out, which is seldom, definite conclusions can
hardly be expected. Not only because of the possibility that the experiment
may not be properly designed or analysed but, more significantly, because a
policy embo~ies a large number of hypotheses; a negative result will constitute
evidence against some of them, and it is usually very difficult to determine
exactly which hypotheses are being contradicted by the experience.
In sum, we are faced here with a situation that arises in many contexts in
which some form of evaluation takes place. The natural tendency is to
evaluate an activity by the results it produces. This is not only an intuitively
RPOR-F*
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appealing. but also a reasonable approach - provided that reasonably
objective criteria of evaluation exist. In such a case knowledge of the process
producing the outcomes to be evaluated is largely immaterial - only results
count. A car buyer is not usually concerned about the internal organization of
the producing firm. But when the factual and value premises of the evaluation
are moot, when no objective criterion for what is a correct decision or a good
outcome exists, then the process or procedure by which the results are
obtained acquires special significance. This is the basic reason why procedural
questions become so important in legislative and judicial decision-making. 31
For the reasons stated above, the conclusions of an analytic study can
seldom be validated or refuted unambiguously. Hence, evaluation by results is
either impossible or unfair (as when the quality of an analytic study is
evaluated exclusively in terms of the actual success or failure of its conclusions
and recommendations - too many factors outside the analyst's control
determine the success or failure of a policy). Evaluation by process becomes
unavoidable. <lnd in this context the notion of craft and craft skills plays a
crucial role.
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If Applied Systems Analysis is
"True", must it also be "Bad"
and "Ugly"? A note on the
emerging methodology of
Systems Analysis
lAIN MITROFF
INTRODUCTION
If the success of an endeavour be measured by the mix of emotions it stirs,
then I would judge this seminar to have been an important success. Most
such occasions fail to generate little if any emotion, save that of incredible
boredom, but I felt myself alternating between excitement, hope, and
optimism, on the one hand, and despair on the other. I felt excitement and
optimism because for all our differences in culture, educational background,
and language, there was a clear convergence in our thinking. It was
abundantly clear that despite our differences in terms, a number of us had
converged on the same general methodology for applied systems analysis. It
was further clear that our methods were not abstract in the sense that they had
been developed in the context of working on real problems.
My despair resulted from the comments of West Churchman, who
throughout the seminar raised the greatest challenge of all to applied systems
analysis. Churchman's challenge was not that we would be unable to develop
a methodology and that this methodology would be ineffective. Rather, if I
interpret him correctly, the danger is that we are developing something that
indeed wor;ks, but that it works in perverse ways. In a word, we are in danger
of developing but another example of an unaesthetic methodology of social
science. 2 To the extent that we are unaesthetic, we distort once again the true
needs and spirit of those we pretend to aid. Worst of all, we distort our own
needs and spirit as participants in a social system. 7
Since I am naturally optimistic, the despair I felt needs to be clarified. It was
not despair in the fatal or cynical sense. Rather, it was despair in the heroic
159
160 Illill Mill'ott
mood. 7 The challenge posed by Churchman was not intended to stop us in our
efforts to develop applied systems analysis. but rather to spur us on to develop
a richer concept of inquiry. I. 2
The plan of this chapter is essentially twofold. First. I describe the
component parts of a general method of applied systems analysis. Although
the component parts were called different things and lumped together
ditferently by the different participants, there seemed to be general agreement
on the necessity of certain critical functions. Second. I describe the problems
of this mdhodology in the sense of the special challenge raised by Church-
man. 2 I also show that. given the current state of our social technology and
political systems. there may be no simple or easy way of overcoming these
difficulties. The outcome. I hope. is a better assessment of the current "truth"'.
"beauty". and "goodness" of applied systems analysis.
A:" OVERVIEW OF A GE:"oIERAL METHODOLOGY FOR ASA
As rL'gards current knowledge and thinking. Table I shows the necessary
steps in a generalized methodology of applied systems analysis (ASA). That is,
given current knowledge. each of the steps accomplishes a necessary function.
Needless to say. at this time we do not know the full set of sufficient conditions.
In fact we may never arrive at such a set for social systems do not admit of this
kind of strict determinancy. Indeed. it is ofcritical importance to realize at the
outset that ASA deals with a special type of knowledge claims or set of
problems.
ASA deals with problems which are basically ill-structured. Well-structured
problems constitute the bulk of "normal"' academic science. 7 For these
problems. the statement or formulation of an issue is itself relatively
unproblematic. In contradistinction. the statement of a problem is itself at
issue for ill-structured problems. Different analysts and/or actors in a social
system will tend to have very different perceptions of a problem, let alone its
resolutionS As a result, a fundamentally different type of problem-solving
procedure and an associated set of criteria for judging success is called for in
ASA ... · - One of the most common fallacies is that of using criteria that were
historically developed and appropriate for well-structured problems to the
treatment of ill-structured problems. I If there was any serious failing of our
seminar. it was that this confusion still seems to reign in our minds from time
to time.
Each of the steps in Table I has been described in extensive detail
elsewhere... ·" My purpose is thus merely to illustrate their nature and resulting
importance for ASA. One of the first things that is apparent from Table I is
that a great variety of different traditional and nontraditional academic
disciplines are involved in the creation of a methodology of ASA. The reason
for this is the great variety of levels and types of systems and their associated
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functions that must be dealt with in ASA. I comment briefly on each of the
steps in Table I.
TABLE I
St~ps in a f:~n~rall11~thodologr 0/ appli~d systems analysis
Type of system
Step involved Activity(ies) Purpose
Disciplines
involved
Social systems
SCIClKC
Multivariate
statistics, personality
theory.
organizational
development
Social systems
sCIence
Management
science. small group
processes
Symbolic logic.
concepts of
argumctl ta 1ion
I. Participant/social Partitioning of larger Effective
social group into functioning.
small group. team interaction.
building conditions for
pa rt ici pa tion.
cxplicit generation
of different views
2. Social Stakeholder Identification of
identification/ vested interest
generation groups;actors
affecting a social
policy
3. Epistemic Assumption Identification of
generation; premises that must
identification be posited to derive
competing social
policies
4. Epistemic Prioritization of Determination of
assumptions and the epistcmie status
structured dialectical of key knowledge
debate claims
5. Epistemic Argumentation Determination of
analysis the relationship
between
assumptions and
social policies
6. Participanlisocial. Knowledge Group integration.
epistemie synthesis. group knowledge
synthesis integration
Orgal1lzation
development.
symbolic logic.
social systL'ms
science
Step I. Group Formation
There was general agreement among the conference participants that
because of its potentially widespread social impacts ASA must involve a
broader conception of an cxpert. This means that those who arc affccted by a
problem must be included. if only potentially. as members of an ASA team.
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The issue of participation, in short, is critical. Participation cannot be
confined to traditional conceptions of the expert. This is not only ruled out on
ethical considerations, but on epistemic grounds as well. On grounds of
equity. it is unethical not to involve in some significant manner those who are
the supposed beneficiaries of ASA. On epistemic grounds, it is an illusion to
think one can know the true needs of a community, society, or culture without
some mea ningful form of their part icipa tion. To paraphrase, an expert is not a
special kind of person. but each person is a special kind of expert, especially
when it comes to each person's problems. or more generally, troubles.
The issue of participation also arises from the fundamental epistemic
consideration that the more complex the problem, the wider the set of expert
skills that arc required to define the problem, let alone cope with it. That is,
when it comes to ill-structured as opposed to well-structured problems, no one
single expert or discipline posscsses the requisite knowledge to grapple with
the problcm. Further. since complex problems require for their effective
management. the cooperation of diverse individuals and social institutions, no
one person. no matter how powerful that person is, can command successful
implementation ora policy. Time and again. the social science litcrature shows
that 1'01' suceessrul implementation or a policy to occur, people must be
involved in tIte formulation of that policy."
The social science literature also shows that small problem-solving groups
of two to eigbt persons generally outperform large groupS.4 The reason is that
small groups. /I/'o/hor!r 'mi!/{'l! in team-building methods, are better in
communicating and sharing ideas. The same literature, however, is also split
on the issue as to whether homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups do
better in creative problem solving, We have tried to combine the advantages of
both I~lctors by rorming small groups which are as homogeneous within and as
heterogeneous helll'('('11 one another as possible, The homogeneity within a
small group allows it to deal more effectively with the tos/( of problem solving.
Needed energy Lick'S not have to be diverted into dealing with interpersonal
/Jroces\ issues such as conflict ovcr stylcs. etc. On the other hand, by
deliberately constructing small groups which are as diffcrent from one another
as possible wc have not left to chance the opportunity to witness and to debate
dilkrent pcrceptions of a problem. .1 We thereby hope through such a process
to minimi/e the chance of solving thc "wrong" version of a problem precisely."
Therc exist enumerable mcthods by which to form small groups from a
larger one. Sincc they have been described elsewhere,'" (, we shall not mention
them here, At the end or this paper. we will, however. comment from the
standpoint of aesthetics what all these methods share in common.
Steps 2 and 3. Stakeholder and Assumption Specification
Assumptions arc the epistemic cornerstone or ill-structured problcms."
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Fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of man, social
systems, and social science govern the production of different formulations of
a problem. 7 Also, since very few assumptions can actually be verified prior or
even subsequent to action, they must remain problematic. In short, they must
remain uncertain; that is, they must remain assumptions. Indeed, facts and
assumptions bear a symbiotic relationship to one another.
A fact is an assumption about which we feel confident, i.e. relatively certain.
Conversely, an assumption is a potential but doubtful (i.e. problematic) fact.
The point is that there is always a potential movement back and forth between
the class of assumptions and that of facts. What is regarded as a fact by one
social group at one point in time may be regarded by another group at another
point in time as an assumption, and vice versa. 7
Assumptions thereby become the basic ground of social reality. For this
reason, the uncovering, analysis, and challenging of assumptions is of
fundamental importance to ASA. Unfortunately, the surfacing of assump-
tions is not something which in general cannot be done directly.
Most people are as unaware of their assumptions as they are of their
unconscious. Asking a person to produce his or her assumptions about reality
is equivalent to asking a person to produce a map of their conscious and
unconscious mind and the interaction between them - no simple task! Thus,
from a behavioural standpoint, the injunction to "State your assumptions!" i~
yirtually meaningless.
Fortunately, there is an indirect way of getting at assumptions which is both
meaningful and simple to do. Assumptions arc in effect the properties of the
stakeholders which comprise a complex social system. That is, complex social
systems are comprised of multiple actors, vested interest groups, in short.
stakeholders. Stakeholders are called such because they represent those
persons, groups, and institutions which have a "stake" in a social policy.
Every social policy depends upon, or affects, and in turn is affected by certain
stakeholders. The nature of the relationship between policies and stakeholders
depends on the properties of the stakeholders which are posited. Various
methods for identifying different kinds and classes of stakeholders can be
found in Mason and Mitrolr. 4
Step 4, The Epistemic Status of Assumptions
Typically, a group feels more confident about the certainty or truth of some
assumptions than that ofothers. Additionally, some assumptions arc felt to be
more important to the success of a policy than others. Plotting the
assumptions identified relative to one another on two dimensions of perceived
importance and certainty accomplishes three important functions. One, it
gives groups, often for the first time, a concrete, externalized image or ma p of
their internal belief system. Two, it allows for a concrete comparison between
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different belief systems. Three, it allows for a more effective dialectical debate
bet ween belief systems.
The importance of these functions cannot be overstressed. So much of
social debate is unproductive because it is designed to accomplish precisely
this purpose. That is. the conditions are set up, often intentionally, but just as
often unintentionally. for the irresolution of differences. Our point is that the
visualization of differences in the form ofa clear and concrete map is essential
and prior to the resol ution of such differences. Again, every step of the process
of ASA needs careful design and management from a behavioural standpoint.
Step 5. Argumentation Analysis
Recently, Richard Mason and 1+ have married Stephen Toulmin's9
interesting framework for argumentation analyses to Nicholas Rescher's8
provocative notions regarding plausibility. The result is an expanded
framework for capturing the structure and dynamics of complex policy
arguments.
More specifically. assumptions play the role of premises in the body of a
policy argument. The framework thus allows one to locate more precisely
how. why. when, and where assumptions enter into the structure of a policy.
Also. since plausibility analysis was designed to allow one to deal with explicit
logical contradictions in an argument, the expanded framework allows one to
deal \\ith strong (i.e. dialectical) challenges to a policy. The result is a
mechanism for tracking the structure and shifting credibility ofa policy over
timl' Also as the plausibility of the assumptions upon which a policy depends
varies. the variability in the plausibility of the resultant policy can also be
studied or charted.
Since this part of the methodology was the subject of some critical
discussion during the conlCrence, it deserves further clarification. I am not
contending that the expanded framework is Ihe framework for capturing the
structure of com picx policy arguments. This is not the point. The point is that
IOI//(' mechanism for tracking arguments will be implicit in a general
111l'lllOdology of ASA. The reason is that. ala Kant. the analysis of arguments
is an iI /iriori neccssity for the possibility of ASA's existence.
It is likL'\\ise not a fundamental criticism of Toulmin to point out that
dill'crl'nt persons ~lnd or groups will structure a policy argument differently.
This again shows a basic misunderstanding of the differences between well-
structured and ill-structured problems. In the methodology we have been
outlining for ASA. we wish dc/ihc/'((Ic/r to set up the hehal'iouralconditions so
th~lt groups can first of all witness why they view a situation differently and
thcn secondly explorc their diflcrences. /1 is 1/01 (ffalaljiwi' 10 poinl oul Ihal
dil/crCl/1 groll/iS do 1/01 ilgrec iI/ Ihcir lISC of (f 1001 Il'hen Ihis is one of Ihe
/lIIulill//CI/IiII /iur/}()SC,I" of Ihc 1001. i.c. 10 allOlI" difli'rel/('cs 10 emerge and he
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examined in a systematic lray. One of the reasons for setting up different
groups is to allow each group to negotiate for itself the structure of its reality.
This is one of its most important tasks in ASA.
Step 6. Knowledge Synthesis Through Group Synthesis
Ifgroups are initially set up to be as different from one another as possible in
order to do everything in our power to encourage systematic differences - the
nature of important problems is too important to go unchallenged - then new
groups are composed later in an attempt to synthesize important differences.
The point is that synthesis is as much a social psychological process as it is a
logical one. 4 . 7 Hence, once again, we have to do everything we can to set up
the appropriate behavioural conditions that will favour the emergence of a
synthesis, if one is possible. This entails the setting up of new groups to work
around the win-lose, competitive psychology that is the basis of the initial
groupings. Whereas such win-lose competition is appropriate to the earlier
phases of the methodology, it is inappropriate to the later phases. Again. the
actual accomplishment of this is beyond the scope of this discussion 4
On the Aesthetics of ASA
The philosophical mood that has governed this paper thus far has been that
of dialectical pragmatism. That is. the roots of the methodology we have been
describing are grounded in a blending of two distinct traditions of philosophy,
pragmatism and dialectics. 1 The methodology is dialectical in that it stresses
the continual need for sharply contrasting points of view throughout the
entire process of ASA. It is pragmatic in that the sequence of steps in Table I
suggests an operational procedure for actually applying the methodology and
in judging its success. In short, the "truth" status of the methodology
described here is grounded in dialectical pragmatism. Whereas rationalism
and empiricism have been historically appropriate for well-structured prob-
lems,l I have argued that the form of dialectical pragmatism discussed here is
appropriate for ill-structured problems.4. 7
When it comes to assessing the aesthetic mood of ASA, the situation is not
as promising. The dominant aesthetic mood which pervades the entire
methodology is that of "cold reason", or, in Jungian terms, that of thinking. 7
For'instance, consider the first step in the methodology, that of partitioning a
larger group down into a number of small groups. Now there is nothing wrong
or evil per sc in breaking down a large group in order to facilitate discussion,
although the very term "partitioning", when it comes to people, is offensive
for some. What is at issue is the means, and the mood underlying it, by which
the partitioning is accomplished.
In the methodology described, the partitioning is accomplished by cat-
166 l(/ill M ilrotf·
egorizing people in to various personality, job, or functional "types". Thus, a
person is described by virtue of membership in some abstract class, i.e. the
properties the person .111(/1"('.\' in co/l1mon with other members of a class or
group.
It is precisely here where aesthetics comes squarely to the centre. If there is
anything that seems to lie at the centre of one of the most important concepts
of aesthetics, it is uniqueness. Simply stated, no two people are ever alike in all
their characteristics. 2 . 7 Even stronger, all of us resist the notion that two
people should ever be alike even in principle. This means that one of the most
central aspects of an individual's psyche is that of uniqueness, that every
individual has a unique side or aspect of style. It is this unique aspect of style
that defines a very different aesthetic than that of the aesthetic of class
similarity.
To put the matter directly, we know how to partition a group based on
concepts of class similarity, but how do we form small groups of people based
on the notion of each person's uniqueness? Or, how do we preserve each
person's uniq ueness in the process of partitioning? Little wonder that Qne
could bcgin to conclude that splitting a group of people is more difficult than
splitting an atom'
There arc other aspects of the methodology which are equally unaesthetic
from other concepts of aesthetics. Consider as another example the notion of
stakeholders. Again, there is nothing wrong or evil with the concept
stakeholders per .I£'. Complex social systems are certainly composed of many
actors. This much is nothing but a tautology although a potentially important
one to realize.
What is at issue (stake!) is how the stakeholders are displayed pictorially. It
is one thing to label people and institutions with abstract names. It is quite
another to convey by means of colour and more sophisticated representation
the complex of emotions that humans are capable of experiencing about
archetypes.
In this sense, our science is still woefully underdeveloped in its appreciation
and usc of the various modes of conveying human expression. 7 There is no
fundamental reason, save that of prejudice and outmoded custom, for the
continuation of this state of affairs. Are we willing to apply our own newly
emerging methodology to ourselves? Are we willing to challenge our own
ass um ptions')
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Organizational Decision Process
and ORASA Intervention
JEAN MOSCAROLA
INTRODUCTION
Rethinking the process of system analysis. This research programme is
induced by some difficulties, pitfalls and failures with which system analysts or
OR men are faced. It implies an attempt to describe the process in which we
intervene - the decision-making process - as well as the study process.
Most of the very numerous methodological studies familiar to the ORASA
Community are exclusively devoted to the stud\' process, more precisely to the
model building and problem solving techniques. Less attention is paid to the
way these techniques are used in concrete situations, and to allth(' other skills
invo!l'('d in any study process. The decision process also is paid little attention
by ORASA literature. II is generally assumed to fit to the model of normatil'e
decision theory, for which decision-making is the activity of a decision-maker
who chooses out of a set of alternatives the best one with regard to his
objective. Thus in the scientific community the rationale of problem solving
disguises the organizational, social or political processes through
which action is taken. The interaction of the decision process with the stud\,
process is, with few exceptions, 10 hardly taken into account. As far as the
specialized literature is concerned. it is dominated by the belief that problem
solving techniques are the right and only way to answer problems which have
to be solved.
To rethink the process of system analysis we firstly have to be able to
descrihe in a concrete and realistic way the study process. the decision process.
and their interactions. That is a condition to look for a helle,. cOlltrol of the
scientist's intervention.
The research team I have been involved in for 3 years partly contributes to
this programme and is mainly devoted to the study of decision processes, and
ORASA intervention.
I shall firstly present the research project which is an attempt to bring
together observations of concrete decision processes and development of
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intervention methods. This will lead us to focus on the manifold complexities
of decision processes. Finally I shall conclude with some implications
regarding ORASA intervention.
The subject is quite large, and given the shortage of space, I have to be brief.
So the reader is referred to the bibliography at the end of the chapter.
I. A RESEARCH PROGRAM: TO OBSERVE THE CONCRETE DECISION
PROCESS IN ORDER TO MASTER INTERVENTION
Analysts arc concerned with "real world problems", with questions raised
within firms, government, international agencies. Among these, applied
system analysis is mainly directed towards complex actions involving several
organizational clements, which may be more or less well identified - a "mess",
following R. Ackolf. Let us call it the pcrceil'cd \I 'or/d.
We introduce this notion rather than the notion of reality to point out that
the context, the mess, with which the analyst is faced is perceived and
interpreted through a cognitive grid made of knowledge, theories, belief.
Some of them belong to commo/l sense experie/lce involving common
languages and theories learnt through action. Others are called scientific.
They involve more precise concepts and theories and fit the criteria ofscientific
knowledge.
!Jccisioll thcory is certainly the favourite cognitive grid of most scientists. It
is a rigorous. axiomatically developed theory. It implies mathematics, allows
calculations to be made and has close links with the economic theory of
rational behaviour. It benefits from the prestige of hard science. Furthermore it
formally lays the foundations of most problem solving techniques used by OR
mel1 and arplied system analysts. But its own foundations are a set of axioms.
Orgillli::'iltioll thcorr provides us with concerts and theories from the soft
sciences. Psychology, rsychoanalysis, sociology (applied both to individual
and collective human behaviour) allow deep insight and understanding of
the functioning of organizational and decision processes. A wide range of
literat ure in social, administrative, and policy sciences covers this field and
rrovides interesting results based on empirical studies, reflecting as much as
rossihle the rhenomena of the perceived world.
If \\e \\ant to examine the cognitive grid through which system analysts
rercei\e the situations in which they intervene, the following main features
arrear:
Common sense experience, although shared by everyone, is largely ignored
or censored. at least when scientists express themselves in publications on
communications within the scientific community.
Organization theory is badly known by people whose educational training
cmrhasizes mathematics and the hard sciences.
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- Decision theory seems to be their main and most familiar reference by
which to interpret and understand situations in terms of alternatives in
relation to the decision-makers objectives and choice. Recourse to these
concepts is reinforced by lack of adequate knowledge of organizational
theory and by a censor mechanism against common sense experience. Last
but not the least, an understanding of the situation in the light of decision
theory is the best way to justify the use of the common optimizing problem-
solving techniques.
Our main research thesis follows from this analysis: Operational Research
and Applied System Analysis are founded on a much too simple, abstract, and
naive representation of problem situations and decision processes. Some of
the difficulties it faces in particularly complex situations come from this
weakness.
To improve ORASA intervention we have thus to develop a more accurate
representation of action and decision, taking into account learning from
organization theory as well as from common sense experience. Thcrefore we
have to observe concrete decision processes in their social and/or organi-
zational context.
More precisely, the purpose of our research has been to develop a set 01"
concepts, drawing on organizational theory, common sense experience, and
decision theory, which can be used to:
- describe in as a concrete manner as possible the perceived world, and speak
about it,
- conceive formal tools and techniques relevant to practicc, and apply them
in concrete/decision situations and processes.
To achieve the previous research objectives the following programme has
been developed:
l.l. Theory building
In order to build up a set of concepts and propositions suitable I"or
representing decision processes which can lead to the construction 01" decision-
making tools, we began I"rom the following ground base:
·the familiar concepts 01" decision theory and notions used in the ORASA
Community.
- a wide survey 01" its literature on the social political and administrative
sciences (see bibliography)
the lessons from our own experience 01" decision-making and ORASA
interventions.
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A quite important theoretical contribution has been thus developed by
members of the team (E. Jacquet Lagreze, G. Hirsch, J. Moscarola, B. Roy)
and by other French researchers (E. Heurgon, J. Lessourne, J. Lemoigne, B.
Walliser, J. C Moisdon and others).
1.2. Testing the empirical relevance of theories
Do the concepts and propositions used to represent decision processes have
any empirical content. do they fit concrete phenomena? As an attempt to
answer this question the following tasks have been carried out:
LiI('/'([lul'C SUITCY of empirical studies devoted to decision processes. 30 The
English language literature is the most important and the best known, but
the German one has also provided very many interesting things46..\1
C([SC Slw/ics. 2M . 17. 32. 12
The purpose of these clinical studies was to test the usefulness of concepts
and theories which describe and explain a decision process, and thus to
discover whether theoretical assumptions are compatible with actual be-
haviour.
Clinical observation of past ORASA interventions (E. Jacquet Lagreze, I"
J. Moscarola 2Y and J. Siskos33 ). These more original case studies are
t
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particularly intended to test and analyse concepts regarding the linking of
decision and analytical processes, and the usefulness, effectiveness or
success of ORASA interventions. Therefore researchers look at a decision
process, for which a procedure or a model has been implemented by other
members of the team, a year or more previously. These investigations are
made under stringent conditions so as to guarantee as little bias as possible
in the results.
1.3. Developing tools and techniques suitable for intervention which will provide
better controls and efficiency in the investigational process.
The main theme of the work is thus to improve decision-making models and
procedures for a clearer understanding of the complexity ofdecision processes
and of the needs of their actors, rather than by increasing the technical
complexity of existing problem solving techniques.
The development of multicriteria and multi-actor decision-making pro-
cedures37 . 38.16 is an example of the impact of such an empirical research on
normative techniques. This point will be developed in part 4 of this chapter,
but let us first present the main lessons learnt from our attempt to construct an
empirical theory of decision processes.
2. WHAT IS DECISION? THE MANIFOLD COMPLEXITIES OF
CONCRETE DECISION PROCESS
Literature surveys, case studies, and clinical observations of past in-
tervention have led us to a general conclusion: Decision theory. which is a
normative theory does not allow us to describe what occurs when decisions are
taken in organizations. Therefore we need what can be called following the
Munchen school,45. 46 an empirical theory of decision process: a descriptive
theory. It introduces us to the description of the concrete behaviour and
process with which intervention is faced. We are going to focus on their
complexity and their dynamic within the organization context. This will lead
us to some interrogations regarding the reality of what is called decision.
2.4. The gap between normative theory and descriptive theory
The following propositions sum up the main results of our research:
Most concepts ofdecision theory which have led to formalized procedures or
models used in common ORASA have no empirical content, i.e. they are not
relevant to a realistic description of decision processes.
The most useful concepts for describing concrete phenomena proceed from
social sciences or common sense experience, and can hardly - if at all - be
formalized using usual mathematical language or modelling techniques.
---- ------
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For example the concepts of objective, or optimizing criteria are some of the
main elements out of which decision models are built, but these concepts
appear as irrelevant to a description of the operation of many decision
processes, or to the behaviour of decision-makers. On the contrary, the
concepts of il/tlu('//c£, or sotisficil/g are much more useful in proving an
accurate description, even though they cannot be formalized with usual
techniques.
These striking results must not be interpreted as an argument for rejecting
decision theory. In fact decision theory has never been developed as a
descriptive theory. It represents the norm of individual rational behaviour,
according to a set of axioms. This is sometimes forgotten or overlooked by
analysts. Our general conclusions thus emphasize the gap existing between the
tlicorcticull/oml olld r('(ll-lijl' situotiol/s. No wonder that the former differs
from the latter. We shall not be able to interpret and perceive concrete
situations through the cognitive grid derived from the norm.
On the contrary. in order to move with efficiency towards more rational
decisions and a better control of operations. we need to get as realistic as
possible a picture as we can of the true decision-making environment. That
should be thc contribution of an empirical theory of decision process.
Let us now introduce more precisely our main findings.
2.2. Disc()\erin~ complexity again
The classical picture of decision-making (the problem-solving activity of a
free and well-informed decision-maker who chooses from a set of alternatives.
the one that is best with regard to his objective) does not reflect the complexity
that is n:vealed by empirical studies. This complexity is manifold. There are
many factors which differentiate each particular decision process but also the
classical assumptions made on the decision-maker, the objectives and
information have to be revised in the light of empirical studies.
• U) I'lIl'ic'/1' olluC!or.1
The generality of those concepts or classical decision-making must be
replaced to take account of the variety of quite separate elements in the
decision process. incl uding the following:
f)cgl'cc oj.ltrullllr£'. The action to be taken. as wcll as the activities of
problem solving, may be more or less clearly defined and complex. The
concepts of action and problem-solving activity arc spread over the
continuum from well-structured processes to ill-structured processes.
ncxl'cc njl/(/I/dol'diziltinl/. Some decision processes occur very often and
follow familiar patterns, others arc novel and arc supported by no previous
ex peflence.
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- Level. Individual and collective decision processes are distinguishable.
Among collective ones some are at an organizational or department level,
others are interorganizational processes involving several organizations
without any particular unique institution being in charge of the overall
process.
- Importance. Strategic and tactical decision process are distinguishable
regarding the consequences and the degree of reversibility in the action to be
taken.
- Structure, standardization and level are neither independent nor objective
characteristics of a decision-making process. The level largely depends on
the analyst's choice: for example an investment process can be studied on
the individual level of the financial director as well as on the collective level
of the firm.
The degree of structuring and standardization may depend on the level chosen
for analysis. For example a disinvestment decision to be taken at the level of a
particular firm is a new and rather ill-structured decision, but may be regarded
as a routine and more structured decision from the point of view of a holding
company.
(b) l1lulliple aclors
Even at the level of an individual, empirical studies show that the decision-
maker is submitted to many influences from other people intervening in
his/her own decision. Thus, empirical studies have led to a major concept
substitution, the decision-maker disappears within the concert of actors.
There are many ways in which different actors may intervene directly: for
example, the institutional decision-maker has the official power to ratify a
decision, the initiators and promotors46 are able to initiate and progress the
process, the opponents, the mediator, the adviser the analyst . .. 15 Others do
not actively intervene, but have an influence, whether the directly intervening
actors take into account their preferences for fear they become active, as
opponents for example, or may even tacitly appeal for their opinion or
support. General De Gaulle is a good example of such a ghost actor
dominating political decision in France.
The actors analysis enables us also to destroy one of the most pregnant
myths in ORASA literature: the singular "decision-maker" and "scientist".
Not only does the decision-maker give place to multiple actors: the client who
pays for the study, the institutional decision-maker, the promotor.I·, the affected
persons (those who are going to be affected by the decision), but the concept of
"scientist" or "consultant" very often also encompasses a chain 01" several
actors. It puts into context the idea of the ORASA scientist dealing with
models and problem-solving techniques and the client actors only interested
in the results of the study. We must think of intermediary advisers,
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involved to differing degrees with the study process proper, but whose activity
is interpreting, sorting. transmitting information produced by the ORASA
specialist. This is particularly true for very large studies involving complex
government actions without clearly defined institutional decision-makers,
where politicians, public opinion, people in various positions of authority are
the most influential actors, and the ordinary citizen is an affected person. In
that kind of process the "single" decision-maker is obviously a myth and the
direct users or interlocutors are other advisers or scientists, ifnot ghost actors!
Ie) Ohjccr iI'£"
The assumptions made by decision theory regarding the objective concept
do not stand up to empirical examination. This has been particularly well
demonstrated by a German study of the initial decision of a firm to buy a
computer.9. .11
Ohjectives are not given and cannot always he empirically discovered. Quite
often actors express official objectives, or give publicity to them, only at the
end of the decision process - or at least after a first selection of alternatives.
It does not really mean that they did not previously have objectives. For
example, there may be reasons for keeping them secret. But the real
objectives may also be unconscious. The situation may even be exacerbated
by the scientist who may project his own objectives. Statl'd objectives may
even be deliberately misleading,
This variety of actual behaviour is obviously an important barrier when
ORASA is supposed to be based on a modelling of objectives.
Ohjectil'l's lire multipll' and altl'matil'es hal'e to be evaluated throughout
s(,\,l'ral dimensio/l.I'. The postulated aggregation of objectives or criteria
along a utility function does not appear to fit concrete behaviour. On the
contrary, objectives are examined sequentially according to procedures
rather than to a balanced analysis, The picture of an overall rationality at a
level at which inconsistencies may be removed, gives room to partial
rationalities bounded to some objectives or actors interests. The over-
lapping between partial rationalities and groups ofactors turns inconsistent
objectives into a conflict between actors. The problem of rational choice
between multiple objectives is then changed into conflict solving and
negotiation proced ures.
Concretl' dl'cisioll processes al'l' moved hr an examination o( the first
,lati,lli/l'forr alter/wtil'e rathl'r than hy the ideali::ed concept o(optimi::ation.
Specification and stepwise improvement (or incrementalism) are the more
usual approaches to be found in empirical studies.
Spl'cification consists of the study of an action satisfying some chosen
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characteristics or aspiration levels. Alternatives are sequentially taken into
consideration, but not compared to each other. There is no choice proper,
alternatives are looked for so long as one fits the specifications.
Progressive improvement21 consists in a partial comparison of those
alternatives which only differ on some point - a proximity comparison.
The properties of such a problematique, compared to the optimization one,
is to put the emphasis on a search for, and evaluation of, particular
alternatives, rather than on their ordering and selection. This appears as one
of the important lessons from empirical studies which greatly reduces the
important lessons attributed to objectives.
(d) Incomplete Iu::::y und parudoxicul information
Information seldom exists on the surface, it has to be sought - this is the first
experience of any ORASA analyst. But furthermore, although important
theoretical developments have taken place in the literature concerning
decision-making under uncertainty, some striking properties of information
and behaviour about information have been revealed through empirical
studies. Although information is always lacking in some degree, the need for
information is more common than the disposal of excess data. In most
decision-processes, certainly the ill-structured ones, both conditions lack of
information and information pollution - may apply; at the same time actors
may look for information and be blinded by data.
Qualitative. fuzzy, ambiguous. imprecise information plays a very impor-
tant role in the improvement of complex decision-making. 25 inconsistent
objectives and conflicting actors. Despite this, actors and organizations
demand hard and detailed figures, and look for certitudes. The whole decision
process may be side-tracked by the controversy about some unique and quasi-
magic figure. 2 7
This very brief survey of the results from empirical studies shows that in
spite of the too poor image given by classical conceptions on decision-making.
we have to deal with the set of concrete actors and their different roles, with the
complexity of their objectives and with the very problematic nature of
information. This is a first step towards an empirical theory of decision
process. It has to be extended by a deeper examination of the dynamics of the
process within its organization context.
2.3. The dynamics of the decision processes within the organizational context
(a) Tillie (/.1' a production fUellir
If we forget the picture which relates the decision to an event taken out of
time, the very moment of choice. we find that decision-making appears to be a
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genuine productive process involving a lot of activities, resources and
organization. Time is in this process more than a bench mark, it is a productive
factor essential to the development of the decision. This development is not a
progressive on-going and regular maturation, but is made up of cycles with
feedback, trial and error. It does not obey the postulated rational succession
of steps. On the contrary a nesting of phases ("'cycles within cycles") are to be
observed. The progression of the decision process is chaotic, some periods of
low activity are broken by periods of intensive activity (highlights) allowing
sudden progression towards a culmination of the process. 4 . 14.26
(h) Intcraction hetlreell organi::.ationa/context and decision
The evolution of the process cannot be regarded as entirely context
dependent. On the contrary, decision processes generate evolution in the
context and organizational change.
Decision theory assumes that, given a decision-maker, his objectives, and
information about alternatives (i.e. the contextual elements which structure
the problem) the selected alternative follows. Empirical studies show
however that these elements are changing during the course of decision.
lIctors lire c!wngillg, some appear, others disappear. The system of relations
and influences between them is also liable to change for example in case of
negotiation. Thus the decision process contributes to the structuring of
human relations within an organization.
ohjcctircs arc not ohjec1i!·e. They are not stated at the outset but are
discovered and modified throughout the process. For example, the
examination of a new alternative can unveil new objectives. The decision
process is thus an important element in organizational goal setting.
in/orlllatio/l is also produ('edthroughout the decision process. It is produced
and processed. Actors do not only need information in order to make
decisions, they also have to decide what information they need, which
information has to be taken into account, which information is to be
communicated, to be calculated, etc. 19 The decision process helps
determine organizational information systems.
Thus. being regarded as a production process, decision-making appears as
being itself the convergence of a lot of decisions taken by the actors (among
them. all the decisions taken by the analyst relating to the conduct of the
investigation). Decisions are taken about the decision. Thus the decision
process affects what happens in the immediate environment, not only by the
action it initiates, but also through all the activities, actions and decisions that
have to take place in that environment.
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2.4. What about the reality and effectiveness of decision process?
(a) What is the reality of' the decision process?
The overlapping in organizations and society of decision processes with
different objects at different levels, which accidentally, as well as on purpose,
come into relationship, may give us the image of a garbage can model25 which
seems to have nothing to do with any kind of obvious rationality.
Likewise, the boundaries of the decision process appear as very difficult to
define. In fact, to speak of the start or the end of a decision process is rather
artificial: it is preceded by an initiative process which mayor may not lead to
the examination of the problem set by the initiators.4o On the other hand,
after the decision has been taken a number of events may modify it and thus
lengthen the decision process proper.
Thus a particular decision process is neither clearly standing out against
other on-going decision, nor does it correspond to a well-identified period of
time.
In the face of such confusing observations, the main conclusion is that
decision processes are not "hard facts" belonging to any kind of objective
reality enjoining and allowing only one unambiguous description. On the
contrary a decision process is a model, an image, a narration, a relation of
events built up by actors, and which help them either to structure and guide
their own actions, or to understand their surrounding world. This image is
constructed on purpose - action, or analysis - and is an attempt to sketch
some order out of the mess of organizational or social life. To this attempt
some fundamental rationale, assumptions, skeleton, or paradigm is required.
That is the very use and utility of theories. Thus empirical theory of decision
process opens out to more realistic and pragmatic narrations or images of the
decision process. It also introduces some new points of view.
(h) What is the nccessity and utility of' a decision process?
This question has to be interpreted within the framework of the preceding
remarks. Given a particular rationale, skeleton or theory, projected on the
perceived world in order to describe it in terms of a decision process, what are
'the values referred to, and which criterion is used to select the elements and
phenomena which will take into account, evaluate the usefulness, and justify
the existence of decision processes.
Roughly speaking the lessons from the empirical studies lead us to a
paradigm shift:
Normative decision theory focuses on the properties o{ the results: the
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decision action which has to be taken. These properties are evaluated at the
level of organi:ation conceived as an entity (the firm is like the entrepreneur)
and using efficiency criteria (ratio output/input) related to economic means
and rationality.
On the way to an empirical theory of decision process we are led to focus our
description on the events of the process (the programmes followed) and the
behavioural habits (evaluated at the level of particular actors on the basis of
legitimacy criteria). They are an evaluation of the conformity of behaviour
and action with past experience, routine programmes and work patterns,
pressure from social norms, and of their contribution to the safeguarding of
actors and organization identity. 13 It is a move towards concepts largely
influenced by cybernetic models and the social sciences.
This is only a brief overview of recent developments and discussion about
decision and system analysis. 13.6.34. 11 These developments have led to a shift
of paradigm symbolized as follows:
Properties of results---> Events of the process
Organiza tion ---> Actors
Economic efficiency--->Social legitimacy
A change relating to our understanding of decision analysis may be a
necessary condition for new development, and for progress regarding
description as well as intervention.
But as a major conclusion let this remind us that if a decision can be
certainly thought as an attempt towards a rational and progressist mastering
ofaction, it is also and always a social ritual. To forget this aspect of decision is
a recipe for disaster, experienced at least once by most analysts.
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORASA INTERVENTIONS
At the same time that we were looking for an empirical theory of decision
processes, we were engaged in methodological research and practice regarding
ways to improve ORASA intervention.
Thus in addition to an ongoing effort towards new modelling techniques we
have been looking for a methodology of decisional audit or organizational
diagnosis. More recently we made some attempts towards a methodology for
post-evaluation of ORASA intervention. Thus we hope to learn how the
organizational context of decision reacts to intervention mode and tools
3. I. Decisional audit another manner to help decision-making in
organizations
To be able to give an accurate description of the process in which the
scientist has to intervene, it is certainly necessary for him to find the right
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method and tools. But a simple description of the decision process can also be
regarded as a first step to help the actors involved.
Therefore we have developed a methodology that helps the analyst to
describe the situation he is involved in. This method 13 is based upon the
analysis and description of five systems that structure the context of decision:
The systems of actors, of actions, of values, of information, of procedures. In
addition to the concepts useful to such a description, the following principle is
assessed: Several descriptions of the same situation may at the same time be
relevant as far as different actors are concerned.
- Such an attempt to outline a coherent structure which provides a relevant
description of the "mess", provides actors with significant help. Starting
from better intelligence and understanding, founded on the description of
their perception of the situation and of the on-going process, actors are thus
able to improve their own motivation towards a satisfactory conclusion and
to better structure their own actions and strategies. This is particularly
useful when they have a tendency to oversimplify or overrationalize their
perception of the situation.
- With regard to the specific strategy of the scientist. such an approach makes
it possible to reverse the proposition "the methods and models enable the
definition of the problem i.e. models are looking for problems" (which is all
too often a rather good description of current practice). We now say "The
contextual analysis and decisional audit direct the choice of methods and
models". To which audience must the study be devoted? Which arguments,
or rationale have to be developed to perform a persuasive intervention? The
answers to questions of that kind depend on knowledge of the context, and
direct us towards such or such a method, model and style of intervention.
3.2. Developments in decision-making models and techniques
We have been faced in the field of multicriteria methods with the difficulties
raised by objectives and preference assessments. These difficulties experienced
by all analysts appear, within the framework of an empirical theory of the
decision process, as the result of the gap between the norm (action should be
directed by objectives) and actual behaviour (objectives are fuzzy and
discovered when action takes place).
To take this gap into account we have developed two types of novel
modelling techniques and procedures.
(II) AIIII//ernli/il'e llxiom.!il/" pnIe/"ellce modellillg
Given two actIOns a and a' it is generally assumed that with regard to the
decision-maker"s preferences, objectives, or criteria one of the actions is
preferred to the other, and when not, they are indifferent.
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This preference axiom has been one of the basic assumptions made by
scientists. It aHows the construction of powerful algorithms, but also
postulates that the knowledge of what is preferred or indifferent is clear for
everyone, or at least that the actors concerned by the decision are able to
express their own preference. However, empirical studies and our own
practice of multicriteria methods have convinced us of the impossibility in
many situations of assessing whether a is preferred to a' or a' preferred to a or
a is indifferent to a'.
In such situations we have to introduce a new relation which takes into
account the fact that for such and such a reason the analyst cannot assess and
model a preference or an indifference between two actions. This relation is
called the incomparability relation.
We come thus to a new axiom: given two actions, a and a', one and only
one of the following relations may exist:
Classicul uxiom
" is prdcrn:J to u'
a is prd;:rr~J to u
a is inJiIT~r~nt to u' (r~t1~xive)
Alternative axiom
--- ---- ------------
u is preferred to a'
a' is preferred to a
a is inditferent to a'
a is incomparable to a'
B. Roy and his team have developed in France several methods usmg
incomparability relations. They make it possible to:
look for some satisfying actions (ELECTRE I)
rank actions (ELECTRE II and III)
sort out well-known actions (either good or bad) from less known actions
(TRICHON)
(h) Rnl'/"se pre/i're/lce onoll'sis
When objectives arc imperfectly understood it is often much easier to ask
actors about their preferences with regard to some concrete actions that they
know well rather than asking them to tell what in general their criteria are.
They will be a ble to rank a few actions according to their feeling but will not be
able to assess which is the relative importance of each criteria to take into
account.
In order to help them in this task the basic idea of reverse preference
analysis is to compute the relative importance of a set of criteria out of an
ordered list of actions, previously ranked by the actor. This is the reverse way
of usual decision-making techniques that from the criteria compute the
ranking of actions.
Organizational Decision Process 183
Reverse preference analysis
FIG. 2
Using a linear programming code, UTA, 13. JJ. 41 is a method that alIows
us to assess an additive utility function that aggregates in criteria according to
the holistic preference given by the actor. This method can then be used in an
interactive way which involves the analyst and his client in a learning process
of the preference structures inherent in the problem.
(c) These methods share with other recent developments in ORA ')A the
following features that particularlY.fit in Il"ith empirical evidence
They are not problem-solving techniques but only represent an attempt to
assist actors by the way of simulation, partial ordering of alternatives, or
simply trial and error.
The methodologies do not imply strong assumptions regarding objective
preferences or utility, so as to allow a complete modelling of preferences of
actors.
These methods are actors or audience oriented, thus taking into account the
plurality of actors shown by empirical studies, and giving room to some new
concepts. According to this, ORASA has to be concerned with persuasion or
argumentation about alternatives.
3.3. Post evaluation of ORASA intervention
Recently we have been engaged in a new research direction toward a
methodology for the evaluation of ORASA intervention. The idea is to look 6
months or a year after the conclusion of a study on its impact with regard to
the decision process. This evaluation raises theoretical difficulties J2 . JJ but
may really be useful. As far as we have experienced it. it shows that the
interaction between the study process and the decision process is very fuzzy
and ambiguous. Quite often what is regarded as very important by the analyst
is completely overlooked by the decision-makers who on the contrary may
find a great help in activities in which the analyst has been less interested.
The major conclusions that we may draw at the moment are that:
- Within the organizational context, information processing is perhaps
more important than concern about the rationality of choices
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- Short and flexible studies are capable of adapting to the changing nature of
actors' perceptions and they may be more effective than in depth, too
specialized and long studies
These are for us the major challenges for further technique development in
ORASA.
4. COMING BACK NOW TO THINKING ABOUT ORASA IN
ORGANIZATIONS
Rethinking the process of ORASA within an organizational and social
context also implies paying more attention to identifying and legitimizing
phenomena rather than to means and analysis and the search for efficiency.
The scientist is thus faced with a double challenge:
to accept and recognize the limits of pure rational analysis and abstract
scientific calculations, which are neither sufficient nor necessary to lead to
sound action. The intellectual search for the one best way has been a
dream, if not a dangerous mystification. On the contrary - ambiguous
time-wasting, compromising, unconscious mechanisms are the incentives
to action which have as their aspirations that they should be satisfactory,
feasible or not too bad. The earlier ORASA enthusiasm has thus to be
tempered and changed into a self-awareness of our real abilities and
contributions.
to develop other modes of intcrvention and skills if we, nevertheless, still
wish to bring in some more rationality and contribute to help mastering
action. These skills are those of the organizer, the communicator, the
negotiator. They are essential to ensure an impact from the work of the
analyst using hard science,
Thus we return to the origins of OR. At that point in time, its promoters
claimed the necessity for multidisciplinary teams or multidisciplinary train-
ing, They had already experienced the problem of controlling their approach
in the light of practical experience. Thirty-five years later, the empirical theory
of decision process reminds us of those lessons. If we bring together common
sense experience, decision theory and organization theory, we may hope that
we can make real progress in the effectiveness of ORASA intervention.
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Analysis of Systems Support
Some ideas on improving
Systems Analysis
GERARD DE ZEEUW
INTRODUCTION
Systems analysis is relatively young as an identified set of activities: only
some 20 to 30 years of age. These years have brought some successes,
recognition, and some degree ofestablishment. But also two difficult problems
have appeared, concomitant to this development. One is of course that one
has come to expect something from systems analysis. It turns out not to be
easy to satisfy all these expectations. The other type of problem is that one
starts to run into various peculiar difficulties, when one wants to improve the
activity of systems analysis itself, in order to be able to satisfy better such
expectations.
In this chapter I shall be especially concerned with the latter type of
problem, covering something that we may call difficulties of the second order.
or difficulties on a meta-level. What can we do about these difficulties or
problems, how can we "rethink" systems analysis to raise the level of satisfied
and satisfiable expectations? Or. conversely, what are the stumbling blocks to
be overcome? I will try to describe one possibly useful answer to the latter.
There are still many different ways of characterizing systems analysis. in
terms of the activities it covers. But at least one can already do more than just
enumerate those activities! The following may be a reasonable characteristic.
to be entertained in the sequel. Systems analysis stands for two main activities:
constructing combinations of various systems be the latter identifiable
activities. languages, artifacts, people. concrete organizations. advice or
objects - such that new possibilities for improved action (of users. parti-
cipants, clients) are generated; and at the same time trying toil/stit)' that the
combinations are necessary and adequate for the latter purpose (e.g. see
Quade and Miser. 1980). This defining characteristic implies systems analysis
to be an activity to answer at least two types of frequently asked and
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important questions: (a) I want X, but cannot get it; you indicate how to get it
in an acceptable way; (b) I want Y so people can get X' via Y, if they want it. In
both (a) and (b) the "I"' usually is a more or less powerful decision-maker or
actor and the "you" is someone who does systems analysis - and should
construct something like X, X' and Y (systematically and justifiably). The "I"
and "you" may of course overlap.
It will be clear that this characterization still allows for many different
activities to be called systems analysis. Some of these have established
themselves in their own right, like innovation management, technological
problem-solving, action-research, decision-making, urban development. As
suggested however, they have some important common element, allowing
them to be subsumed here under systems analysis - albeit with different
interpretations for X, X' or Y - or for what was called "new possibilities for
improved action". In what follows I will mainly confine myself however to the
systems analysts' activity of "change and improvement in human affairs".
This is the field where my main interest lies (Jungermann and De Zeeuw, 1977;
Groen ef al., 1980). It also seems to be one of the fields where the meta-level
difficulties mentioned earlier turn up most frequently. Indeed here some
subsystems not only can be observed and talked about, but can do such
talking themselves - bcing apparently level-switchers more or less by nature
(De Zeeuw, 1981 a). People in fact are quite different in this respect from non-
talking systems like iron, electricity, etc. Activities not dealing mainly with
such talking or so called I-saying systems (De Zeeuw, 1981 b) will only be dealt
with here by implication.
SIGNALS TO RETHINKING
Would everybody agree that there are meta-difficulties to systems analysis?
Presumably not. Hcnce it seems fair, as a first step, to list at least some of these
difficulties, as I see them. They must be distinguished of course quite clearly
from what may be called the difficulties of the first order. The latter encompass
(direct) questions such as: what to advise as energy-saving policies: what to do
about the world (or local) food situation; how not to further unbalance
government budgets with social security outlays, while not decreasing such
security support: etc. These are difficulties of the first order, for systems
analysis. In answering cach ofthcse, as a systems analyst, one tries to avoid the
so called environmental fallacy (Churchman, 1980), Let us point out some
difllculties of the second order.
A. Policy-makers do not listen (often) enough to what systems analysts
advisc. Feasibility studics go unheeded; alternatives that are preferable
according to systems analysts are rejected and all this much too often, and
not due to any apparent lack of quality on their part.
B. In most cascs thc rclation betwccn X and X' (see above) remains unclear
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- i.e. between what decision-makers or a decision-maker wants, and what
people more generally may want, or need or want to need. Is an improved
airfield an improvement? Is heeding environmentalists an improvement? Does
professionalization in psychotherapy imply improvement?
C. What type of knowledge is acq uired in the process of systems analysis?
Is it something standard? Is it about regularities in a world where the desired
combinations of systems are not yet available? How would these regularities
change when the latter are introduced, and how would that influence what is
desired? Or is it about regularities in or created by the new combinations? Or
even about something else - e.g. the experience of the systems analysts
themselves?
D. Evading the environmental fallacy implies looking for approaches to a
problem, precisely at those places where that problem is not being felt as a
problem. This means that one has to enlarge on what is taken as the (relevant)
context to the problem - but how far? To what scale should one do so? What
should be modelled? How much of the environment should one leave alone, to
solve its own problems, thereby however helping to overcome the difficulties
of the problem one started out with? What environmental fallacy does evading
environmental fallacies introduce?
E. Any advice of a systems analyst presumably may help improve the
quality of life in a society - when it is heeded. But to what extent is this only
possible by not changing that part of society which makes that heeding
possible? How much support for the established structure of society is implied;
and will any revolutionary power be generated? Would the fact that people
other than the decision-maker know about the advice change the advice- and
if so. would such advice thus be dependent in terms of its quality on a
particular goalgroup (usually therefore its benefits confined to the more
powerful group, even when that is not desirable)?
In the above some problems were listed, seen as (important) difficulties
about systems analysis. It seems that some of them at least allow for an easy
interpretation, suggesting approaches to tackle the difficulties. For example,
people not listening to systems analysts seems a direct consequence of the way
the analysts design their work, especially in the case of human(sr systems.
Indeed, if they follow the standard precepts for independent scientific work
they actually design for not being listened to by policy-makers and politicians!
This can be understood as follows. For one thing, the systems analysts
presumably would design their activities not to be direct partners to the
policy-makers; scientifically they would want to act value-free, therefore only
as "servants", not as political partners. But who would want to have servants
then dictate what should be listened to? They should have no say whatsoever,
being only part of the world of decision-makers. Secondly, if systems analysts
actually provide some useful insights about the outside world, they pre-
sumably can do so only by restricting themselves to clearly defined sub-
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systems. Then. either the policy-makcr(s) plus all their opponents are in it.
behaving similarly as defined in the insights- and knowing about that will
cease to be interesting. Or only some are in it; and then the policy-maker
would be wise to behave as if he or she is not in it. Indeed, he or she should
behave as part ora different subsystem - possibly of his or her own making, to
maintain some leverage against other opponents. That also means not
listening. The solution to this difficulty of not listening seems clear, given this
interpretation: do not design your work so as not to be listened to! Be a real
opponent yourself. especially to the rulers (presidents, bureaucracies, parlia-
ments) of this world. Or design advice so as to be acceptable, seen from all
potential users' points of view - to involve them more, to have them all take
advantage of the advice at the same time. and to prevent them from creating
opposing subsystems to themselves.
We will come back to this type of solution. First however we will discuss
somewhat more generally the assumptions, presently seeming to underly most
work in systems analysis (see Churchman, 1980).
SOMETHING ABOUT EXPERIENCE
If one wants to realize X, i.e. something new or necessary, of course one
would like to do it well. For that however, usually one needs to know various
things: one's own and others' resources, quality criteria to be able to judge
whether or not one is still doing well or has to start to choose alternatives, data
to work with, procedures to order one's activities, etc. All these one may
already know. or still have to acquire. It is in the latter case that the activity of
research may be of help - to acquire the data, to build models of (parts of) the
situation in which onc wants to realize some X, or X', to compare alternative
actions on the basis of the model's predictions (and thus on the basis of the
data). or to compare allocations of resources. Preferably all this should be
done at the same time that the design of the new combinations is realized.
This research activity can be structured in various ways. One general way to
do so is via the so called predictive cycle: observation, induction of
regularities. deduction or testable consequences. testing, evaluation in a more
general context of the still acceptable inductions ... to get the desired
knowledge. possibly via repetitions of this cycle. Another way is formulated in
the regulative cycle: problem definition, diagnosis, development and com-
parison or alternative plans for actions. intervention on the basis of one or the
plans. evaluation ... again, with possibly some repetitions.
These eycles are well known. in one form or another (Bemelmans and De
Boer. In I). They are based on the assumption that people will act better, to
get some X. when they acquire knowledge that somehow reflects what
happens in certain parts or reality. That is to say that it is assumed that such
parts ean be distinguished or separated from other parts, and can be
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described, independently from describing such other parts. Thus one should
be able to build a descriptive model of for example an organization, even find
input-output relations, without really taking cognizance of the co-existence of
other such organizations, or of the purposes for which one does the modelling,
or of the possible changes themselves brought about in reality and in the
latter's partitioning, by using the modelling description. This assumption of
separability may be useful, but it ofcourse can also lead to problems. In fact it
even is at the heart of what we earlier called our first meta-difficulty (meta-
problem A), i.e. knowledge being generated so that it seems designed to leave
people free to use it or not. The policy-maker or contractor of the research
specifically is not usually one of the parts to be modelled, and thus no
knowledge will be found about the relation between this policy-maker and the
model. Similarly, it seems improbable that one will be acquiring knowledge
with revolutionary power (meta-problem E), by assuming from the beginning
that the real world can be partitioned so that a change in one part does not
affect changes in other parts (which indeed is just the opposite of revolution).
On the basis of this type ofargument it seems safe to conclude that the meta-
or 2nd order problems of systems analysis may be at least partly due to the
concepts and precepts themselves, used in systems analysis and in its necessary
and accompanying research. These concepts ~pparently sometimes restrict in
a way where such restrictions become impediments instead of useful tools.
To overcome these restrictions (and the engendered meta-problems A to E,
and possibly others) therefore, we apparently need a change in such basic
assumptions. Many possibilities suggest themselves. Most obvious would be
to loosen and extend the concepts used somewhat - i.e. to generalize them.
This is what I will try.
Indeed, the following generalization may do the trick. In order to do or
realize something ( X, X', Y) well or better, o/le needs to use more 01" (people's)
experience. That is: more than systems analysts are wont to do at present.
This suggestion for overcoming the difficulties of the 2nd order by itself is
imprecise. I will make it more precise in what follows. But something should
be indicated now. That is that the usual assumption for inquiry has been
changed in a fundamental way - even though one is dealing with a simple
generalization. For via it we leave out the restriction that we accept as (tested)
knowledge only that which, as part of our experience, relates to well-
delineated and -delineable parts of reality. That implies that we will accept as
knowledge much more than what is usually accepted, e.g. via the predictive
cycle. The claim I want to argue of course is that systems analysts would
actually do better, on the 2nd order level. if and when they would thus base
themselves differently.
As a first step. let me enlarge somewhat on this concept of experience. and
what I mean by it. Each individual can be construed as having an enormous
store of remembered experiences, adding to it all the time. Contrary to what is
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usuaL this store should not be seen only as something inside people's heads; it
is also something external to this. For example: it is necessary, to continue
walking, to experience and to remember where one is. Streets may provide
clues and signals for this. That is, they are actually supports for memory:
where to walk, where to cross. Similarly: in schools. in the structure of society,
in habits, in crafts, in religion - in each one will find support systems for
individual memory. for building up experience. Experiences remembered in
this (external) way also help to organize actions, and to improve upon them
(Schilpp, 1940).
This may all seem obvious. What I want to emphasize is that "knowledge"
is usually seen as only a part of the many different experiences that people
store via sueh external and internal support systems. Looking for it, one
restricts oneself to what is "the same" for everybody - to what is related to
clearly separable and delineable parts in reality, and thus to what does not
allow for individual variation in remembered experiences. This type of
knowledge of course is often useful and necessary - e.g. as it concerns the
course of the moon and planets as "same" experiences, used to support
navigation. But a lot more than such "same" experiences may have the quality
of being useful to act and to improve actions, as external memories or memory
supports.
Consider the case of decision analysis, as an example of what flol restricting
oneself to "same" experiences may do. In decision analysis one is interested in
comparing and evaluating alternative plans for action. For each plan one
needs data: possible consequences, probability estimates and evaluative
statements about whether or not the decision-maker likes the consequences
(Vlck, Stallen, 1980). In the traditional situation these data are collected to
start a process of reduction: to find out what is "shared" and "the same" in the
experiences of some people (e.g. experts, or participants in the decision-
making process). The more "shared" the data are, the better (or "harder", or
more valid) the data are believed to be - and hence the better able to support
the decision-making. The "sharing" is thought possible and necessary due to
something "real" in reality, of which the various experiences of people may be
mere glimpses. In the sharing these glimpses are then supposed to be pieced
together. to form a "decision support system".
But what when there is no such "real" thing in reality. to guide the piecing
together. when nothing more than something accidental is involved? Then the
sharing is no longer a guarantee for quality - even though the experiences of
the various people involved may be still relevant to improve the decision-
making. In this case a sensible decision support system must be built on
different lines than those of "sharing", of "sameness". It may be like the ones
developed by Humphreys, 1980; Pearl el al., 1980. In these systems the
decision-maker him- or herself is asked to state alternatives, preferences and
probabilities and these are then repeatedly checked for consistency and
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completeness ("is this all; would you like to reconsider ..."). Thus the support
system here in principle is empty (although it will record what is happening). It
can help however in selecting parts of the experiences of a particular decision-
maker. What is important is to find the experiences that help the decision-
maker to choose the alternatives that are preferable - not in a general sense,
but in terms of what is relevant to a particular context. Hence, nothing of
"sameness" or of "sharing" is implied. Only if the system is used by someone
else, he or she may use what experiences have been recorded, but there is no
need to consider looking for similarities or "samenesses", in relation to the
previous user. In the case of this type ofdecision support system it is therefore
the process ofcutting and selecting in a particular person's experiences that is
supposed to help the decision-maker's activity - not the piecing together of
general experiences to get at some part of reality that could be separated and
independently described. This alternative decision support system therefore is
indeed based on using all kinds of experience, not only "knowledge" in the
traditional sense.
Such less restricted cutting and selecting in (general) experiences is
meanwhile producing something that practically also may be called know-
ledge. For indeed, one is helped to approach X (or X', if one wants), implying
the use of something like knowledge; knowledge ofa more general type than is
usually accepted as such. It was and is my claim that this generalized concept
of knowledge and the precepts that derive from it will be of help in overcoming
most or all of the 2nd order difficulties of systems analysis. I have now tried to
indicate more precisely what the proposed generalization means; later I will
argue the claim itself somewhat more technically.
ENLARGEMENT. MORE EXAMPLES
One will realize that this generalization does not relate to the cutting into
parts itself, but to what the cutting is relative to, respectively to what the
quality of what results is required to be. For example, in research based on the
predictive cycle most cuttings (of experience) are rejected as not fitting the
general criterion of being the "same", and fitting "reality". One may therefore
call this type ofcutting "cutting relative to reality". In my generalization one is
also cutting relative to experience. But one would reject cuttings only when
their realization would have no influence on the improvement of activities -
when they provide no support to improvement. But cuttings that have this
improvement-property will have the effect of changing experiences, i.e. of
becoming part of the latter while being experienced (as opposed to a situation
where what matters are experiences of what is independent - in reality - from
the user; i.e. "same" experiences). One would therefore like to call this type of
cutting "relative to experience".
Such experience may be the whole existing conglomerate of experiences, as
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it is stored via individual brains, or via streets, schools, rituals; i.e. everything
that may be changing and be partly ephemeral, not only that which may have
some permanency over time, the "real". It should be clear of course, that
cuttings relative to experience and relative to reality may overlap, one being
the generalization of the other. The boundary between the two itself however
is variable (this boundary is also the result of a cutting, of course; it is an
example of cutting relative to experience).
To make these ideas more concrete one may think of the following. Suppose
one wants to climb to the top ofa mountain. To do so well, one might want to
have a support system, in this case a description of the mountain area (map)-
i.e. a valid description of a fixed part of reality (the result of cutting relative to
reality). Plans will be made and evaluated on the basis of this "knowledge".
On the other hand, one also simply might want "to have a go at it" - to go
ahead and to learn as one goes along. The support system now may consist of
a set of rules: to observe certain things, and then to act in a certain way (check
which direction is upward from where you are now: take that direction ... ).
These rules imply a cutting relative to the existing, as one experiences it over
time: where one is, what can be seen. The observations provide the changing
content of the support system.
The latter approach is based on the more general concept of knowledge.
This concept in effect implies the former, exemplified in the idea ofa map. For,
if continuously taking account of the existing leads to building up a map, the
two approaches are similar. This applies even when the situation arises where
there are local maxima in the mountain. The point of course then is that such
differences between the approaches can only be detected if one has a map -
and th us already has selected a fixed part of reality (a mountain with a top, to
which other tops can be defined as local maxima). But the latter cutting itself
depends on experience - and thus actually is a case of cutting relative to
experience.
It should be noted that these two types of approaches can be recognized in
many of the formal systems that nowadays are in use to change or improve
activities. For example, there are various types of statistical support systems
to improve choice, e.g. in research. One of them is the well-known
Neyman Pearson approach for hypothesis testing. This is a formal system,
the primitives of which must be identified anew for eaeh choice situation. One
of these primitives is the concept of"population", requiring identification of a
certain part of reality. The concept of population thus cuts up relative to the
real (its position is analogous to that of the concept of a map, in the paragraph
above summarizing what is known, in the traditional sense). Another type of
approach is the less well-known Bayesian support system for induction. Here
one bases oneself on a rule to review probabilities. i.e. a rule to change the
existing representation of one's experience in terms of beliefs or probabilities.
In this case we deal with a cutting up relative to experience, the cutting being
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the recognition of certain new events or experiences as relevant to the change
in beliefs. The Bayesian system is especially geared to the use of such relevant
experiences, from step to step, i.e. contextually. It does not imply any
traditional "knowledge", like what is represented in the idea of a population,
to which one has to relate. But it does imply the possibility of improving one's
actions by using (some) experiences, as one goes along. A similar example may
be found in the interpretation of probability itself - either frequentistic
(cutting relative to the real) or subjective (cutting relative to experience); see
Phillips, 1973.
In other support systems the two approaches may be recognized too
(traditional measurement versus contextual measurement, etc.). But there are
also mixtures. Consider for example the rituals of any religion, or society.
Clearly, these may serve to cut up experience for individuals, for them to be
morally or conventionally "good" and thus to act better. But the rituals or
behaviour rules themselves usually are claimed to cut up relative to reality (to
be based on the "real and living god", "social reality", etc.). This mixture of
claims presumably arises out of the need to justify the rituals and rules
somehow "externally". We do not need to consider such mixtures here.
Using experience in the sense of the more general approach may be called
the process of "experiential redesign". For indeed, the cutting up involves a
process of redesigning. One tries to find, design and construct new experiences
on the basis of earlier experiences, better suited to support what one is doing.
Methods for such experiential redesign can be exemplified as follows.
Suppose that one wants to improve an organization (be it a small one, or a
large one) - i.e. make it possible for the organization (as such) to do its work
better, and at the same time to justify the value of that (improved) work. Let us
assume this is the type of X', one would like people to help approach.
As a first step one would have to organize the activities of the helper (the
"you", who wants to help the organization) into those of a researcher. The
latter's activities should become the desired support system. As a second step
one can take one of the individuals in the organization, and analyse what he or
she is doing. The analysis may involve listing activities and how they hang
together (as one possibility of a method for redesign). For example, two such
a~tivities may be "therapy" and "administration", partly coupled to each
other. As a third step the researcher may try to find procedures (suggestions,
rules), to change some or most of these couplings between activities. Such a
procedure might be: "get more administrative help", or "let the client do the
administration by having him or her fill out forms", or "get a different
representation of the data necessary for administration". Such procedures
would of course change the relation of "therapy" and "administration", for
those involved (and of course lead to new experiences).
The procedures may be thought up by the chosen individual, or by the
researcher. The source for ideas, concerning possible procedures is free to
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choose. But in all cases the procedures should be checked, in terms of the extra
quality they may provide. The checking involves two parts. First the
individual can be asked to indicate which procedure(s) have the most positive
(and fewest negative) effects on his or her own work and activities, i.e. which
recouple and help reformulate those activities, with most positive con-
sequences in terms of his or her own quality criteria (which can be left
implicit), and least negatively on other people's (presumed) criteria (the latter
criterion is introduced for various reasons: one of them to guarantee that
positive effects will not be endangered via the defensive actions of the
negatively affected). The individual's experience here is used as a control. The
second type of checking is done by selecting a second individual, and asking
him or her. similarly to indicate which of the now available procedures is most
helpful for the redesign of their own activities, and least harmful for those of
others in the organization and possibly outside of it. The second individual
may moreover be a source for new procedures, like the first, to be checked in
the same way (by a third individual, etc.). And so on, with other individuals, a
procedure possibly leading even outside the organization (Van Bercum et al., .
1979).
In practical situations of course the above procedure still requires some
problems to be solved. It is not a recipe. For example, I talk here about
"individuals", but also some more general sub-systems of the organization
may be taken as "individuals" (e.g. "the administration", "the clients"). A
choice must be made. Similarly, an appropriate aggregation level has to be
found for the list ofactivities: one might prefer to have not more than some 15.
Also the number of "individuals" whose experience is used as checks or as
sources is a point for debate. In principle of course there is no limit to this
number. But there are practical limits: time, manpower, administrative
ability. Hence, the constructing and checking should be designed so as to help
the individuals interviewed start their intended improvements promptly -
thereby making it possible for others also to start thinking about change. This
will imply designing an amplification of the improvements in the original
group or organization. In this way the whole structure of the organization
involved, seen as the (formal) link between individuals' activities and those of
their collectives may start to change in the desired direction, triggered by the
researcher (as a support system for using and providing experience, relevant
for the research activity).
The main reason for giving this example is not this plethora of practical
difficulties, of course. It is to point out the following:
(a) The activities of the individuals are based on, and therefore represent,
their experience - in terms of their interactions with the organization
and with other individuals.
(b) The new procedures are designed to change this experience (and its
various memory supports), and to use the effects of such changes as
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further stimuli for change (with other individuals or activities). This is
what systematic "experiential redesign" implies.
(c) The new procedures are meant to help realizing improvements, both in
terms of different individual quality criteria, as well as in terms of the
relation between those criteria. That is, if one individual would try to
improve on his or her own criteria via the procedure(s), then that
activity itself should help others to improve - and vice versa.
(d) The researcher is seen here to be a "change support" (similar to the
system for questioning and answering for decision-makers;
Humphreys, 1980). He or she must initiate (part of) the construction
and checking of changes (that is he or she is providing V's, for X's - to
use an earlier terminology). But in principle that is all done by the
participants in the change process themselves. The checking and
constructing therefore is in vivo. It helps participants to be better able to
overcome difficulties, which are due to the way their experience is
organized in the first place.
As already suggested, there will be other ways of "cutting relative to
experience" to start an "experiential redesign" process - apart from changing
the couplings ofactivities (as above), or from having people express their own
preferences and probabilities (as in the decision support system). After the
examples given these may be easily surmised. One can think for example of
redesigning the stories that people tell about themselves, in their relation to
others (Van den Berge et al., 1980). Or of redesigning what everyone sees of
what others are doing (changing control structures). Or one can also think of
redesigning streets and public places, so as to make different uses ofexperience
possible (architects are not yet very good at this, although they want to and do
sometimes succeed; Zeisel, 1981). Designing new laws to support improved
activities (not restrain them) would similarly be an example of "experiential
redesign", in the jurisdictional domain.
TECHNICAL MATTERS: ROUNDING UP
In the previous paragraphs I took time to develop the idea of "cutting
relative to experience", as a generalization of the more traditional "cutting
relative to reality". In a concrete form this generalization would lead to
looking for "experiential redesign", as a process of inquiry. And I claimed that
this process of experiential redesign is particularly useful in overcoming the
2nd order difficulties of "straight" systems analysis (as formulated. in
problems A to E). Let me now briefly develop why I hold this claim. While
doing so I will raise some related, more technical points. I will follow the
previous order of presentation. That is, point A' is akin to 2nd order problem
A, etc.
A'. In the process of experiential redesign two things (should) happen; one
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is that participants in the process of inquiry are redesigning their own
experiences (and the ~upport systems for those); the other is that at the same
time they should be providing themselves with more options for choice -
choice in terms of new alternative actions (the increased possibility for such
choice is the improvement). Both changes imply that the participants are now
more or less forced to heed the research process of the systems analysts and
their results. For the changes are now more or less their own doing and their
own responsibility. Among the participants must be the policy-maker(s),
and/or the research contractor(s). Thus the result of the study now actually
can be designed so as to be listened to by such policy-makers.
B'. In most practical situations the policy-maker is not the only "problem
owner". There will be many others, like when a policy-maker wants to do
something about drug abuse, or about enlarging an airfield: due to the
activities of the policy-makers (and others) the peddlers may become problem
owners (if they are not already), as may the drug-users, or the en-
vironmentalists, etc. Usually one can not say that there is "a deeper problem"
or dominant problem, covering the problems of all these problem owners.
Thus one will have to solve all such problems at the same time, vicariously.
The 2nd order problem however seems to derive from the assumption that one
can on}y solve such a dominant problem. What is eventually taken as such will
always fall short, when there is no such dominant problem. According to my
proposal this difficulty is overcome by providing some suggestions that may
help any problem owner, even future ones, to solve one's own problem, by
helping one another. The researcher hence is no longer "the" problem solver
(via inquiry) for the dominant problem, formulated by the research contractor
- but is actually one of the many problem owners, only with the (special) task
of finding something to make overcoming everyone's difficulties easier. This
implies that each problem owners' own resources and creativity (and
experience) are taken as context and used - and not neglected (as is usual in
inquiry). And that again implies that the researcher actually looks for
procedures (Y) that leave intact any relation between X and X' (what policy-
makers want and what others want), and even will strengthen such relations,
when positively conjugated. This relation thus may be left implicit, but it
surely is not neglected (see problem B). As a further clarification we may also
refer to a frequently used formulation in the social sciences: if one would
collect "what people need", and would then try to find something to satisfy
those needs, one is not solving all problems "at the same time", as I suggested
is necessary to prevent one problem to become dominant (e.g. ofone powerful
problem owner). In our proposal such an "inventarization of needs" is never
necessary. That is the desired improvement (on the 2nd order level).
C. The results of a process of inquiry (in the sense of my proposal) will
consist of rules and of plans for procedures (as "empty support systems; see
earlier). These will not always be abstract, in the sense that they will be
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implemented only later, after the study is done. Most times the implemen-
tation starts directly, with the participating individuals and during inquiry.
Even then results can be formulated as rules and plans: direct changes in the
way one does things. Thus the results may indeed be of the general form of
plans or suggestions.
Such suggestions by the way sometimes are also arrived at via the other
process: cutting relative to reality. The idea then is to separate some part of
reality and to indicate its possible variations, given variations outside that
part. The latter usually are expressed as A (antecedents), the former as C
(consequents) - and the relation between the variations as statements or
propositions like "If A, then C", or "the more A, the more C", etc. After that,
if one wants a suggestion for improvement one specifies the desired C, and the
resulting suggestion then follows directly: change A to the level, appropriate
to the desired C. The 2nd order difficulties of course stem from the necessary
separation not being possible, nor the inversion of the statement therefore. I
mention this type of thinking again, to try and say something about the
general form of results when "experientially redesigning".
For surely this form will not be something like "under conditions B, do D",
as might be expected in analogy to "If A, then C" (and is often accepted).
For I stressed earlier the context dependency ofadvices - and "conditions" of
course serve more as a fossilized context, than as a context. What may be
expected in terms of the form of advices seems more like "If you want to be
able to do more than you do now, do E"; where "more" is defined in terms of
participants' own quality criteria. In particular cases this form may become
somewhat paradoxical or contradictory: "If you want to do F, do not do F'
(or even to " ... , do the reverse of F"). This latter type of advice may apply
when one temporarily should desist from doing F, as when continuation of
doing F itself would obstruct doing F. A simple example can be found in an
advice to improve on present running ("'take a rest, in order to run better
later"). Another example would be to go in the reverse direction of where one
wants to go - in order to be better able to jump across (e.g.) a crevice. These
changes indeed imply having knowledge - but of the more general form, as
indicated.
The next point to be considered is the concept of "generalization", as the
quality criterion for (good) knowledge. In the more standard interpretation
"generalization" is used to indicate that one wants to find the outmost
boundaries of that part of reality where a certain description may apply. Thus
one will try to insure to be able to change A's (in sentences like "If A, then C"),
in a range of situations as wide as possible. But when we try to "cut relative to
experience" the concept of generalization must mean something else: to find
procedures for experiential redesign, such that even distant participants will
experience its power of improvement. By "distant participants" I mean for
example people not yet born, or not as yet a client of an organization, or not
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yet a user of certain services. This seems to be a difficult quality criterion. Can
one actually find suggestions for improvement, generated in this sense? The
answer is yes: we already have many of such plans or procedures. One is for
example embodied in the concept of plane geometry, one in that ofthe formal
theory of decision-making, one in that of statistical inference - each of which
"theories" may serve as improvement supports, even for distant participants
(as far as we know up till now). Another such procedure is embodied in the use
of a bicycle: to take it and use it implies a suggestion for experiential redesign
in terms of muscle movements. This redesign will work for all kinds of distant
participants.
These (generalized) procedures or suggestions indeed will help overcome
the 2nd order difficulty considered here: of not controlling what is taken to be
the partitioning of reality, nor of the precise type of quality increase that
follows. In the approach suggested here this is made into an asset: procedures
should have different supporting effects for different participants.
D'. When one assumes that problems must and can be solved directly, it
easily follows that one should do so wherever they occur. For if not, solving a
problem may also have all kinds of effects elsewhere, even unpleasant ones (as
follows from the fact that one can also solve somewhere else). But it was
argued earlier that such direct solutions will in principle not be possible (due to
the restricted usefulness of cutting relative to reality; hence the 2nd order
problem). From that derives the need to look for "entrances", weak spots not
necessarily directly related to the problematic area, where small changes will
have larger effects in the attack on the problems. This need can be satisfied via
the proposed design: finding such weak spots (different from where problems
occur) can be made part of the interaction with the chosen individuals. For
example. looking for possible changes in the couplings of activities implies
that such couplings are seen as the desired weak spots. Similarly, weak spots
also presumably may be found in the "visibility" between activities, or in the
stories that give meaning and form to activities, or in the consistency and
completeness of what one may use as experience relevant for improved
decision-making, etc.
E'. To help gather knowledge in the usual way. so a policy-maker may be
better able to choose (to get X), implies restricting oneself to what that policy-
maker thinks is important. That will have several drawbacks: among them the
ones mentioned under D'. What is necessary therefore is to be able to step out
of the implied problem area to leave the definition of where to look for a
suitable "entrance" to the participants. This then will introduce the possibility
of some increased revolutionary power. in the sense of changes with widely
distributed positive etTects. Examples of changes with high revolutionary
power are the introduction of the Arabic notation for numbers, the
introduction of bicycles. etc.
One can distinguish several procedures or plans to attach at least some
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revolutionary power to the results of inquiry (without fully guaranteeing its
acquisition, of course):
(a) one tries to identify an area or system (as "entrance", see 0'), aspects of
which one can describe as a formal system (i.e. a set of axioms and
primitives). Such formal systems are not always easy to recognize. In
fact however, the usual procedure for research and inquiry is geared to
finding such formal systems as descriptions of the identified area. This
procedure therefore will help, even though of course it is usually not
meant for what here we want to use it for. The idea then is first to find
such a formal system, and second to find one that is equivalent to the
one found in the first place, but having some other properties too. One
then replaces the earlier system by the latter - as was done with the
Roman and Arabic notations mentioned above (equivalent, but
implying different computational structures). This type of replacement
may introduce results with strong revolutionary power. One should
note that we deal here only with partial replacements, replacements of
(temporarily) identified subparts of the experience of participants (via
cutting relative to experience).
(b) one first tries to find what it is that maintains some area or part of
reality, as ((it were a fixed subpart of reality (and not of experience); we
call such maintained partitioning organizational closure (Pask, 1978).
For example, what is it that holds together an organization (and
prevents deviations), or what is it that maintains a committee, or that
maintains a policy-maker in his or her position, etc., as an identifiable
entity? To change and improve in the case of organizational closure one
may try to mobilize such maintenance procedures - to use their power.
One may for example introduce conflicting demands or set up random
sequences of threats to a self-maintained identity. These will tax the
maintenance procedures - and may lead to a change in them. Thus one
helps such an identity to grow (to be more robust), which again may
help users of what one tries to change, to be better able to do better what
they are doing, or to choose what they want to do.
There are others, of such general procedures, to increase revolutionary
power. The ones formulated above however should satisfy as examples.
The points A' to E' summarize my arguments for the claim as to why
"cutting relative to experience" may be preferable to "cutting relative to
reality", when it comes to solving so called real world problems in a social
setting, with a minimum of 2nd order difficulties. They also are meant to
elucidate some technical points - like those involved in questions about the
form of knowledge, about revolutionary power, about generalization and the
like.
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MULTIPLE POINTS OF VIEW
It is one of the miraculous phenomena of human life that people indeed are
able to design activities that are much better (in a variety of senses) than
anything they have done before. Research as it was developed for example in
the European Renaissance did indeed give power and truth to anyone with
eyes to see and wisdom to interpret. Systems analysis later on did point out
some of the bad parts that arose out of the very strength of such research. Ah,
and there we have one of the strange phenomena of human life: whatever one
designs, in the end its very qualities may turn it into a hindrance, into an
obstacle, because valued. Research even as it was redesigned again and again
shares this same hlte. I have tried to show this via the enumeration of some
second order ditllculties, when trying to do research to help improve on social
functioning.
If this phenomenon the thing itself becoming a danger to the thing - is so
widespread, what can we do about it? And indeed, is there something to do
about it'? Can it be changed or prevented?
Presumably not; there are some good reasons for that negative answer. But
it seems we do have the ability to ameliorate its conseq uences, at least as far as
research to support social change is concerned. In the paper I restricted myself
to the problem ofamelioration and presented a design for such research, and a
jus tifica tion.
The justification hinges mainly on the said phenomenon itself. Nothing
should be accepted as given, but all as produced by the past in some kind of
jumping out act. That jumping out is the basis of our ability to see drawbacks
to what exists and is valued, to see that strange phenomenon; and it can
therefore also be the basis for improvement - the old becoming part of the new
and supporting it, not being replaced by it. Thus this jumping out -
formulated as particular type of cutting relative to experience - was built into
the research method presented. This is why the method can be argued to have
less of those curious negative side-effects most good designs introduce. The
weakness is used to become more like a strength.
Another way of formulating this would be to say that such second order
ditllculties stem for the most part from assuming the existence of a preferred
point of view: from it the world presumably can be seen as it is (objectively,
validly, etc.). When such a point of view however turns out to be produced
rather than appears to exist. other points of view become equally valid. Thus,
as I indicated in the beginning of the paper, the researcher actually designs
himself not to be listened to when he or she assumes such a preferred point of
view. It is only when he or she becomes a real opponent that something may
happen but that implies taking the politicians' point of view seriously, and
indeed admitting multiple and parallel points of view for all the actors
concerned. The researcher thus becomes only one of the observers, and has to
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behave accordingly to have any effect. The researcher cannot take on the role
of a super-observer.
[ have tried to show that this very multiplicity of points of view does not
mean the end of serious science. But it does mean the implementation of
research methods that base themselves on this multiplicity - on the fact that
there is no clear reason for assuming some "final" goal for humanity, some
"underlying" and objective world similar for all individuals, some single
"best" utopia where we will all know it all. The proposed research method
implies that the world is produced by itselfin all its variety, and that therefore
some preferred productions (preferred from many different points of view)
can be helped to come into existence, via the production process itself.
The method considered has been used extensively by me, and thus has
grown in scope and precision. [ have tried to sketch some of this. But my main
aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that there are some inherent defects to all
that is good, and that even so these still may be overcome. To find (other) ways
to do so seems to me to be the main challenge for systems analysts, especially
when interested in practical change, supported by research more of a
challenge than designing something that is (only) good.
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Rethinking the Process of
Systems Analysis and
Operational Research: From
Practice to Precept - and Back
Again
ROLFE TOMLINSON
INTRODUCTION
There is an old saying "You should practise what you preach" which is
sometimes stated in more formal language "From precept to practice". It
implies, not only that what we do should be determined by our philosophy and
our beliefs, but also that we should develop and state those beliefs with a view
to their application.
In the early days of systems analysis and operational research this approach
was very much adopted. A set of precepts were taken over from the natural
sciences and adapted as guidelines for the practice of ORASA (Operational
Research and Applied Systems Analysis). Some deviation from the ideal was
necessary. of course, but this was at first seen as a departure from perfection.
inevitable in an imperfect world but not giving cause to question the basic
thesis. Only gradually did it appear that the discrepancies were so great that
doubts needed to be cast on the precepts, not on the practice. There had been
many saying this from the 1960s on, but it was a long time before it was
realized that these statements were morc than the sour grapes of curmud-
geonly old men. It was in the light of this that in reviewing the state of OR and
Systems Analysis for the Royal Society in 1977, I took as my title "From
Practice to Precept". I The time had come, I suggested, to take a look at
successful practice having removed the scales over our eyes imposed by
inappropriate precept. We needed to examine what is really happening and
restate appropriate precepts in the light of good practice.
This rethinking process has been going on in most countries which have
seriously attempted to make usc of ORASA as an aid to policy development
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and organizational decision-making. Discussions in line with those held in
the IIASA seminar have recently taken place, e.g. in the Methodology
Working Group of the European Association of OR Societies. Although the
experiences and approaches used vary greatly, there is extraordinary
agreement with regard to the main conclusions. The reformulation of our
precepts - our beliefs and ideals - is not a matter of simple academic interest. It
has the deeper purpose of improving the general practice of the subject - a
development that is now possible because we have a firmer, more systematic,
philosophical foundation. No longer need we be defensive about apparent
departures from precept. At last. we should be able to train newcomers to the
subject as it is, and properly advise them as to the means of achieving
effectiveness. The circle is complete - from practice to precept, and back again!
This final chapter. then. examines the practical implications of what was
said in the seminar, what was learnt by those present, and what can be passed
on to others. There is something here for all the actors involved in ORASA;
not just practitioners, but also for their clients, for those who teach and for
those who do research.
Before we go on to discuss the likcly impact of these ideas on the various
actors concerned. it may be helpful to set out wha: seem to be some of the most
important practical points that came out of the discussion. 2 They are not
prescriptions. The wheel which has now turned once, will turn many times
before we can be prescriptive abo lit the subject. Indeed, its very nature makes
prescription almost impossible. But already we believe that the ideas stated
here can. and do, change practice.
I. The necd to understand the /la/lire of the system that is the subject of
study. In particular the analyst should be aware of the aspirations of,
and the demands placed upon, the human actors in the system, whether
they arc involved directly or indirectly.
2. The need to understand that if the analyst's work is to be of value, he will
be ill/l'l"\,('/1illg in this sytcm, and indeed, become an element within it.
3. The need to explore the "hidden assumptions" which underlie both the
analyst's approach and the systems response.
4. The need to develop an awareness of "process" both in organizational
decision-making and in the analysis, and the importance of the
interaction between the two.
5. The need to understand the ways in which change can take place, and
that in most cases the analyst has to be content with "change for the
better" rather than "change to the best"· ifindeed that latter phrase has
any meaning at all.
Many practitioners may claim that they already take these factors fully into
account some certainly do. Since we havc developed our arguments from
good practice it could hardly be otherwise. We arc saying that if we accept
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these factors as part of the fundamental structure of the subject, rather than
seeing them as departures from the "pure" methods of science, there will
follow certain basic changes in practice, in the attitude and behaviour of our
clients, in our teaching, and in our research. Let us now examine each in turn.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTITIONER
In the traditional image of scientific research, the practitioner is a god-like
creature, remote and separate from the world of things and artefacts that he
observes and experiments with. He can be, indeed must be, totally objective;
the answers he produces are "right" in an absolute sense. Ifhe has to descend
from this god-like position in order to "sell" his product, it may affect his
personal integrity but should not modify the "rightness" of his results. He will
certainly receive little professional praise for such activity, even though it may
be accepted as necessary. In this tradition the ORASA worker would be
logical and dispassionate, developing coherent hypotheses based on verifiable
data of known precision which he has subjected to critical validation. His
work will be openly available for criticism by his peers, who will be as logical
and dispassionate as himself.
The reality as we now see it is very different, and at first sight it may appear
that everyone of the foundation stones of the scientific tradition on which the
ORASA scientist has tried to build his career is broken or despoiled. Indeed, if
the classical scientific paradigm were retained, it would be possible to view the
discussions on which this book is based as an attempted justification offailure.
That would be wrong and totally misleading. On the contrary, the concepts
are based on success - the real failure against which it is directed is a failure of
theory, not practice. There have been failures in practice, of course,3 for the
same reasons that there are failures in all forms of activity. There is nothing in
the nature of the trained ORASA worker that guarantees his or her freedom
from human failings such as incompetence, inexperience, over-confidence,
intolerance and incomprehension. Starting from success, however. we have
identified those elements that successful practitioners have known to be
important, and then fitted them into a general methodological framework
which enables us to identify why certain factors are important. Only from this
basis can we develop our methodology.
Perhaps the key word in this whole question 01 rethinking is "process".4
Instead of visualizing the problem situation as static and unchanging, we must
understand it as dynamic. If the work is related to organizational decision-
making, it is necessary to understand that in any living organization there are
frequent changes in the personnel, developments of opinion. changes in the
environment, changes in policy. Thus the analyst has to be aware of the
organizational process - the actors, the pressures to which they react, the
information they receive and the channels through which it comes, and the
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actual processes by which discussions take place and ideas are codified. In
particular a good deal more attention needs to be paid to the structure of
information, its accessibility and its point of entry into the process of decision.
These factors may seem relatively unimportant when the study is of an
apparently more abstract nature directed towards public policy. But this is not
so: opinion develops over time and a variety of political processes are
inevitably going on. The analyst who works in ignorance of the "process"
underlying public decision-making is in turn in serious danger of being
ignored by that "process" when his report is available.
Equally, attention needs to be paid to the process of investigation. Too
often this is described in sequential terms, involving the successive major steps
of problem definition, data collection and verification, model building and
verification. solution formulation. and implementation. When this simple
description is found to bc unsatisfactory. reality is approximated by
introducing multiple feedback loops - to allow for problem redefinition,
reformulation of models, etc. etc. Although, in theory. this apparently enables
one to reconstruct any actual process of investigation, I can no longer believe
that it is an adequate representation of the ORASA process, (anymore than I
can believe that a sinusoidal oscillation, as the amplitude and wave lengths
reduce to zero, approximates satisfactorily to a straight line). To understand
the ORASA process we need to restructure our thinking. For any study that is
not of a standard format and it could be argued that ORASA workers are
not. by definition. concerned with standard format problems - the approach is
akin to that of the climber traversing new ground through the process of trial
and error. 5 whereas classical science tends to describe his work as if he has a
map on which he can plot an optimum path. The analogy cannot be taken too
far. since the analyst will have additional sightings beyond those he can
acquire from his own experience (some of which will, of course, be wrong). But
the investigation docs necd to be seen as a journey based on the analyst's
understandings and the perceptions that develop as he proceeds. And of
course we must assume that he possesses a compass to check direction.
The question then follows what compass? The IIASA seminar had a
subsidiary title "The Hidden Assumptions of Systems Analysis" which is
extremely relevant to the question. If the assumptions, whether of the analyst
or the decision-maker, remain "hidden ,. the analyst's "compass" is likely to
prove a dangerous and defective instrument. Indeed, the development of an
adeq uate compass is one of the first and major steps that the investigator must
undertake. He cannot do it on his own. away - to maintain the analogy -- from
the mountain. The only way to develop and test the compass is in the field by
interaction between the analyst and those involved in the organizational
process. But interaction at a single point in place or time is not adequate.
Testing has to be continuous for things change with place, within the
organization. and with time. We must thcrefore think of the interaction itself
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as a shared process common to the organizational process and the analytical
process. It is as a result of this interactive process that the manager can acquire
the understanding that makes it possible for effective implementation to take
place, because the organization believes itself to be adopting its own solution.
Incidentally, when we talk in these terms we find the analyst very much
involved in implementation; he cannot reject it as a "managerial re-
sponsibility". But this concept of implementation is very different from the
"salesman" concept which implies that the organizational world and
analytical world are separate, and that the solution is an "analytical" solution
(based on the hidden assumptions ofanalysis) which has to be foisted on to the
organizational world (with its different, and often contrary, assumptions).
However, even though the new approach rejects the reductionist, sequential
approach associated with classical scientific methodology, the elements used
to describe the classical process do have reality. Problems do have to be
formulated, data collected and analysed, models built and verified, and
solutions formulated and implemented. Skills have to be developed in them
all. But that is how they should be considered; as skills (i.e. elements of human
ability) to be drawn upon as required, rather than a formally structured
foundation to the investigational process. Seen in this light, the mathematical
methods of operational research and systems analysis constitute one
important part of the set of tools that have to be mastered in the development
of a skill. Let us then look at these four essential skills and determine how our
understanding and practice of them should be modified by our rethinking.
Let us start with problem formulation. Classical statements of ORASA
imply that the problem must be clearly defined in any study in organizational
language we refer to "terms of reference". We can accept, as we must,D that
there are many ways in which a problem can be formulated - depending on the
analyst and the internal and external environment at the time of study -
without altering this fundamental requirement. Nevertheless, the results
displayed during the seminar force us to modify even this simple requirement.
The first step in formulating a problem is to identify the problem owner. But in
real life situations we often find that there are many problem owners, owning
different, though overlapping, problems - all of which have to be solved to
some degree if the problem of the principal problem owner is to be
satisfactorily dealt with. At first sight this simply appears to be a matter of
optimization under multi-objectives. But the dynamics of the relationships
involved and the conflicting nature of the objectives, as well as their fuzzy
definition, lead us realistically to a more sophisticated appreciation of the
problem situation. From the search for optimization, we move to a search for
feasibility and for improvement. But what is "improvement"'? The danger
here is that in operationalizing "improvement" the analyst is likely to do this
using his own, sometimes hidden, assumptions. In fact, if one looks
realistically at many apparent ORASA successes, e.g. in the field of stock
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control. we find that success has been achieved despite fundamental
disagreements between the analysts' and managers' assumptions. Overall cost
minimization (including spurious measurements of the cost of service) is not
an assumption that is usually part of the management ethos. The work has,
however, brought a rationality, a consistency, a convenience of operation,
together with visible savings in many cases, so that the answer does meet the
overall need for "improvement" which has satisfied many problem owners.
The approach has failed, however, when the manager's other "assumptions"
have been overriding, e.g. when they wanted to implement a process of "stock
l11({/wgC!lWI/(' which was not easily handled with the "minimum cost, stock
COl/fror assumptions of the analyst.
So problem formulation must be thought of in more complex terms than
before. It is therefore attractive to seek formal methods for identifying or
categorizing the problem situation. There have been many attempts to do this
in thc past. In thc military field every young officer in the UK used to be taught
"militaryappreciation" to appraise the situation before he took action.
Many consultant firms have made a successful practice in selling so-called
problem-solving methodologies. In the UK in the 1960s I found myself under
pressure to adopt a technique known as "critical analysis" introduced by
I.e. I. with some success. Most such attempts were summarized very well by
Rudyard Kipling in his poem:
I keep six honest serving men
(They taught me all I knew)
Their name, are What and Why and When
and How and Where and Who.
In my experience, these formal approaches were of great value in "design"
situations, where it is necessary to ensure that a piece of hardware, a computer
system. or an organization, matched its formal specification and the
environmental situation. I found little success in investigational work, where
the most important element is orten in finding a way of breaking away from
the shackles of conventional thought, whether these exist in the mind of the
investigatory or are taken over from the organizational actors. This need to
develop "horizontal" thinking, 7 to jump out ofthe grooves of vertical thought
that one is often set into by experience, is at the heart of ORASA work. Two
approaches to such thinking were deScribed at the seminar. One was a
"dialectic" approach, described by Mitroff - the other was the carefully coded
and documented "soft science" approach of Checkland, which is now the
basis of the teaching in at least two universitic:s in the UK.
In the earliest days of OR in the United Kingdom, the stafremployed were
from many different fields of technical expertise, the only common elements
being that all eonsidered themselves to be "scientists", and that they saw no
anomaly in the fact that their studies bore no obvious relation to their current
field of application. This meant that from the outset the approach to
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individual problems was diverse, and that peer criticism was doubly effective
since the critics did not share the same hidden assumptions as the
investigators. Although this interdisciplinary approach has remained an ideal,
the need for some formal training in ORASA has tended towards a more
uniform mode of thinking and approach. It is now possible to see this as a
danger, which will be increased rather than overcome by agreeing on a
common formal approach to the formulation of problems and the conduct of
investigations. The development of any science depends upon original
thinking, and this is most easily done by drawing into the subject people from
many different educational backgrounds and with varying experience. Peer
criticism should be the prime means of ensuring horizontal thinking. Indeed
the question remains as to how far an isolated ORASA worker, without
benefit of divergent peer criticism, can maintain effectiveness. Nevertheless, if
the peers speak too much with one voice, they can have the reverse effect.
(Many see this as the basic failure of the "professions".)
To return to the main issue, the new thinking forces us to realize that
problem formulation is not only complex and imprecise, but that it depends to
some extent on time and on the information available. It may be possible to
define the problem adequately only at the end of a study. This means that the
investigator needs to exercise particular care in defining his original terms of
reference, and then in making sure that the client's requirements (and his own)
do not alter significantly during, and as a result of, the study. Terms of
reference are not intended to be a safety barrier between the analyst and
reality.
We now come to the question of data. The accepted precepts of the ORASA
worker relating to data collection and analysis have been those of the
statistician. There is a search for quantification, a concern with reliability of
sources, an insistence on measuring uncertainty ~ all these, combined with a
realistic understanding that data will never be perfect, that there is a balance
between cost and effectiveness, and that when the time comes the best advice
must be given on the evidence available.
This, so far as it goes, is wholly admirable - and analysts who spend their
time spinning models in the absence of data deserve the criticism they too
seldom get. BUT, numerical data is only a small part of the data available to
the ORASA worker. It is like the tip of the iceberg; however visible and even
menacing the tip may appear to the layman, it is not the largest or most
dangerous part of it. Similarly, although decisions may appear to be made on
the basis of the visible, often economic, facts ~ acceptance and implementation
will certainly depend on proper account having been taken of the hidden,
qualitative, reality underlying the situation.
Statisticians are, of course, often aware of this hidden mass of data -
particularly when it relates to human experience or belief. Bayesian
statisticians, games theorists, decision analysts and others have worked hard
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to discover means by which such hidden data can be made visible and to
develop a methodology whereby non-quantifiable factors can be inserted into
numerical equations. This remains one of the most potentially exciting, but
also potentially dangerous. areas for mathematical statisticians to extend the
range of tools available to ORASA workers. The danger lies of course in the
presumption that all usable data can be reduced to numerical form - or.
conversely. that analysts can only use numerical data.
To a large extent this thinking joins up with what has been said in the
previous section on problem formulation and objective setting. Just as the
objectives of a study often cannot be set in the traditional multi-objective
programming formulation, because of complexity, fuzziness and changing
relationships. so the appropriate data cannot be confined in this way. We
assume that concepts such as "efficiency" can be adequately described in
numerical terms, but it may not always be possible. Certainly, we do not pay
sutlicient attention to "structure" and "process". Too many studies. and too
much data collection, assume a static situation. Time and relationships create
a dynamic situation that must be fed into the analyst's data bank. Even here,
of course, quantification remains an important tool. but it is never sufficient.
In particular. the interpretation of num bers in a dynamic system needs a deep
understanding of the structure of the system. But it also requires an
understanding of how that structure may change if some of the "hidden
assumptions" alter.
We come now to the question of model building and verification. So many
text books have been written on the subject that it might be thought that there
is no more to say. For all the rethinking that is going on, the building of a
model remains at the heart of the ORASA process, and is perhaps its most
distinctive feature. But whereas. in classical theory. the importance of the
model was the ahility to undertake formal experiments and determine optima,
it is now seen to be much more:
(i) as providing an open statement of belief about structure and
relevant relationships for discussion between interested parties. and
(ii) as an instrument for exploration, to answer "what-in" questions.
Its importance lies much more in the ability to create understanding, and to
suggest relationships. th<ln in m<lking numeric<ll predictions.
The repercussions of such an <lppro<lch are considerable, but they are not
<llways obvious. In my experience, the changing aW<lreness of this was related
to <l move from l<lrge optimiz<ltion models in planning, tow<lrds small
"wh<lt-if" models. But the question is not "big/sm<lll" or "op-
timization/simulation", nor even "hard/soft"! (where a "soft model" is
one that makes use of qualitative relationships as well as quantitative ones).
Increasingly the question is not "Which model?" or "How Large?". but rather
"What should our modelling strategy be?". Some 20 years ago I was
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responsible for what appeared to be a straightforward linear programming
problem at a chemicals plant. We started by working on weekly data, but the
marketing people could not use our results because of short-term, day-to-day,
capacity requirements and the production people said that they could not
efficiently switch their plans as often as this. The work was never implemented
because we could never find a single model that would adequately reconcile
the two sets of requirements. With modern computer facilities, we might have
steamrollered ourselves out of trouble, but in retrospect, we were looking at
the wrong problem. There was no way that a single model could satisfy all the
requirements. So, just as we have had to give up the idea of the single client
with a single objective and a unique problem - just as we have had to give up
the idea that all data is numerical and concerned with the state of the
organization at a point in time - we must also give up the idea of a single
model. We need mixes of models, some simple and some complex; some for
the analyst and some for those in the organization. And the skill we need to
acquire is not simply one of model classification and manipulation, but of
modelling strategy - a very different skill.
Finally, we come to the question of solution formulation and implemen-
tation - a question that brings us to ask questions such as "'What is a
solution?" and "'What do we mean by implementation?". How. in fact, do we
judge the success of a study? Do the organization and the analyst have the
same criteria? Should they? The only satisfactory definition of success must be
very general in form. As a result of the analysis some changes should occur
which is accepted by the "'problem owner" as effective and beneficial.
(Incidentally, this gets over the question of whether a recommendation "'Do
nothing" is change. It does not change action, but it does change attitudes and
understanding.) Thus, a study of production control, in which the manager
rejects a proposed computer support system but develops an improved
understanding of the relative importance ofdifferent factors in the production
process, thus enabling him to make changes leading to higher output. must be
judged a success. Equally, a report on energy policy may have an initial impact
on a government committee, but is unlikely to create a change in policy unless
the study provides a link to action in the form of appropriate information and
models which can enable the officials to translate ideas into practice. Because
of this, it is impossible to separate the question of solution formulation from
that of problem formulation. We have to remember that it is the owner of the
problem that must own the solution, and if there are many problem owners
the question of solution ownership will be equally complex. 1t hardly needs to
be said that a mathematical formulation is not a solution formulation, and the
bridging of the gap needs to be seen as part of the science of ORASA. not as an
unscientific, demeaning addition to it.
At our seminar, the consensus of how this could be done was through
involvement, and we shall be discussing some of the problems that arise from
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this in the next section of this chapter. Before we leave the practitioner,
however, we need to say something about the ethical problems forced on him
by this rethinking. As a substitute for the professional standards of behaviour
followed by doctors, lawyers, etc. etc. the ORASA worker has tended to claim
that he follows the "scientific" ethic - which in practice has meant two main
things, objectivity and verifiability. It is difficult to reconcile these two factors
with the processes described here (indeed, their validity for the scientific world
as a whole is under criticism) but they should not be discarded too lightly.
Both practitioners and their clients will demand something in their place, and
perhaps we would do better to define more closely what we mean rather than
try to invent some new concept.
Objectivity in the strict philosophical sense means a total lack of bias in
undertaking the study and presenting the results. In this strict sense it is
unattainable, for. even if they do not start with "assumptions", analysts
inevitably develop a belief about their ideas and understanding in the course
of the work and they certainly have to employ advocacy in getting those ideas
accepted. The usual answer to this is that the analyst must at least "know
himself' and that he has also to explain his assumptions and uncertainties
when reporting to his client. (I t is not always realized that the client is not at all
interested in what appears to be a process ofself-justification and avoidance of
responsibility.) More seriously, however, it is doubtful whether, in this strict
sense, objectivity has any real meaning when dealing with a complex situation
which has many problem owners. There is, for example, no way of presenting
conflicting value judgements without implying relative values. In practice we
find ourselves in a situation of "relative" objectivity. In my experience in the
OR team in the National Coal Board, the stance taken by members of the
team in a particular study would generally be strongly pro-National Coal
Board (though not necessarily pro- a particular policy), and, less strongly,
pro- the immediate client (in relation to some other level of authority in the
Board). Yet one of the most frequent comments made on our work was
its "objectivity". Relative to the problem owner we were able to take a birds-
eye view of the problem, without being constrained by adherence to local policy
or prejudice or from threats relating to promotion prospects, etc. Neverthe-
less, there were constraints upon us - we would not wish to offend the client
unnecessarily, for fear we were not able to work for him again, nor would we
lightly make a recommendation against declared HQ policy. So the idea of
objectivity remains a desirable ideal a guide for action to ensure that when a
decision-maker acts on "objective" advice, the full consequences of that
action arc known to him, so far as they can be known. Legalistically and
philosophically, therefore, objectivity may mean very little. In practice,
objectivity remains a powerful guiding force, despite the inevitable partiality
that arises in relation to the client's affairs and the advocacy that goes into the
acceptance of a solution. Incidentally, even this qualified objectivity stands in
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contrast with other professional ethics. For example, most ORASA
professionals would deny that the freedom of the legal advocate to suppress
evidence in support of his case is available to the ORASA worker.
The question of verifiability is even more difficult to support in rigorous
terms - it implies:
(i) open data, cross-checked,
(ii) a model in which every element has been verified and tested for
sensitivity,
(iii) a rigorous checking of results against data independently collected.
When much of the data is drawn from people's statements rather than from
checked documents; when many relationships are, at the most, good guesses:
when the only people who can check on validity are the people who have
assisted in developing the model - when all these occur - the rigorous concept
of verifiability is quite inapplicable. But, in some broader sense, the concept of
verifiability remains vital to general acceptability of the ORASA process.
Data must be checked, even if it is based on opinion or personal observation.
The model(s) must be open, and the main areas of sensitivity explored. There
must be validity checking. Clients satisfaction is clearly essential for success,
but client satisfaction may not be enough. The change must be for the better.
In the classical concept, "better" could usually be equated with the
minimization or maximization of a single index - cost, profit, journey time,
etc. No longer. "Good" is a vector of many factors, some only qualitative, but
we must have some means of judging the areas of progress and regress. The
ORASA worker who does not concern himself with verifiability - deliberately
offering himself to criticism both by his clients and his peers, is on a dangerous
and slippery slope.
Because the process we have described started with practice, the statements
set out above may not appear to be different from the best practice in
operation today. Indeed, they are not. But they are very different from much
that is undertaken in the nal17e of ORASA, and it is to be hoped that increasingly
practice will follow the guidelines laid down here. More importantly, the new
focus provided by the rethinking process should encourage the practitioner to
concentrate the attention of researchers to these points where progress needs
most to be made. It could well be argued that the world does not so much need
new ,olutions to old problems, as a new formulation of its problems.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ACTORS
The Client
Little attention has been given in the foregoing discussion to the major
implications of these ideas for the client of an ORASA study, and to the
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changing behavioural patterns that they seem to demand. At first sight the
new ideas might be expected to receive enthusiastic support from those
involved in the decision-making processes, in ensuring that the work will be
fully relevant. but they imply, illle}" alia, very different client-analyst
relationships. It cannot be taken for granted that such change will be
welcomed. In exploring this area systematically, we have to consider:
(i) the compatibility of the proposed method of operation with the
expectations of the (individual) clients involved,
(il) the compatibility of the analytical process with the management or
decision-making process of the organization concerned.
We shall first consider the individuals. Clearly the approaches that have
been discussed involve a very different relationship between the client and
analyst than exists in the "classical" situation. This change in relationship
could well place a burden on the client's shoulders that he is not willing to
bear. In the classical relationship the client would discuss the problem with the
analyst. and give him access to relevant people and data sources. The analyst
would then make a formal proposal setting out terms of reference, statements
of resources req uired (notably money!) and a postulated completion data. The
job would then be done and reported, with recommendations, in due time. In
all this the client's position and relationships within his organization remains
unaltered and unthreatened. He has neither associated himself with the results
of the study, nor given up any of his authority. He may, without loss of face,
accept aiL some, or none of the rccommendations. In the new relationship,
postulated in the "rethought" analytical process, something quite different is
proposed. It is now expected that the client (or some of the clients) will be
involved at the problem-formulation stage, that he will be involved in the
building and verification of models. and that he will take personal
responsibility for the proposed decision. Can we seriously assume that he will
be prepared to accept such a relationship, or indeed that he should be so
prepared.
In the classical situation the analyst is clearly cast in the role of the "expert"
one who cannot be cOll/rudicled. within the very clearly-defined limits of his
expertise. but who can be igllored. largely because his advice as an expert only
carries weight within those clearly-ddined limits. Thus the client can always
c1'lim that factors outside that expertise are over-riding' If he accepts this
"expert" relationship the analyst pl,lces himself with the engineer, the doctor,
the lawyer. the accountant in the role of professional adviser. It is, of course. a
role that has its compensations; e.g. it gives him the right to speak without
responsibility for decision, and he can a void the difficultics of serious problem
formulation. On the client side. many managers and politicians would prefer
that the rehltionship should be of that form. It is both a comfortable and
famili'lr situation for them. Not the least advantage is the freedom to ignore
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advice that proposes action contrary to their wishes. The new situation implies
a commitment from the beginning.
If the problem were to be posed in the form of such simple relationships,
"rethought" ORASA would have no chance of success; the client would
simply not be interested. However, the picture we have just given implies the
grossly oversimpli.fied assumption that decisions are taken by one man (or one
client group) at a point of time, whereas an essential element in our rethinking
has been an appreciation of the fact that we are dealing with processes,
involving many problems involving different problem owners, each with their
own attendant decision-making processes. The unitary client becomes a
complex "client-system".
One of the major difficulties that may arise is the conflict that may occur
between cooperation and commitment. Organizationally this may often be
resolved by a formal scparation of the two functions between, say, manager
and executive. The same may be reflected in the ORASA side. This is
illustrated by the following diagram. developed by Lockett and Poulding,8 in
a continuing study of OR implementation. They postulate three levels of staff
involved, both at the client and the ORASA level. and study the interactions
between them occurring in a sample of OR studies.
C
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FIG. I
Figure I shows the level and the most likely interactions. The research
showed that a very great variety of interaction patterns occurred in practice.
For our present purposes it does indicate how "commitment" can be
delegated. Thus if the executive is the "problem owner", and if he delegate~ to
the manager responsibility for supervision of the project. (/Ild responsibility
for an implementablc (or implemented) solution. he may ensure that the spirit
of the "rethought 0 RASA" proccss is maintained without losing his freedom
of action. Similarly. the existence of an ORASA executive above the project
leader may make it possiblc to bring in the other problem owners without
violating the project leader-manager relationship. Hence. by proper organi-
zational relationships, it witl often be possible to introduce the new
methodology in an acceptable manner to the e1ient executive (problem
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owner). However, it only does this by creating a problem of a different kind at
the level of client manager/project leader.
This whole field requires further study. The implication of the relationship
described above is that the level of responsibility for the final solution becomes
blurred. The ORASA worker becomes, so to speak. a "thinking extension" of
the manager himself. They have to build a dialogue between them in which
each. to some degree, moves away from the traditional client/expert
relationship. It is not a situation for which the manager is likely to have been
trained, nor in which he will have experience. Moreover, he may simply not
wish for such a relationship - seeing it as incompatible with his managerial
responsibilities. How then does one describe the compromise? One thing is
clear - there is no approach which is "ideal" in any absolute sense. The
manager is part of the system. and the analytical process needs to be designed
to match the managerial process.
This brings us to the second of the compatibility req uirements mentioned at
the beginning of this section. The "investigation style" must match the
"managerial style". A study directed towards government policy will be
conducted quite differently in the UK, USA and USSR, because the decision-
making processes arc quite different in the three cas·es. Similarly the style needs
to be different in a strongly-decentralized organization from that where the
central control is absolute. Within the same political system and national
cult ure, there arc extreme differences in the way in which decisions can be
taken and implemented within organizations - differences that depend on
history. technology and, above all, individual behaviour patterns. A critical
element in a successful study is an understanding of what knowledge is
available, what information is used and required - by whom and when - and
the continual appreciation of process that can only be acquired by strong
personal contact. Some decision-making processes are of a very formal style,
giving little apparent opportunity for analytical input except at critical
decision points. by which time most of the "informal" opinion formation may
have been completed. This means that the "informal" process must be
understood and penetrated.
Neither the manager nor the managerial process are likely to be redesigned
for the benefit of the analyst. He must initiate the process of designing a
fruitful method ofinteraetion with his process of investigation. But too often
he received no training relating to this. which passes some of the responsibility
on to the teachers.
Teaching
It is clear that there arc major implications in what has been said above,
concerning the teaching of analysts and also of managers. So far as analysts
arc concerned it implies a greater knowledge of social behaviour in
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organizations and a formal training in methodology, i.e. the science of how to
undertake an ORASA study. Currently it has to be admitted that - under
pressure from students, from other academics and even from the non-
academic world - teachers of ORASA tend to teach what is both readily-
teachable and examinable - this means an emphasis on tools rather than skills,
and even less on general methodology. Part of the reason is that most formal
training is given to people without experience in a field where appreciation of
the truth requires some experience. Another reason is more deeply philosophi-
cal in that there is an inherent difficulty in teaching a subject which is so
strongly related to the structure of individual problems, in a general, non-
problem specific, environment. Indeed, the very attempt to produce a teaching
format is likely to impose a structure on the subject which is not a true
representation of the reality. However we may overcome the difficulties, it is
clear that the currently available philosophical and methodological bases for
teaching are inadequate.
There is no place here for full discussion of the issues involved. These are
better discussed elsewhere9 than would be possible in the short space available
in this paper. There is ample scope for more debate. One thing is clear - most
courses as they now exist are inadeq uate - if the typical product is expected to
be expert in the craft of ORASA. (To be fair, most courses do not claim this.)
Even more inadequate, however, is the teaching in this subject and on
courses for prospective managers. Why, you might ask, should managers be
trained to make use of systems analysis - they don't get specific training in
making use of lawyers, engineers and other professional advisers? Surely it is
the adviser's job to learn to speak to them. It is a legitimate reaction. which
drives the question deeper. The question is not one of the manager
understanding the analyst better - as we have said, "Why should he?"' But the
manager does need to understand the organizational processes within which he
operates and the way that these can improve. Such understanding will
inevitably lead to an awareness of interactions with tl.e analytical processes,
so that decisions can incorporate that analysis so as to create positive changes
and increased efficiency. That this is not done can be seen from the limited
success of very many attempts at organizational change - whether the
proposals for change come from within the organization or from external
consultants. So, part of the problem lies in the fact that management
education as a whole gives too little attention to the systems behaviour of
organizations.
But, beyond this, we have the fact that although organizational problem-
solving remains a vitally important activity of management (we must
remember that the analyst only helps with a small subset of all management
problems), it is given little if any attention on formal courses. It is seen as an
acquired gift. At the moment it is - because it has to be. But the lessons are
hard learnt and, in many cases, ill-learnt - i.e. people misunderstand their
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experience and then transfer their deductions inappropriately. Without a
background of understanding derived from such knowledge, the task of the
ORASA intervener will remain hard, and uncertain. Thus, the ORASA
teachers have a dual task - to restructure their teaching of methodology for
prospective and experienced analysts - and to develop more effective teaching
programmes for managers in general problem solving.
Research
If what we know provides a challenge for practitioners, for managers and
for teachers - our lack of knowledge provides just as great a challenge for
researchers. The unknowns are so many that it is almost presumptuous to
make a personal selection. Individual researchers will, as always, follow a line
that seems to them to be of interest and potentially useful. We shall only make
two main points.
The first of these is that there is a great need to lay emphasis on process, to
unders.tand that any study ofORASA which ignores the dynamics both of the
investigational process and of the managerial process under investigation is
ignoring the substance of what ORASA and decision-making are about.
Much more research of this kind is needed. In making such research studies,
however, it is important to accept that any observation is unrepeatable, and
that even the most meticulous applied research needs to be theory-driven.
Much of the research in this field is either static, or implicitly accepts the
classical reductionist paradigm of hard science. This is partly because much of
the data is collected by relatively inexperienced students brought up in this
paradigm. Yet if experienced staff are employed - a much more costly process,
particularly when considered in opportunity-cost terms - the implicit theories
which they bring to their observations affect the whole course of the
investigation. In order to get valid observation, therefore, peer criticism of the
underlying theories is of vital importance. Even with well-structured theories
it is difficult to reduce the number of primary observations to a manageable
level - which is, of course, no excuse for unstructured data collection. Many
basic issues in research methodology need reexamination.
This leads to a second point of issue, namely the need for collaboration.
Individual researchers cannot hope to tackle the area adequately. They need
to get together and coordinate the approach. The results of the seminar
already indicate that the same principles are appearing in work from many
cultures so by careful design we can collaborate to our mutual advantage.
Conclusion
To have obtained a general consensus of opinion with the very diverse
group of scholars and practitioners who attended the seminar was something
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of a miracle, and gives rise to a hope that we are seeing a substantial move
forward towards the design of a soundly-based ORASA methodology, which
will be of major value to decision-makers at organizational. national and
perhaps even international levels. Then, and then only, will it be possible to
discuss rationally - between the analysts themselves as well as between
analysts and the problem owners - the part that ORASA can be expected to
playas an aid to complex decision-making.
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